In the past decade a substantial literature has emerged analyzing the role of work-family conflict in hampering women’s economic, social, and civil equality. Many of the issues we routinely discuss as work-family balance problems have distinct spatial dimensions. “Place” is by no means the main factor in work-family balance difficulties, but amongst work-family policy makers it is perhaps the least appreciated. This Article examines the role of urban planning and housing design in frustrating the effective balance of work and family responsibilities. Nothing in the literature on work-family balance reform addresses this aspect of the problem. That literature focuses instead on employer mandates and family law reforms. This Article fills the gap by evaluating the effect of place on work-family balance and the role law plays in creating our challenging geography. The Article argues that effective work-family balance requires attention to the spatial dimensions of the work-family conflict.
Stone v. Ritter is the first post-Disney Delaware Supreme Court case articulating the doctrine of good faith. Taking Stone v. Ritter as a point of departure, we propose a way of understanding how good faith fits within the broader context of Delaware fiduciary duty cases. We see potential cases as arrayed along a continuum from traditional care cases to traditional loyalty cases. In between are cases where director or officer objectivity is impaired, but less so than in traditional loyalty cases. The emerging law of good faith helps courts deal with such cases. Particular clusters of cases develop detailed guidance for certain recurring problematic situations—the adoption of takeover defenses, board responses to shareholder derivative suits, the approval of executive compensation, and so on. At the same time, a more general doctrine of good faith is emerging, one that provides an expressive handle on which to ground future holdings and encourage the development of appropriate norms.
Whenever a work of fiction can be reasonably read as stating actual facts about a real person, courts allow juries to decide whether the work actually conveys a defamatory meaning. As a result, current defamation law essentially forces fiction authors to write about unidentifiable people or unbelievable events. This Note examines the jurisprudence surrounding defamation in fiction and, for comparison, defamation by implication. After surveying policy arguments, the Note concludes that current defamation law is inconsistent, inefficient, and burdensome as applied to fiction. Finally, the Note suggests that courts apply a heightened threshold test to defamation in fiction claims, similar to the tests courts sometimes apply to defamation by implication claims or use to assess falsity or actual malice. The adoption of an appropriate heightened threshold test would retain protection for reputations while allowing authors to avoid liability through the use of contextual devices, such as disclaimers, and without altering the content of their work.
In Davis v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified its newly minted approach to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, set out just two years earlier in Crawford v. Washington. While Davis provides some guidance to the lower courts in their attempts to separate “testimonial” from “nontestimonial” statements—the hinge on which confrontation jurisprudence now swings—it falls short of offering a bright-line rule. In fact, Davis may be construed as endorsing not one but three tests for determining whether a statement is testimonial, prompting confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts. This Note attempts to sort through the alternatives in an effort to effect a stable and uniform confrontation jurisprudence.