This Article takes a new approach to resolving the growing tension between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the unconscionability doctrine.  While arbitration provisions are favored under the FAA, they are viewed far more skeptically by courts applying unconscionability to refuse enforcement of one-sided arbitration provisions.  This tension, which has increased dramatically in recent years, represents a major fault line in contract law.  Jurisprudence and commentary on this issue have assumed that courts have the authority to apply the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration provisions.  This Article refutes that assumption, taking the position that Congress, in passing the FAA, removed from the courts the power to use unconscionability to deny enforcement of arbitration provisions.  This argument is based on the language and structure of the FAA, the FAA’s legislative history, commentary contemporaneous with the passage of the FAA, and the nature of unconscionability.  To the extent it is necessary to protect vulnerable parties from one-sided arbitration provisions, judicial application of the unconscionability doctrine cannot be the solution.  This Article suggests that the arbitration system itself may be capable of addressing any such overreaching.

   This Article critically examines Oliver Wendell Holmes’s widely influential but controversial “bad man” theory of law from its inception during a speech Holmes gave for the dedication of a new hall of the Boston University School of Law in 1897, through its development over the next century, to its current influence over legal fields as diverse as contract law, tort law, and modern punitive damages jurisprudence.  This Article argues that Holmes’s theory, despite its extraordinary influence, has been widely misunderstood and can be more profitably understood—by both supporters and critics alike—not as supporting the bad man but the good, by providing an effective counterpart to the traditional positivist theory of law for which Holmes’s bad man theory has so often been associated.  Indeed, Holmes’s theory, which has been portrayed by some as supporting the argument for the strict separation of law and morality, has been attacked by its critics both descriptively (as providing an incomplete picture of the law) and normatively (as providing an immoral or, at best, amoral theory of law) and has been accused of artificially driving a wedge between law on the one hand, and justice or morality on the other.  Far from overlooking this relationship, however, a careful reading of Holmes suggests that he was himself well aware of the intimate relationship between law and morality, and seems to have recognized, somewhat surprisingly, that only by engaging in an analytical separation of these two concepts can they then be normatively reunited in an intellectually consistent and satisfying manner.  In short, Holmes’s theory supports the idea that only by recognizing the differences between the concepts of law and justice, rather than by stressing their similarities, can the two be brought together and integrated into the social fabric upon which law must necessarily rest.

   A noncitizen facing a federal judge for sentencing confronts a demonstrably different future than an otherwise identical citizen.  Deportation, immigration detention, harsher prison conditions, and a longer actual sentence may all await the noncitizen federal inmate.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to whether a district judge can consider those consequences in crafting a sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

   This Note argues that the circuit split results from circuit courts’ varying appellate scrutiny of sentencing decisions after United States v. Booker.  To resolve the split, this Note encourages the U.S. Sentencing Commission to adopt an amendment to the Guidelines, thereby promoting uniformity among sentencing courts.  As an alternative, this Note argues that it is proper for sentencing courts to consider alienage under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

   The United States district courts disagree as to whether the plausibility pleading standard for claims first described by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly also extends to affirmative defenses pled by defendants in federal courts.  The divergent opinions result from conflicting interpretations of the language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, standards of preferred practice, and notions of fairness.

   This Note examines the district courts’ arguments in deciding whether the Twombly standard extends to affirmative defenses.  It identifies the quiddities of the courts’ reasoning through an analysis of their decisions and, based upon this review, argues that the courts should not extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.  This Note shows how this conclusion adheres to the text and intention of the Federal Rules, as well as the holding and public policy considerations of Twombly itself.  Moreover, it acknowledges that simple injustice would befall defendants on account of an extension of the Twombly standard.

   The Supremacy Clause includes treaties in the list of supreme laws which state judges are bound to uphold against conflicting state laws.  However, as the U.S. Supreme Court most recently affirmed in Medellin v. Texas, not all Article II treaties receive this Supremacy Clause effect immediately upon ratification.  Some treaties, known as non-self-executing treaties, are domestically unenforceable by United States courts until passage of federal legislation implementing the treaty.  Based on this distinction between non-self-executing and self-executing treaties, courts have disagreed as to whether an implemented non-self-executing treaty can preempt state law or whether only the implementing legislation can have such Supremacy Clause effect.

   This Note argues that the inclusion of the words “all Treaties” in the language of the Supremacy Clause is grounded in the decision that the federal government would dominate national foreign relations and in the necessity of reigning in conflicting state actions in that area.  Due to this constitutional framework, once a non-self-executing treaty has been properly implemented, in some cases it can and should preempt state law.  In short, implemented non-self-executing treaties should have Supremacy Clause effect where it is necessary to uphold United States foreign policy decisions and to stop states from placing the United States in breach of international obligations that have already been domestically executed.

   In 2005, 54.4 million people in the United States reported some degree of disability.  For many of these people—particularly the 13.5 million Americans who use wheelchairs, canes, crutches, or walkers—the issue of sidewalk accessibility is not merely one of convenience, but of civil rights and public safety.  Faced with public sidewalks that are impassable due to disrepair, physical obstacles, or an absence of curb ramps, many individuals with disabilities are forced to choose between remaining housebound or traveling in the streets—posing a danger to both themselves and drivers.  However, as disability activists push to resolve these shortcomings with an eye toward enhancing accessibility, cities counter by pointing to the significant expense of upgrading thousands of miles of sidewalk. 

   How to remedy the deterioration of public sidewalks has become a topic of debate between disability advocates and cities grappling with severe budget constraints.  Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  This Note examines the circuit split among federal courts as to whether public sidewalks are “services, programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II, thus providing plaintiffs with a private right of action to force cities to ensure that public sidewalks are accessible to the disabled.  This Note argues that the statutory text, legislative history, implementing regulations, and agency interpretation of Title II of the ADA supports the conclusion that “services, programs, or activities” includes public sidewalks.

   This Note examines the conflict between New York State and the Seneca Nation of Indians regarding the taxation of cigarette sales to non-Indians on Indian reservations.  In 1994, the United States Supreme Court found New York’s taxation scheme facially permissible without providing boundaries or guidance for the state’s subsequent enforcement.  Seventeen years after the Court’s decision, no taxes have been collected on these sales.

   The issue involves conflicting spheres of federal, state, and tribal control.  From 1965 to 1994, the Supreme Court balanced these competing interests, creating precedent that has failed to provide a definitive solution to this crisis.  The Note examines the background of these decisions, the history of the treaties between the Seneca tribe and the United States, and the shift in federal Indian policy towards promoting a government-to-government relationship between the United States government and Indian tribes.

   Lastly, this Note proposes a solution modeled on the example of Washington State.  Facing a crisis analogous to that of New York, Washington created a lasting solution to its taxation crisis by forging a relationship of trust between the state, its agencies, and the Indian tribes.  This Note advocates that New York follow the same path and create cigarette tax compacts between New York and the Indian tribes.

   The United States has used economic sanctions targeting the energy sector that is so vital to Iran’s economy with varying degrees of intensity since the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979.  By and large, the sanctions did not have their intended effect.  By 2010, Iran was the foremost state-sponsor of terrorism and was on the brink of acquiring the capability to develop nuclear weapons—a phenomenon that could have cataclysmic repercussions for American interests in the Middle East and beyond.

   In July 2010, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, in an effort to use the most drastic sanctions measures yet to finally change the course of Iran’s behavior.  This Comment begins by tracing the history of United States petroleum-related sanctions against Iran through various inflection points since 1979.  This Comment then discusses the political context, content, and preliminary implementation of the latest round of sanctions against Iran.  Thereafter, this Comment critically analyzes the legal bases, political challenges, and inherent policy difficulties surrounding the new sanctions law.  Finally, this Comment proposes a number of policy recommendations for the President and Congress in light of the changing policy landscape.

   In sum, this Comment concludes that a far-reaching, robustly applied, multilateral sanctions policy remains the last, best hope of peacefully preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.