There are “haves” and “have-nots” in the federal appellate courts, and the “haves” get more attention. For decades, the courts have used a triage regime under which they distribute judicial attention selectively: some appeals receive a lot of judicial attention, and some appeals receive barely any. What this Article reveals is that this triage system produces demonstrably unequal results, depending on the circuit handling the appeal and whether the appellant has counsel or not. Together, these two factors produce significant disparities: in one circuit, for example, an unrepresented appellant receives, on average, a decision less than a tenth the length of a similarly situated, represented appellant in another circuit. Compounding that, in most federal circuits, thousands of decisions issued annually in unrepresented appeals—especially those involving incarcerated persons—are not available on free court websites. That renders some decisions functionally unusable by those facing the greatest barriers to accessing justice in federal court.

This Article both unearths these systemic inequities and calls for greater attention to their consequences. These disparities not only threaten dignitary harm to litigants, but they also risk a disparate impact on the development of the law. The courts—and Congress, if need be—should realign the existing triage regime to prioritize procedural justice values alongside efficiency. At a minimum, this Article argues for transparency reforms to better assess the effect of the federal appellate triage regime on marginalized litigants. More controversially, it also argues that Congress should establish minimum and uniform standards for federal appellate decision-making.

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INTRODUCTION

The “haves” come out ahead in the federal appellate courts. They benefit from a system that, for decades, has distributed judicial time and attention selectively: some appeals—those presenting issues deemed sufficiently important—receive lots of attention, but most appeals—those presenting “easy” or routine issues—receive hardly any. The former usually benefit from oral argument and robust judicial engagement, while the latter may receive a judge’s rubber stamp on an “unpublished” decision that was drafted by the legal staff who read the parties’ briefs. This two-tiered system of judicial triage self-consciously divides the world of federal appellate review into “haves” and “have-nots.” But we’ve all been wrong. The world


2. “Unpublished” decisions are those not designated by the courts for inclusion in the Federal Reporter. The standards that govern publication decisions, the nomenclature the courts use to describe these decisions, and public access to them all vary across the circuits. See Rachel Brown, Jade Ford, Sahrula Kubie, Katrin Marquez, Bennett Ostdiek & Abbe R. Gluck, Is Unpublished Unequal?: An Empirical Examination of the 87% Nonpublication Rate in Federal Appeals, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–25 (2022) (discussing circuit practices, rules, and nomenclature related to publication).

of federal appeals does not just have two tiers. It has three. There is a bottom rung.

In some—if not in most—circuits, there is a first tier of review for counseled appeals involving the most “important” or “interesting” cases; there is a second tier for the system’s “haves” who have lawyers but present routine, boring, or “easy” issues; and there is a third tier for the system’s “have-nots” who are unrepresented. Unrepresented appellants, on average, receive decisions that are half the length of decisions received by their represented counterparts, even when holding oral argument, outcome, and publication status constant. And in some circuits, the disparity is even more dramatic: in one circuit, an unrepresented appellant receives a decision that, on average, is less than a tenth the length of a decision in a similar, counseled appeal. Making matters worse, thousands of decisions issued annually in appeals involving unrepresented appellants are unavailable on free court websites (and, as a result, never make it into usable commercial databases).

Unrepresented litigants already face great barriers in accessing justice. This work demonstrates just how high those hurdles have become in the federal appellate courts. Useful law is harder to find for many unrepresented appellants, and, if it is available, it is more likely to be thinly reasoned. It is also far more likely to be non-precedential or unpublished, a decisional


4. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 8 (2004) (“As law becomes increasingly crucial and complex, access to legal services also becomes increasingly critical.”); id. at 14 (“All too often, parties without lawyers confront procedures of excessive and bewildering complexity, and forms with archaic jargon left over from medieval England.”).

status reserved for decisions that purport, on their face, to make no law because they break no new ground.\textsuperscript{6} But that law remains freely citable as persuasive authority in federal courts,\textsuperscript{7} and the volume of unpublished authority substantially dwarfs the volume of precedential authority courts create.\textsuperscript{8}

These forces combine to threaten systemic underdevelopment of the law in areas where marginalized litigants litigate the most: civil rights claims brought by incarcerated persons, asylum and other immigration matters, and habeas corpus petitions. Moreover, many of these are also areas of the law that depend, quite literally, on decisional law to develop and define the contours of constitutional rights and duties.\textsuperscript{9} By issuing perfunctory decisions in civil rights cases, for example, courts are more likely to stymie efforts to overcome qualified immunity and to thwart the development of constitutional rights in the modern era. Procedural shortcuts thus create legal barriers to obtaining relief.

This Article makes three main contributions to an emerging conversation around access-to-justice issues in the federal appellate courts.\textsuperscript{10} First, it demonstrates that not all unpublished decisions—the most common type of federal appellate decision by far—are created equal. There is a bottom rung of federal appellate justice for unrepresented appellants in most circuits. Using a unique data set containing more than 11,000 hand-coded decisions issued by every federal appellate court during a continuous six-month period,\textsuperscript{11} this Article demonstrates that decisions in unrepresented appeals are, on average, about half the length of decisions in counseled appeals when holding constant the factors of publication status, outcome, and oral argument.

Second, this work proves that not all unpublished decisions are equally accessible, and that this disparity, likewise, affects unrepresented litigants more than represented ones. Thousands of decisions issued by federal

\textsuperscript{6} See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 37 (concluding that “the federal judiciary is disproportionately and systematically not publishing cases brought by certain types of litigants—namely litigants representing themselves and incarcerated individuals”).

\textsuperscript{7} FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.

\textsuperscript{8} See supra note 5 (observing that approximately 87 percent of federal appellate merits decisions are unpublished).

\textsuperscript{9} See Alan M. Trammell, The Constitutionality of Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 977, 989 (2020) (recognizing that “precedents create affirmative legal obligations for state officials, even if those officials were not parties to the precedent-making lawsuits”).

\textsuperscript{10} This Article builds on a recent study on unpublished decisions from Professor Abbe R. Gluck and colleagues. See Gluck et al., supra note 2; see also infra Part II.C.2 (situating this project in the context of other studies).

appellate courts on the merits during the study period are unavailable on the commercial database this study used. That finding builds on my earlier work revealing the existence of “missing” unpublished decisions from free court websites and commercial databases. These decisions instead remain locked away behind the federal docketing system’s paywall, and thus out of easy reach of litigants and the commercial databases who use free court websites to access them. This Article offers the first detailed analysis of what is missing across all circuits. Here, that is more than 5,000 reasoned decisions, and 85 percent of those decisions involve marginalized litigants—including incarcerated persons, criminal defendants, and those without lawful or permanent status in the United States. Not only is there a bottom rung of federal appeals, but it is also harder for the litigants that the courts shunt to that bottom rung to find and use relevant law.

Third, this Article demonstrates that not all federal appellate courts are created equal, either. Decisional practices or habits across the circuits vary widely, risking the uneven development of the law in different regions and imposing differential dignitary harms on marginalized litigants. Disparities over the use of unpublished decisions across the circuits are well known. But this work is the first to demonstrate that it is not just the rates of publication that vary, but the extent of reason-giving itself. Assessing outcomes by decision length, the litigant experience (especially for unrepresented litigants) varies significantly across the circuits—sometimes by as much as a factor of ten.

Although some scholars have celebrated certain forms of disuniformity across the federal appellate courts as valuable “circuit personalities,” this Article identifies more pernicious circuit habits. These entrenched practices are cause for reform, not celebration. Indeed, they demonstrate the failure of the courts to oversee and evaluate the effects of their triage regime on the vulnerable litigants who frequently seek redress in the federal appellate

12. See Merritt E. McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1101, 1103 (2021) (demonstrating that “approximately twenty-seven percent [of merits terminations] are missing from the most popular and powerful commercial legal databases”); see also Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 10 (“[W]e found that court websites and commercial databases contained only limited subsets of all unpublished opinions, limiting the empirical study that could be undertaken. A recent study by McAlister confirms that commercial databases are indeed missing a significant share of federal appellate dispositions.”).

13. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1105 (explaining that because commercial databases depend on free court websites for most of their content, they are unlikely to obtain merits decisions not available there (unless requested by a database user)); id. at 1138–40 (describing in detail how certain “judgments” are locked behind the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s docketing paywall).


15. See generally Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, Circuit Personalities, 108 Va. L. Rev. 1315 (2022) (arguing that circuits have unique personalities that are important counterweights to increased judicial partisanship).
courts. At a minimum, this work calls on Congress to mandate transparency reforms to enable courts, scholars, and the public to better assess the disparities that the triage system produces. More controversially, it also argues for a congressionally mandated reason-giving minimum requirement for all nonfrivolous federal appeals.

This Article has three parts. It begins with a discussion of the current federal appellate triage regime, which, broadly speaking, generates two tiers of federal appellate review: one for argued cases and one for nonargued cases. That discussion focuses largely on the costs and benefits of this regime—for the courts, the litigants, and the public. The next part is the Article’s primary, descriptive contribution: it discusses the results of a study of more than 11,000 appellate terminations on the merits from across the geographic U.S. Courts of Appeals during a six-month period. This work demonstrates that, even when accounting for outcome, publication status, and oral argument, unrepresented litigants receive decisions that are approximately half the length of those received by similarly situated represented litigants. Further, appeals involving incarcerated persons are far more likely to be missing from commercial databases than other categories of civil appeals. The final part considers why these results matter—both as a matter of distributive justice and law development. The federal appellate regime is a system of “haves” and “have-nots,” and that reality harms litigants and the law alike. Ultimately, these disparities, and the risks of dignitary harms and legal underdevelopment that they create, are reasons for reform, such as imposing a uniform reason-giving mandate across the federal appellate courts.

I. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE TRIAGE

The two tiers—or, more neutrally, the two “tracks”—of federal appellate process are well established: in every appellate court, there is a nonargument track and an argument track. Cases resolved using the former

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17. See Pether, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that federal appellate courts provide “second-tier justice” to some); see also McAlister, supra note 3, at 1140 & nn.7–9, 1147–48 (describing “tiers” of federal appellate justice).

18. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis 119 (2013) (discussing development of “two completely separate tracks for justice” in the federal appellate courts over the past half-century). For a more thorough discussion of the history and development of these tracks for federal appellate review, the work of Professors William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds is invaluable.

process commonly result in unpublished decisions20 authored primarily (but not exclusively)21 by staff attorneys hired and overseen by legal staff;22 Judges sign off on these decisions, but the urge to rubber-stamp them may be, in the words of one judge, “great.”23 This second-tier process permits courts to handle a substantial volume of routine matters and other low-value24 or “easy” work by outsourcing its resolution mostly to other, nonjudicial decision makers. Meanwhile, more complex or “important” cases receive first-tier review: they go to oral argument, end more frequently in published decisions, and receive more judicial attention.25 Judges themselves26 innovated what is now described as an appellate “triage” system,27 under which judges “lavish attention” on some appeals and spend only “a few minutes” on others.28 The courts, and scholars, largely defended these procedural innovations—the development of unpublished

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668 (2005) (“To manage their burgeoning caseloads, courts have increasingly resorted to docket-management tools that have resulted in a bifurcation of how cases are considered and resolved by federal appeals courts . . . . There are now two separate and unequal tracks by which cases are considered and resolved in our federal appellate courts.”); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYUL. L. REV. 3, 58 (observing that courts focus on “elite cases” and not “ordinary” ones). But see Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L. REV. 605, 613 (2020) (arguing that there are not only two tracks but “a sprawling, multilevel system of review” that includes not only “lower court and agency decisions . . . but also staff attorney, law clerk, and panel decisions”).

20. See Levy, supra note 19, at 346.

21. These procedures are not uniform, and there are different triage regimes and screening practices within the circuits. For a more detailed discussion across the circuits, see id., and Richard A. Posner, Reforming the Federal Judiciary: My Former Court Needs to Overhaul Its Staff Attorney Program and Begin Televising Its Oral Arguments 49–61 (2017).

22. See McAlister, supra note 3, at 1156–59 (discussing development of staff attorney program and key differences between staff attorneys and law clerks); see also Richman & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 275 (“[T]he judge is now the manager of a staff, whose primary role is to conserve judicial effort by screening cases and participating significantly in the decision making process.”).


25. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 278 (describing traditional, first-tier appellate practice as “the Learned Hand model,” which includes “[o]ral argument,” “a thorough discussion among the judges in a face-to-face conference, one panel member prepar[ing] a draft opinion, circulat[ing] the opinion among the panel, and then revis[ing] the draft in response to their comments”); further, the judge writes the opinion themselves, using a “law clerk as a research tool and sounding board,” and when the panel agrees, “it is published in a reporter accessible to everyone”).

26. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 18, at 115 (describing procedural innovations by federal appellate courts as occurring “unilaterally”).

27. See, e.g., Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 19, at 1673; see also Copus, supra note 19, at 610 (describing “ad hoc triage system” in federal appellate courts).

28. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 18, at ix, xii.
decisions,\textsuperscript{29} the reduction in oral argument,\textsuperscript{30} and the use of staff attorneys\textsuperscript{31}—as needed responses to caseload demands.\textsuperscript{32} Because judicial appointments did not keep pace with rising caseload volume,\textsuperscript{33} the courts were forced to innovate ways to handle rising caseloads while minimizing delay.\textsuperscript{34}

This part considers the attendant advantages and disadvantages that accompany the modern federal appellate triage regime. Undoubtedly, these


\textsuperscript{31} All three are constituent parts of the procedural triage regime the courts developed to tackle their caseload demands. \textit{See} McAlister, supra note 3, at 1147–63 (discussing development of federal appellate triage system and its constituent parts).

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{See} Posner, supra note 23, at 168–69 (“Given the workload of the federal courts of appeals today, the realistic choice is not between limited publication, on the one hand, and, on the other, improving and then publishing all the opinions that are not published today; it is . . . between giving the parties reasons for the decision . . . and not”); Levy, supra note 1, at 443–46 (concluding that appellate case management practices are “loosely consistent with . . . the twin goals of error correction and law development”); Jon O. Newman, \textit{The Second Circuit's Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases—A Case Study of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management}, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 437 (2009) (explaining that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s use of a nonargument track is “fair[, effective[, and efficient[”); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., \textit{In Defense of Unpublished Opinions}, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178–79 (1999) (arguing that unpublished decisions are a “necessary, and not necessarily evil, part of the job”); \textit{see also} Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey O. Cooper, \textit{In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin}, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2025, 2025–26 (1999) (agreeing that unpublished decisions “play an important, even a necessary role in the workings of the courts of appeals” but arguing that such decisions might also permit legal innovation and experimentation in circuit courts).

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{See} McAlister, supra note 3, at 1148–49 (explaining that, while caseload grew by 900 percent between 1960 and 1988, the number of authorized judgeships increased only from 68 to 167, or by 245 percent).

\textsuperscript{34} There was another, obvious response: to ask Congress for more judges, a topic that Richman and Reynolds have discussed at length. \textit{See} Richman & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 277 (explaining that triage “transformation was not inevitable” but rather the result of “[t]he Judicial Establishment . . . steadfastly resist[ing] the one obvious solution: to ask Congress for a radical increase in the number of judges’

reforms reflect some needed evolution in the traditional appellate process. Not every appeal may demand the same level of attention from the courts. But the benefits of these reforms may not outweigh their costs—or, at least, those costs may call for a recalibration of the system itself. We already know, for example, that caseload pressures, triaging, or some combination thereof, have reduced reversal rates across the federal appellate courts. No costs may be weightier than the possibility that error goes undetected, but there are still other, systemic costs that federal appellate triage imposes. This part considers those tradeoffs.

A. The Benefits

Where resources are limited, a “procedural triage” regime operates to ensure the most efficient distribution of resources: more attention where it is needed most—based on whatever values one seeks to maximize—and less attention where it is needed least—again, based on the values one seeks to maximize. In medicine, where triage regimes may be most familiar, doctors sort and allocate treatment to maximize survival. Judges, however, have developed the federal appellate triage regime without being particularly explicit about what values they have sought to maximize. For example, one court has explained: “[Appellate courts certainly have the inherent authority to allocate scarce judicial resources among the petitions and appeals that press for their attention, and such allocations become especially necessary in this era of burgeoning appellate dockets.” But the question of allocation presupposes that institutional design choices have been undertaken to maximize something. The features of the second-tier process, or nonargument track, all redound to time savings for the courts. Writing opinions, for example, is one of the

35. See generally Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011) (demonstrating causal link between caseload demands or judicial burdens and outcomes on appeal). See Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 289 (2006) (identifying a decline in reversal rates from 1945 to 2005, during which rate dropped from nearly 28 percent nationwide to 9 percent nationwide while case numbers rose dramatically); see also John J. Gibbons, Illuminating the Invisible Court of Appeals, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 484, 487 (1989) (questioning “quality of the supervision which courts of appeals are supposed to be exercising over [lower] courts,” given that “reversal rates . . . have declined markedly in recent times”).

36. See Matthew B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 79, 83 (2015) (introducing concept of “procedural triage,” whereby administrative agency “ration[s] process among claimants based on the inherent value of participation to particular claimants”); see id. at 83 n.11 (defining “procedural triage” as “sift[ing] among claimants in distributing procedural protections based on their capacity to derive inherent benefit from those protections”).


38. Pillay v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

39. See Levy, supra note 1, at 422 (recognizing that setting a “baseline” in evaluating how judges allocate decisions is “challenging to frame” and observing, further, that “it is difficult to identify what variables should be maximized” and to measure those maximized variables).
most time-intensive exercises for judges.\textsuperscript{40} If that work can be outsourced to
others, as it often is in the context of unpublished decisions issued without
oral argument,\textsuperscript{41} the time savings are even greater. Second-tier cases
 conserve judicial resources for first-tier cases—that is how the system has
been designed. The less time that judges must spend on second-tier cases,
presumably the better—and even better if the triage decision itself is also
made by another actor, or is made by default rule.\textsuperscript{42} Only in one circuit—
perhaps not coincidentally, the least busy circuit—do judges make the triage
decisions themselves and decline to send certain classes of appeals to staff
by default.\textsuperscript{43}

In the most comprehensive and forceful defense of the federal appellate
triage regime, Professor Marin K. Levy has argued that the federal appellate
courts use these case management practices to allocate judicial attention to
maximize two outputs: “error correction and law development.”\textsuperscript{44} Levy
recognizes that one could use a procedural system to further other
objectives,\textsuperscript{45} and by those measures, the federal appellate regime may be less
successful. But Levy has argued that the current system “comport[s] fairly
well with an attempt by the courts to maximize their error-correction and
law-development functions with their limited resources.”\textsuperscript{46} What works, she
suggests, is the basic case management framework that identifies certain
“complex” cases with “novel issues” for “argument and consideration in
chambers,” while “separat[ing] certain kinds of cases—repeating appeals,

\textsuperscript{40} Although surely an outlier, one federal judge observed that drafting opinions
sometimes involves twenty or thirty or as many as sixty drafts. Alex Kozinski, Essay,
“significantly enhance[] the court’s productivity” is well recognized. \textit{See} Martin, \textit{supra} note
U. CALIF. L.J. 1, 7 (1989)).

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{See} Gluck et al., \textit{supra} note 2, at 106 & n.408 (recognizing that “[j]udges can also
reduce their drafting time to the extent they limit their reason-giving or rely on staff attorneys
submit drafts for their approval,” and noting that staff attorneys are at least “sometimes
involved in drafting unpublished opinions”).

\textsuperscript{42} In most circuits, this is the case. \textit{See} Posner, \textit{supra} note 21, at 49–61, 162–65
discussing how circuits use their staff attorneys’ offices); \textit{see also} Levy, \textit{supra} note 19, at
333–39 (discussing screening or triage procedures in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits). Third Circuit judges actively screen
cases for oral argument, \textit{see} Levy, \textit{supra} note 19, at 371, but the court screens unrepresented
cases and most immigration cases to nonargument panels by default, \textit{see id. at} 351.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{See} McAlister, \textit{supra} note 3, at 1160–61 (discussing triage schemes and identifying
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as the only circuit that “appears not to rely on
central staff to screen appeals or handle certain classes of appeals by default” and observing
further that “the Tenth Circuit is the least busy of the geographic circuits”).

\textsuperscript{44} Levy, \textit{supra} note 1, at 401, 405–06. And, of course, as Levy observes, there is a good
deal of literature that suggests these are two functions the appellate courts have been designed
Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 12–13 (1969); Roscoe Pound, Appellate Procedure in
Civil Cases 3 (1941); Daniel John Meador, Appellate Courts in the United States 3
(2d ed. 2006)).

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{See id. at} 425–26 (recognizing “alternative objectives” for appellate system, including
those arguably subsumed within error correction and law development, as well as those
independent of them, like legitimacy and constraining costs).

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id. at} 406.
patently frivolous appeals, and those that have received at least one meaningful review”—for less judicial attention.\textsuperscript{47} Levy argues for improvements to “facilitate the identification of those traditional nonargument cases that require full judicial attention,”\textsuperscript{48} but she concedes the rationality of sorting cases—even by default rules—“based on the characteristics of the claims and not the status of the parties.”\textsuperscript{49}

What emerges from Levy’s work is that the primary benefit of the current regime is efficiency.\textsuperscript{50} The triage regime, in Levy’s view, both rationally and efficiently allocates the scarcest judicial resource—that is, judicial attention—to produce desired outputs (again, error correction and law development). Professor Ryan Copus’s recent work suggests there is a mechanism for Pareto optimization\textsuperscript{51} of Levy’s framework—his work is a proof of concept that machine learning could generate a better triage system that more accurately identifies cases that need more attention (assuming, again, that error correction and law development are the triage system’s optimal outputs).\textsuperscript{52} Copus would replace default triage rules—which are driven, often, about presumptions around the relative merits of certain types of appeals—in favor of a more complex algorithmic triage regime that predicts “degree of error” and “degree of instability” to better allocate judicial attention.\textsuperscript{53} Copus may have built a better mousetrap—or at least produced a blueprint for doing so—but his proposal likewise values efficient distribution of error correction and law development above other values.

The fact that efficiency emerges as the prime benefit of the triage system is no surprise.\textsuperscript{54} The triage regime is perhaps the federal appellate system’s

\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 435; see also K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 418 (2001) (concluding that “some decisions do have the potential to play a more significant role in shaping future decisions” and that “[c]ourts should be permitted to spend additional time in producing these decisions” and to weigh them more heavily as precedent).

\textsuperscript{48} Levy, supra note 1, at 444.

\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 440. Those characteristics include frivolity and repeated claims, among others. Id. at 438–39.

\textsuperscript{50} “Efficiency,” of course, is itself “chameleon-like,” but it is nevertheless the animating force behind the triage regime. Joseph Sanders, Road Signs and the Goals of Justice, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1297, 1297 n.4 (1987).

\textsuperscript{51} Under Pareto theory, “[a] legal rule is efficient if it induces people to behave in such a way that no one can be made better off (in terms of [their] own preferences) without making someone else worse off.” Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 687–89 (1986).

\textsuperscript{52} See Copus, supra note 19, at 625 (identifying Levy’s framework as “conceptual foundation” for use of “statistical precedent”—that is, a machine-learning tool that more systematically identifies cases that would benefit from more judicial attention based on likely need for error correction or law development).

\textsuperscript{53} Id. at 613; see also id. at 654 (explaining there is “little justification” for assigning high-error rate pro se appeals to staff attorneys by default and observing that “10% of civil pro se appeals have error estimates that place them within the range of other civil cases”).

\textsuperscript{54} See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 18, at 115 (“[The appellate triage regime] ha[s] certainly helped the courts process appeals in a timely fashion. Dispositions per judge have increased dramatically over the past thirty years, and the number of pending appeals is small. Limited publication, central staff, and reduced oral argument have done what they were supposed to; the trains do run on time.”); see also Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent,
embodiment of federal judges’ contemporary managerial role.55 In her pathbreaking work on “managerial judging,” Professor Judith Resnik has argued that, among others, efficiency concerns—or, rather, inefficiency concerns—propelled courts to innovate “systems management as the solution.”56 Professors William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds have made a similar point about the appellate triage regime: they argue that “[j]udges on the federal courts of appeals now run something that resembles an office in a large law firm.”57 These managerial reforms concentrated judicial power, permitting judges to play “a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results.”58 Judges wield managerial powers “beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions”—a process that, according to Resnik, “may be redefining sub silentio our standard of what constitutes rational, fair, and impartial adjudication.”59

The triage regime’s efficiency boon is usually described as conveying benefits for the courts, the public, and the development of law alike. We suppose that courts should issue decisions more quickly, and that litigants might prefer such a system to one in which judicial review takes more time.60 Likewise, we presume that the public benefits from judicial curation, through which some decisions lack “precedential” status because too much precedent both clutters the Federal Reporter and makes governing law more difficult to find.61 The triage system itself is a way for the court to convey useful information to the public—pay attention to this decision because we did (because we gave it oral argument and published treatment) and do not pay attention to that decision (because we did not). It serves as a signal for what matters, or what should matter, and litigants take heed. A recent study from Professor Abbe R. Gluck and a team of colleagues (the “Gluck Study”), for example, demonstrates that litigants infrequently cite to unpublished decisions.62 Whether that is because they are overall unhelpful on their face

55. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 (1982) (“[J]udicial management may be teaching judges to value their statistics, such as number of case dispositions, more than they value the quality of their dispositions.”).
56. Id. at 398.
57. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 18, at 115.
59. Id. at 380.
61. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168–69 (1978) (explaining that concerns over the growing volume of decisional law was one reason for the courts to innovate unpublished decisions).
62. Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 85–88 (discussing citation practices related to unpublished decisions in appellate decisions and briefs).
or simply duplicative of well-established principles in published opinions is difficult to know, however. And the fact that some unpublished decisions have been cited more than a hundred times, as the Gluck team finds, suggests that courts are not always good at predicting the need for precedent—a suggestion that the appellate courts’ case management processes sometimes fail to provide needed law development.

Even if we recognize that the triage regime preserves scarce judicial resources in a rational way—that is, that the triage regime is an efficient system or something close to it—that assessment, itself, carries value-laden judgments.65 The idea that efficiency might be the primary boon of the triage system is itself an assertion about “the relationship between the aggregate benefits of [the] situation and the aggregate costs of the situation.”66 That is to say that embedded within claims about efficiency are claims about what the system should be designed to achieve—claims that are contested and competing. The system is only efficient insofar as it permits judges to spend time on the cases they deem most “important” in whatever way they define importance. That appraisal of importance may center, as Levy argues, error correction and law development.67 But what if what is “important”—and thus what the triage system enables judges to prioritize—is just what a particular judge finds interesting?68 Is such a system still efficient if the benefits it serves are primarily personal to the judge (and public benefits may be secondary)? What if we have just grown accustomed to the distortions that triaging produces? For example, we expect unrepresented cases to be meritless because the law has developed more slowly in the areas where unrepresented appellants litigate most; that those cases are perceived as repetitious and meritless thus only propels the seeming rationality of the triage regime.

Moreover, the view that the system efficiently serves the ends of error correction and law development depends on one’s view of how much risk of

63. See id. at 88 & n.336 (discussing certain unpublished decisions being cited more than a hundred times).
64. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 61, at 1191–94 (arguing that judges have a hard time predicting accurately when precedential decisions are needed and when they are not).
66. Coleman, supra note 65, at 1796 & n.118 (quoting A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7–11 (4th ed. 2011)) (asserting that this is efficiency “at its most basic level”).
67. Levy, supra note 1, at 406.
68. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 190 (1998) (“To the extent that the judges share a distaste for a particular area [the examples given are “veteran’s benefits or prisoners’ rights cases”], the availability of the [summary disposition] can mean that the hard cases in these areas will receive less attention and the case law will be underdeveloped . . . . The availability of the [summary disposition] distorts the development of the law toward areas that judges enjoy.”).
error to tolerate and how much law development is optimal. Start with law development. It is conceivable that too much triage—and, indeed, too much triage for certain kinds of cases—may lead to the underdevelopment of the law in certain areas.69 Depending on one’s view, that may create inefficiencies because it requires courts to resolve more disputes in areas of the law where rights and duties could have been better developed to give all parties sufficient notice.70 This is a particularly great risk given what this work reveals about decisions missing from commercial databases and court websites. When unpublished decisions are not just nonprecedential, but also unfindable, one might argue that the system is quite inefficient in developing useful legal rules (to say nothing of other values like transparency, equality, and dignity).71 Unpublished decisions are still useful law;72 indeed, in areas where litigants frequently lose, they may be even more useful as clear signals of what arguments have been tried and have failed before (perhaps even repeatedly).

Similarly, we tolerate some risk that error goes undetected whenever courts relegate certain types of appeals to a second-tier process by the operation of default rules. For example, Levy has argued that some appeals may categorically involve a lower risk of error because they have already been subject to an additional layer of review or because they involve common, straightforward issues (immigration and social security matters, for example).73 That is hardly true for all cases relegated to the second-tier process by default. Levy acknowledges that unrepresented appeals do not neatly fit those categories for low error risk,74 even though some claims brought by unrepresented incarcerated persons may be “repeating claims,” which are common claims that arise from well-developed law.75 The decision to relegate these appeals to a nonargument track by default may rest

69. The Gluck Study confirms this risk. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 38 (asserting that “certain areas of the law may be developing more slowly and less broadly because they are deprived of precedential, reasoned opinions,” and “these areas of the law correlate with claims brought by disempowered litigants”).

70. See David R. Cleveland, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain Precedential Status of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, 65 U. MIA MI L. REV. 45, 50 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he inclusion or exclusion of unpublished opinions as evidence of clearly established law [in the qualified immunity context] may alter the ‘contours of the right’ and the clarity with which an official would understand that the right has been violated”).


72. See generally McCuskey, supra note 71 (arguing for a capacious view of precedent in which district court decisions, which are never precedential, are useful as precedent).

73. See Levy, supra note 1, at 432–33 & n.177 (discussing rationality of screening immigration matters, social security matters, and unfair labor practices claims to a nonargument track because they involve issues commonly seen by the courts, issues that have already been reviewed by multiple decision-makers, or both).

74. Id. at 436.

75. Id. at 437.
on the courts’ view that they involve “a higher percentage of frivolous claims” than other civil, represented appeals.76 But that is, itself, a subjective assessment—one that may be just as influenced by bias against incarcerated litigants as it is rooted in reality. The reversal rate in all civil appeals is still quite low,77 and Copus’s recent work underscores that “while ‘pro se’ is not an awful proxy for low merit, it is far from perfect.”78 Nevertheless, it is largely the proxy that fuels the current triage regime—perhaps, partly, because it is efficient to administer (as a binary choice) and results in the default screening of nearly half of all filed appeals.79 Efficiency spurred, and continues to propel, the triage regime.

Finally, the triage system’s efficiency calculus and the tradeoffs it entails may change over time, but the system’s path dependency may make such reevaluations difficult. Decades of reform have created institutional bureaucracy that supports and perpetuates triage. And the system seems largely impervious to on-the-ground changes. Indeed, to the extent that “triage” itself embodies a sense of crisis or emergency, the emergency appears to be no more, raising the possibility that the courts no longer need triage. For example, the need for unpublished decisions as a time-saving device appears to have lessened over time: courts receive more than 20,000 fewer appeals today than they did at their caseload zenith in 2005,80 yet the nonpublication rate is approximately 5 percent higher today than it was then.81 The justification for the use of unpublished decisions—a crushing workload—has weakened over time. Judges still have lots of work, to be sure, but they also have more help to do it. Yet they continue to rely on

76. Id. at 438.
77. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., TABLE B-5: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—DECISIONS IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2021, at 1 (2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b5_0930.2021.pdf (national average reversal rate was 8.7 percent, the reversal rate for federal prisoner litigation was 4.9 percent, the reversal rate for nonfederal prisoner litigation was 4.0 percent, and the reversal rate for civil matters not involving the federal government was 11.7 percent).
78. Copus, supra note 19, at 654.
79. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 77 (pro se appeals account for nearly half of all appeals commenced and terminated—21,423 of 44,546, or 48 percent of, proceedings commenced and 23,452 of 47,748, or 49 percent of, proceedings terminated).
procedural and decisional shortcuts at very high rates. The reason surely has something to do with a certain amount of path dependence: now that the operations for triage and procedural shortcuts are firmly in place, there is little incentive to realign circuit priorities as workload reduces. The courts have redefined our expectations for federal appellate process—and perhaps not always for the better. I next consider some of the costs of these reforms.

B. The Costs

Just like its purported benefits, the triage regime’s potential costs are subjective and difficult to quantify. An appraisal of cost necessarily privileges a certain view of the triage regime’s goals and its failures. Moreover, other procedural values—like equality, dignity, transparency, and legitimacy—are all in some tension with efficiency. Asking courts to do more to further other objectives may be costly and time-intensive. In this way, the triage system has been constructed to minimize inefficiency (as measured by cost and time) while maximizing federal appellate docket control. A readjustment of those priorities may flow from a recognition that the system’s costs are greater than its efficiency benefits. This section briefly considers those costs through the lens of those disadvantaged most by the current system: the everyday litigants whose appeals receive second-tier treatment.

Most fundamentally, the triage regime defies core notions of distributive justice, fairness, and equality. Professor Matthew A. Shapiro’s recent work, which categorizes the various “goods” that access-to-justice arguments

82. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 78–79 (explaining how “highly path dependent” the federal triage regime is); McAlister, supra note 3, at 1216 (observing that “[e]ven as judicial workload has eased, the courts have not begun publishing more cases or hearing more oral argument,” reflecting a seeming “path dependence to [the courts’] procedural shortcuts”).
83. It may, however, be for the better for the judges themselves. They benefit from a triage regime that permits them to focus on the most interesting work before the court, while reducing their overall workload (and thus freeing up time for other activities). Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court and Celebrity Culture, 88 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 299, 301 (2013) (observing that when Supreme Court justices have “more time on their hands” because of reduced workload they engaged in more “public intellectual activ[ity]”).
84. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 106; see also id. at 8–9 (“[T]he system’s values as they intersect with nonpublication—for example equality vs. efficiency—are sometimes in tension with each other.”).
85. See id. at 106 (recognizing that unpublished decisions are “one of the most significant efficiency tools of the federal appellate judiciary today”).
86. As with many of our modern procedural schemes, the appellate triage system and its exaltation of efficiency may also reflect a certain myopia about the nature of efficiency itself. As Professor Brooke D. Coleman has argued, “efficiency” is not a single-minded talisman for rendering litigation cheaper and faster; rather, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure originally conceived of efficiency as a way “to unburden civil litigation of needless administrative distraction.” Coleman, supra note 65, at 1788. Put differently, even those costs that are more difficult to quantify should affect our efficiency calculus.
87. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 899 (1981) (“The demand that the techniques for making collective decisions not imply that one person’s or group’s contribution (facts, interpretation, policy argument, etc.) is entitled to greater respect than another’s merely because of the identity of the person or group is so ubiquitous and intuitively plausible . . . .”)}
seek to distribute, recognizes that “judicial resources” are among those goods.\textsuperscript{88} A system that distributes judicial attention sparingly and selectively is one that is distributionally unequal. Other systemic needs—including, of course, efficiency interests in the face of a substantial workload—may justify that disparity, but we must recognize from the outset that the distribution of judicial attention has been triaged and is, as a result, distributed unevenly.\textsuperscript{89}

That unequal distribution creates risks and harms for both the claimants who receive the least attention and for the system itself. The triage regime runs on, and perpetuates, inequalities in how the courts process and resolve disputes.\textsuperscript{90} It sets up a favored track for resolving “important” matters and a lesser track for handling “disfavored” matters—principally, those brought by “prisoners, the poor, [and] immigrants.”\textsuperscript{91} That these procedures favor and are designed by the “one percent”—that is, the elite within the system—is not a new concern, as Professor Brooke D. Coleman has demonstrated, nor is it one that affects only the appellate system.\textsuperscript{92}

The effects of triage on disfavored litigants operate on multiple levels. Systemically, triage regimes threaten public values. The cases on the losing end of triage are those that Professor Owen M. Fiss once described as involving “significant distributional inequalities,”\textsuperscript{93} like the “struggle between a member of a racial minority and a municipal police department over alleged brutality, or a claim by a worker against a large corporation over work-related injuries.”\textsuperscript{94} In that context, adjudication serves “broader” aims by “explicat[ing] and giv[ing] force to the values embodied in authoritative texts.”\textsuperscript{95} Moreover, Fiss argued that in a system in which “imbalance of power can distort judgment,” including “the quality of presentation,” we depend “on the guiding presence of the judge . . . to lessen the impact of distributional inequalities.”\textsuperscript{96} But the federal appellate judge operating

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Matthew A. Shapiro, \textit{Distributing Civil Justice}, 109 GEO. L.J. 1473, 1477, 1491–92 (2021).
  \item \textsuperscript{89} See, e.g., Richman \& Reynolds, supra note 18, at 119 (recognizing “that cases involving prisoner rights, social security, criminal convictions, and the like [are] disproportionately subject to second-class treatment”); Pether, supra note 3, at 20 (same); see also David R. Cleveland, \textit{Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions}, 10 J. APP. PRAC. \& PROCESS 61, 147 (2009) (“The discrimination that occurs in a regime of non-precedential opinions is that similarly situated litigants, indeed even the same litigant in the same factual setting, may be treated differently by the courts.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{90} See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 78–79 (identifying some of the “path dependent” aspects of the triage regime, which make it so that the initial decision about oral argument “leads to a presumption of nonpublication, but also a presumption of staff drafting and cursory review by judges”).
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Richman \& Reynolds, supra note 18, at 116.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Brooke D. Coleman, \textit{One Percent Procedure}, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (2016) (defining “one percent procedure” as “a system where the metaphorical ninety-nine percent of relatively small cases that are the bread and butter of federal and state dockets are governed by a set of rules made by and for the elite”).
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Owen M. Fiss, \textit{Against Settlement}, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984).
  \item \textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.} at 1076.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} \textit{Id.} at 1085.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} \textit{Id.} at 1077.
\end{itemize}
within the triage regime does quite the opposite: much like the criticisms that Fiss lodged at settlement, the appellate judge takes advantage of distributional inequalities to make the process of judgment easier. They rely on the unrepresented status of the appellant to shortchange the amount of judicial attention that an appeal receives—often by default rule and irrespective of the nature of the claim.

Inequalities arising from, and perpetuated by, the triage regime also threaten to hinder legal development in particular areas of the law. One of the findings of this work, as well as other recent works on the federal appellate courts, is that “courts systematically treat certain types of litigants or certain subject matters differently.” Although the curation that publication and nonpublication entails has been lauded as valuable efficiency reforms for the development of the law—that is, curation makes it easier to identify what has precedential value—there is something of a Goldilocks problem in this effort: How much precedential development is enough? When have the courts gotten it just right, as opposed to underdeveloping or overdeveloping certain areas of the law in certain ways or in certain regions of the country? Even when some might prefer that judges say less, or publish less, because of the risk of creating “bad” law, the risk to law development is still present: how do we decide how much law is “too much”? Ultimately, these effects can, as the Gluck Study recognized, “skew[] development of the law in areas that judges find less interesting or important.”

Categorically devaluing classes of cases as “meritless” stymies legal innovation writ large, as Professor Alexander A. Reinert has argued. There is a meaningful difference, for example, between the claims of

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97. These practices, as the Gluck Study warns, “exacerbate concerns about equality.” Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 99.
98. Id.
99. One of the concerns animating the creation of systemic nonpublication was that the volume of decisional law was becoming unwieldy. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 61, at 1168–69.
100. And why, for that matter, do the issuing courts themselves have exclusive control over when they are bound by precedent and when they are not? See Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and the New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 735 (2006) (arguing that judgments on precedential status of decisions should be “made with the benefit of time, and with input from lawyers, litigants, and other judges”); see also Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899–900 (8th Cir.), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (striking down circuit law on nonprecedential decisions as violating Article III’s “judicial power” because judges do not have the power “to avoid the precedential effect of . . . prior decisions”). But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with Anastasoff).
101. Cf. Gertner, supra note 71, at 113–15 (discussing “asymmetric” pressures to write decisions only when granting dispositive relief, thus creating “Losers’ Rules” and distorting law to advantage defendants).
102. Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 31.
so-called “Sovereign Citizens” — quintessentially “frivolous” filings — and legal arguments that push the envelope, such as when parties attempt to overcome the high bar for qualified immunity. The latter type of case, which predominates the second tier, is necessary for innovation; only the former, by the Sovereign Citizen, can be safely screened without imposing any systemic harm. Coleman has made a similar argument in the context of federal pleading standards. The “restrictive” turn in procedural doctrine — a turn mirrored in how the appellate triage regime restricts access to judicial attention — imposes uneven burdens and advantages. Certain kinds of “vanishing plaintiffs” — those without access to legal resources and those whose cultural narratives render them “others” — suffer “distinctly” in this new, restrictive regime. And the public loses opportunities for “path-breaking” law as a result.

Triaging judicial attention also threatens to impose dignitary harms on litigants themselves. As Professor Jerry L. Mashaw has argued, “decisional processes” can “preserve and enhance human dignity and self-respect.” The “form” of governmental decision-making, Mashaw has explained, has the capacity to “nurture or suppress[]” those “values inherent

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104. See Jessica K. Phillips, Note, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created Equally: Examining the Need for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221, 1222 (2016) (explaining that “Sovereign Citizens” are “[a]dherents of [a] loosely organized, borderline-cultish group [that] disclaim[s] the legitimacy of the United States federal government and, therefore, all laws and financial obligations arising under the purview of the federal government” and noting that their ultimate goal is “to use the courtroom as a forum of protest against the very existence of the judicial system and Federalism itself”).

105. Reinert, supra note 103, at 1226–30 (arguing that meritless cases are “necessary to the development of a doctrine” and have the ability to “prompt more direct change in the law,” including through congressional action; they also have the ability to bring “institutional conduct and behavior” to light, even where claims may not succeed under current frameworks).


107. Id. at 502 (“While in the early 20th century procedural rules were animated by a ‘liberal ethos,’ today’s procedural regime is undeniably more restrictive . . . . The articulated reason for this move is that frivolous claims undermine the civil justice system [including by] drain[ing] scarce judicial resources . . . .”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2010) (“I would say that a ‘restrictive ethos’ prevails in procedure today, with many rules being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court.”).


109. Id. at 505 (explaining that the “vanishing plaintiff distinctly suffers” under a restrictive procedural regime).

110. Id. at 504.

111. Dignitary harm, in turn, raises issues of legitimacy. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 162 (2006) (“Procedural justice is the key normative judgment influencing the impact of experience on legitimacy.”). See generally McAlister, supra note 14, at 541 (arguing that, from a procedural justice perspective, unpublished decisions can be “marginalizing and (potentially) legitimacy threatening—a consequence that . . . may follow when courts are insensitive to procedural justice concerns [like dignity]”).

112. Mashaw, supra note 87, at 886.
in or intrinsic to our common humanity—values such as autonomy, self-respect, or equality.”\textsuperscript{113} Taking claims by disfavored litigants seriously thus has the capacity to legitimate unfavorable rulings, making them easier for litigants to accept.\textsuperscript{114} But, structurally, the triage system appears to do the opposite: it tells litigants who receive unpublished decisions that their decision is “summary” or “nonprecedential,” which may lead the litigant to question whether they have received attention or respect from the court—\textsuperscript{115} a concern that may only grow if the decision is also perfunctory, circular, or unreasoned.\textsuperscript{116}

Ultimately, the courts treat second-tier appeals differently, and they communicate that difference to litigants in a variety of ways: by refusing argument, by issuing shorter decisions, and by issuing unpublished or nonprecedential decisions. Litigants might conclude that their appeal has received short shrift, even if they are unaware of the extent of judicial attention it has (or has not) received. “We do distinguish,” Mashaw has argued, “between losing and being treated unfairly.”\textsuperscript{117} Whether the federal appellate triage system has crossed that line—that is, whether, through its unequal processes, it has communicated to disfavored parties that it has not taken their problems seriously—may be unknowable. But the risk is great and persistent, and it is more present in some circuits than others. What we can observe is the extent of disparate treatment that litigants receive—and those facts may inform how we weigh the trade-offs of the current regime.

II. THE BOTTOM RUNG: UNREPRESENTED APPEALS

This part contains this Article’s primary contribution: it discusses the results of a multiyear project examining the substance of more than 11,000 unpublished decisions issued across the federal appellate courts during a six-month period in 2017. What this study shows is that unpublished decisions are not created equal. Not only are unpublished decisions issued more frequently in cases involving unrepresented litigants,\textsuperscript{118} but it also appears that unrepresented appellants usually receive decisions half the length of decisions that are issued in comparable, represented appeals. In some circuits, the disparity is even greater. These data suggest that unrepresented appeals occupy the bottom rung of appeals in the federal appellate courts. Those proceeding without a lawyer rarely receive oral

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Tyler, supra note 111, at 149 (“Authorities can enhance the acceptance of their decisions by the way they present them to affected parties.”).
\item \textsuperscript{115} See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 101 (arguing that labels on unpublished decisions “may shape parties’ perception of the respect that the legal system offered to them” and that dignitary harms may “increase” if the litigant is aware of the triage process itself).
\item \textsuperscript{116} See McAlister, supra note 14, at 580–81 (describing how litigants might respond to perfunctory and circular unpublished decisions that undermine procedural justice values).
\item \textsuperscript{117} Mashaw, supra note 87, at 888.
\item \textsuperscript{118} See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 37 (“[T]he data reveal that the federal judiciary is disproportionately and systematically not publishing cases brought by certain types of litigants—namely litigants representing themselves and incarcerated individuals.”).
\end{itemize}
argument or published, precedential decisions.\footnote{119} They are also more likely to receive shorter decisions, and decisions in these cases are more likely to be harder to find on free court websites, a reality that frustrates the interests of transparency, accountability, and law development.

Before describing the data supporting these results in Part II.C, this part first describes the data collection process and what is missing from the compiled data set. The extended discussion of what is missing adds to my earlier work on the incompleteness of commercial resources with respect to unpublished decisions, and it strengthens the argument for identifying a bottom rung of federal appellate process for unrepresented litigants.

**A. Data Collection**

This study evaluates “merits terminations”\footnote{120} from across the geographic federal appellate courts issued between January 1, 2017, and June 30, 2017. “Merits terminations” are decisions that resolve appellate proceedings on the merits (as opposed to on procedural grounds).\footnote{121} Procedural terminations—which are occasionally published, but are usually unpublished and are often just clerk orders\footnote{122}—are not formally reported by publication status by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (the “Administrative Office”). Scholars do not tend to focus on that pool of decisions for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that they are hard to find, typically have

\footnote{119. See infra Part II.C.1. In this study, less than 4 percent of cases terminated on the merits after oral argument involved appellants who were unrepresented throughout the proceeding. And less than 3 percent of published decisions were issued in appeals brought by unrepresented appellants.}

\footnote{120. This is something of a term of art that refers to the “last opinion or final order,” whether reasoned or not and whether signed or not, issued to resolve an appeal or other proceeding that originates in the appellate court in the first instance (that is, something other than an appeal from a final judgment or a decision reviewing final agency action). Compare \textit{Table B-12, supra} note 5 (noting that “merits” terminations are distinct from procedural ones, in which the court does not reach the merits of the appeal and, instead, dismisses on procedural grounds), \textit{with Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Table B-5A: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Cases Terminated on Procedural Grounds, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2021} (2021), \url{https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b5a_0930.2021.pdf} [https://perma.cc/W4PY-ULZZ] (identifying categories of “procedural” terminations, including for jurisdictional defects, defaults, and with the consent of the parties under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42). When scholars discuss “unpublished decisions” as a category, they are generally referring to unpublished decisions in merits terminations because that is the category of unpublished decisions that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts tracks. So, whenever you see percentages of unpublished decisions that rely on Administrative Office statistics, those are merits terminations. In reality, the courts reach more decisions or terminations than those numbers convey, but those are decisions in cases that end for procedural reasons.}

\footnote{121. For a more thorough discussion of the Administrative Office terminology and how it reports data, see McAlister, supra note 12, at 1115–16. Appellate proceedings most commonly involve appeals as of right, but they also involve original applications and petitions like writs of mandamus or requests for certificates of appealability. \textit{Id.}}

\footnote{122. See Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., supra note 120; Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 43–44 & n.195 (discussing procedural terminations).}
no reasoning, and often (but certainly not always) have little independent value.123

The project began in early 2019, and I selected a six-month study period from 2017 because it was the most recent period (at the time) for which data from the Administrative Office was available for comparison. Working with various Bloomberg Law databases,124 I trained a team of research assistants (RAs) to extract basic case information into Excel and then hand-code decisions across a variety of fields, including, among other categories,125 decision word count126 and whether a rehearing petition127 or a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed. Another RA randomly cross-checked approximately 400 of these entries, finding a low rate of disagreement (four of 396) for these fields.128

I vastly underestimated the difficulty of this undertaking in a variety of ways. My RAs devoted hundreds of hours to this project; the work—even in its most basic form (like identifying word count)—was far more burdensome and time-consuming than I imagined. The laborious nature of hand coding aside, the most important difficulty involved data access. The number of decisions available on Bloomberg Law (and on other commercial databases) does not match what the Administrative Office reports that the courts issue,

123. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 43 n.195 (explaining decision to exclude most procedural terminations from study).
124. I selected Bloomberg Law, initially because of its integration of two databases: an opinions database and a docket database, which makes it easy to work backwards from an opinion and find that appeal’s docket. To obtain the initial opinions list, we searched Bloomberg Law’s court opinion database by circuit, without any restriction, except for the date range of 1/1/2017 to 6/30/2017. Unfortunately, obtaining data from the Bloomberg docket system was quite cumbersome, and it often involved manually updating the relevant docket to retrieve pertinent information.
125. RAs coded the following for each opinion retrieved: panel members by judge name, word count, whether a rehearing petition had been filed, and whether a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed with the U.S. Supreme Court. They were also asked to review the substance of the decision and answer “Yes” or “No” as to the following based only on the text of the opinion: (1) whether the RA could determine the underlying cause of action or criminal offense, (2) whether the RA could identify the issues decided on appeal, (3) whether the appellate court offered reasons for the resolution or outcome, and (4) whether the appellate court expressly and exclusively rested its decision on the district court’s decision (and therefore the appellate court did not offer any independent reasons for its result).
126. RAs were instructed to count only the body of the decision, excluding any header material. When a concurring or dissenting opinion was filed, those opinions were excluded from the word count.
127. Because some circuits treat petitions for rehearing en banc in unpublished decisions as petitions for panel rehearing, see 11th Cir. R. 35-4, and to simplify the coding, I did not ask RAs to distinguish between these petitions, treating either as an indication that the losing party on appeal sought further review.
128. The rate of error or disagreement for other fields was considerably higher. For more subjective assessments of reason-giving described above, see supra note 125, the coders disagreed with each other approximately 12.4 percent of the time (or in forty-nine out of 396 entries). See supra note 125. Admittedly, the task was more difficult than I anticipated. Some examples were clear-cut. Some were less so. As a result, I have less confidence in these results when compared to objective indicia—in particular, word count—that may be a proxy (however imperfect) for these same kinds of concerns about reason-giving quality. Because of the disagreement rate, I have prioritized the discussion of word count throughout.
Sometimes by substantial margins.\textsuperscript{129} It is nearly impossible to gather a complete set of published and unpublished merits terminations from across the circuits for any period using the easiest and most accessible tools: commercial databases.\textsuperscript{130}

To address this limitation, I decided to use the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) Integrated Database (IDB)\textsuperscript{131} as a baseline comparison for our hand-coded data set from Bloomberg Law.\textsuperscript{132} That database is “the most comprehensive dataset on federal judicial appeals available,” and thus, is “the dataset typically used by scholars studying the judiciary.”\textsuperscript{133} This data set is generally reliable,\textsuperscript{134} but the FJC acknowledges (yet fails to explain) data quality concerns for “specific fields related to under-served populations,” including those fields “regarding pro se litigants, in forma pauperis (IFP) status, and class action allegations.”\textsuperscript{135} FJC data entry is not centralized, which can lead to some discrepancies in how courts record certain variables.\textsuperscript{136} Nevertheless, it is a powerful, and generally accurate,\textsuperscript{137} tool.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[129.] For a thorough discussion of this problem, see generally McAlister, supra note 12.
\item[130.] See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 10, 45–46 (discussing issues related to accessing data and confirming findings in McAlister, supra note 12).
\item[132.] By combining the FJC data with the hand-coded data from Bloomberg Law, I was able to supplement the FJC data with information contained only in dockets and decisions, including information about word count, the identity of the panel, and postdecision history.
\item[133.] Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 114.
\item[134.] Id.
\item[135.] FJC Integrated Database, supra note 131, at 4.
\item[136.] The Administrative Office uses some IDB data to generate its annual Judicial Business publication, which includes reports on unpublished decisions, among others, and which, as a result, are subject to quality checks. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 114–15 (discussing data quality issues with IDB and its limitations).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
For each line of hand-coded data describing an entry in the Bloomberg Law database, I matched those data to an entry from the FJC database. This was a time-intensive process, but one that allowed me to overcome the central limitation of the IDB: it does not contain the text of the relevant opinion or order. At the same time, the matching process also enabled me to isolate what was missing from Bloomberg Law during the same period and identify certain key features of what was missing. Although the volume of what was missing was too great to retrieve by hand (a task that becomes necessary if an opinion is not on a commercial database), the IDB enables us to identify a significant amount of descriptive information about those missing decisions in each circuit. In the end, this matching process gave an accurate snapshot of what the courts were doing during that six-month period and what researchers can find of that work on at least one commercial database.

Table 1 identifies the data retrieved from and matched between both the IDB and Bloomberg Law’s database of court opinions. Overall, the match rates—meaning the ability to associate a Bloomberg Law database hit with termination case information from the IDB—were quite high. But, as the raw numbers in Table 1 also reveal, Bloomberg Law has far fewer entries than the IDB has for the same period—those are mostly the missing decisions discussed below. For now, what is important is that this process matched nearly all Bloomberg Law database entries with an associated IDB entry: the match rate was at or more than 92 percent (and usually higher) across all but two circuits.

138. The matching process involved comparing case numbers. Unfortunately, the two systems do not use the same unique number to identify cases, but it is relatively easy to derive the IDB number—a seven-digit number—from the docket number reported by the court on the face of the opinion in the Bloomberg Law database. When courts use six-digit case numbers, e.g., “15-3216,” the IDB reports those as “1503216,” replacing the hyphen with a “0.” See FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 1. When a court—specifically, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—uses a seven-digit case number, e.g., “15-13216,” the IDB reports the number as “1513216.” Id.

139. To obtain the FJC baseline, I ran searches by circuit and judgment date (between January 1, 2017, and June 30, 2017) in the IDB appeals database.

140. To accomplish the task, I aggregated the two data sets by case number. The process involved some automation, whereby I used Excel’s “MATCH” function to identify line matches between the Bloomberg Law data set and the IDB data set. That allowed easy identification of mismatches (both duplicate matches and nonmatches), and investigation of whether any data-entry error (e.g., a transcription error in the manual conversion of the case number into a seven-digit number to pair with the IDB number) created the mismatch.
Table 1: FJC’s IDB to Bloomberg Law Database Entries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed. Cir. Ct.</th>
<th>IDB</th>
<th>BL Op. DB</th>
<th>Matched</th>
<th>% Matched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>2,093</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>2,162</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>4,014</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>1,656</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>6,324</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>3,307</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let me say a few words about the outliers, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Eighth Circuits, both of which had match percentages significantly lower than their peers. The Bloomberg Law database entries for these circuits had a large volume of miscellaneous, nondispositive orders, including (predominantly) orders denying panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.\textsuperscript{141} Where multiple Bloomberg Law database hits had the same case number, and thus when I had multiple matches for the same line of IDB data,\textsuperscript{142} I only retained the Bloomberg Law database entry associated with the termination decision.\textsuperscript{143} My combined data set contains


\textsuperscript{142} A database search retrieves these orders as individual data entries in a date-limited search (and they each have unique database or citation numbers), but they would not pair with a single IDB entry (or sometimes even one from the relevant period) because the IDB date search retrieved termination information, as opposed to information about any order issued during the period. The IDB also generally contains only one line of data for each final decision.

\textsuperscript{143} To increase matching speed, I did this visually most of the time by comparing word counts (e.g., I assumed a 1,000-word decision was the merits decision and a fifty-word decision was a miscellaneous order) or by retaining the last filed decision based on date, unless the hand-coded data indicated the last decision related to the denial of rehearing because of relative word count. When it was unclear, I looked up multiple entries to determine the best fit by date of decision according to the IDB.
12,104 total matched entries; approximately 8.6 percent of those entries involved procedural terminations, which I have excluded.\textsuperscript{144}

The remaining data set of available merits terminations has decisional features comparable to those reported in 2017, but the problem of missing decisions results generally in a data set that is slightly underinclusive in terms of unpublished decisions and cases decided without oral argument in most circuits. Appendix B compares my data set with five-year means (between 2015 and 2020) and the 2017 reporting year for rates of unpublished decisions and cases decided without oral argument. If anything, the data set presents a slightly rosier picture of the decisional practices in some circuits (especially those with more significant numbers of missing decisions, as discussed below). Taken as a whole, the data set generally comports with (that is, lies within one standard deviation of) the national averages during the same period. There is no reason to think that the data discussed here are exceptional or unusual, as opposed to representative of overall trends in the circuits during the same period. Where discrepancies exist, they are generally the result of missing decisions, which are merits terminations not available on Bloomberg Law but reported as having been issued by the courts—a topic I turn to next.

\textbf{B. Missing Decisions}

Contrary to a long-standing assumption,\textsuperscript{145} scholars now agree that commercial databases (and free court websites) do not contain all unpublished merits terminations from the federal appellate courts.\textsuperscript{146} Commercial databases generally populate their databases with the decisions freely available on court websites, but courts are required to post only content that they deem to satisfy a federal “written opinions” standard on free court websites.\textsuperscript{147} Courts, judges, and court clerks all seemingly take different views on what meets this standard, thus generating disparate access regimes.

\textsuperscript{144} Of the procedural terminations, 544 of 1,038, or more than 52 percent, were judge-issued terminations. During that same period, only 26.5 percent of procedural terminations were judge-issued. It is unsurprising that judge-issued procedural terminations are more likely than clerk-issued dismissals to appear in commercial databases, given the greater likelihood that they are reasoned decisions.

\textsuperscript{145} See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, \textit{supra} note 18, at 59 (“Unpublished decisions are now available online and can be easily accessed and analyzed there.”).

\textsuperscript{146} See generally McAlister, \textit{supra} note 12 (discussing existence of “missing decisions,” which are unpublished decisions that courts say they issue but are not available on free court websites or commercial databases). See also Gluck et al., \textit{supra} note 2, at 10 (confirming finding in \textit{Missing Decisions} and observing that “court websites and commercial databases contained only limited subsets of all unpublished opinions”).

\textsuperscript{147} See McAlister, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1114–16 (explaining how databases obtain federal appellate content); id. at 1160–62 (explaining that only decisions designated as “written opinions” must be available for free under federal law). For a thorough treatment of the “written opinions” requirement, see generally Peter W. Martin, \textit{District Court Opinions That Remain Hidden Despite a Long-Standing Congressional Mandate of Transparency—the Result of Judicial Autonomy and Systemic Indifference}, 110 \textit{Law Libr. J.} 305 (2018) (discussing a statutory “written opinions” requirement).
across the courts of appeals. Decisions not made available for free remain locked behind a docketing system paywall; they remain publicly available, but for a price (and one that commercial databases appear to pay only when a customer requests the inclusion of those decisions in the database).

It is important, then, to start with what was missing from the commercial database I used to construct this data set. Consistent with recent work on this topic, my study confirmed (at least the historical incompleteness of the Bloomberg Law database, which has coverage comparable to LexisNexis’s commercial database. What is missing from the database primarily involves decisions on appeals from final judgments in litigation brought by incarcerated litigants, as well as decisions in original proceedings, which also largely involve litigation brought by incarcerated persons (for example, a request to file a second or successive habeas petition). Bear with me: this gets a bit complicated to explain, as I walk through in some detail what is missing and how I identified those cases.

Let us start with the raw numbers of what the FJC’s IDB database contains for the six-month period at issue. Table 3 details the number of merits terminations reported in the database for the study period (January 1, 2017, to June 30, 2017). It also breaks down (and then excludes) consolidated cases from these totals because we would not expect more than one commercial database hit for consolidated cases, even though each case will have a unique line of IDB data. Table 2 compares those postconsolidation merits terminations with the merits terminations matched from the Bloomberg Law database.

148. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1161 (discussing implementation problems with the “written opinions” requirement for accessing federal judicial decisions).

149. For example, in earlier work, I amassed more than eighty dollars in fees to obtain approximately 250 missing decisions from one circuit during a one-year period. See id. at 1139 n.161.

150. Id. at 1158–59 (discussing dynamics between databases and their customers and circumstances for adding material to databases).

151. By “historical,” here, I mean the incompleteness of the database for the period at issue; this work does not offer any insight into whether the databases have greater coverage for decisions issued today.

152. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1129 n.135 (noting similarity between LexisNexis and Bloomberg Law coverage).

153. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (requiring applicant to request permission to file a second or successive habeas petition by motion in the court of appeals).

154. Because the Administrative Office only reports data on a twelve-month rolling basis in three-month intervals, it was necessary for me to derive these numbers from the FJC’s IDB raw data. All data are on file with myself and the Fordham Law Review.

155. To identify “merits terminations,” I used the Excel “COUNTIFS” function to identify the number of IDB entries from each circuit coded with a “merits” termination in the IDB’s disposition field. See FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 9 (describing the IDB’s “DISP” field).

156. This approach is consistent with the evaluation of missing decisions in other work, which also relied on postconsolidation merits terminations; the major difference is that earlier work compared numbers reported by the Administrative Office in its annual Judicial Business publication to database hits. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1120–25 (describing data collection process). That study predicted the rate of Bloomberg Law’s missing decisions to be around 27 percent for this period. See id. at 1128 fig.2. These data demonstrate that it is significantly higher.
database; the difference is what is “presumed” to be missing—and by that, I mean the apparent shortfall between what Bloomberg Law contains and what the IDB reports. Figure 1 graphically identifies the percentage of merits terminations presumed to be missing across the circuits. Those data demonstrate that the problem of missing decisions, and concerns over the completeness of a data set, are uneven across the circuits.
Table 2: Comparing IDB Merits Terminations to Bloomberg Law Database Entries for Merits Terminations Between January 1, 2017, and June 30, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crt. Ct.</th>
<th>Consol. Cases on Merits Terms in IDB</th>
<th>Presumed Missing</th>
<th>% of Merits Terms in BL</th>
<th>Presumed Missing</th>
<th>% of Merits Terms in BL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19,466</td>
<td>7,117</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

157. These are “matched” Bloomberg Law entries, meaning entries that matched with a merits termination from the same period as reported in the IDB.

158. To identify consolidated appeals, I used a “COUNTIFS” function to identify all “merits” terminations, see supra note 155, with a joined appeal, which would be either a cross appeal or a consolidated appeal (a “1” or “2” under the IDB’s “JOINAPP” field). FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 12–13.
In an earlier study of this problem, I observed that my estimates of coverage were likely “overly optimistic,”159 and unfortunately, I was right. Those estimates pegged coverage for merits terminations during this period on Bloomberg Law at nearly 73 percent of the total (with roughly 27 percent of merits terminations missing).160 The results here find closer to 40 percent of merits decisions presumed missing from Bloomberg Law, by comparing matched Bloomberg Law database entries for merits terminations to the total number of IDB entries for nonconsolidated or lead-case merits terminations from the same period.161 Consistent with that earlier work, coverage in the D.C. Circuit is outstanding, and the single presumed missing decision is a result of a reporting glitch explained below—one that likely accounts for some portion, but certainly far from all, of these missing entries.162

Because of how I constructed the data set, I can do more than identify presumptively missing decisions: I can identify decisions that are, in fact, missing from Bloomberg Law’s database. By taking a closer look at trends in the decisions that are missing, we can learn more about what kinds of decisions are underreported on commercial databases. Table 4 describes the collection of “missing” or unmatched entries from the IDB database—that is, those entries for which I could not identify a Bloomberg Law database match

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159. I described estimates of missing decisions as “overly optimistic” because I was not able to exclude procedural terminations, duplicate entries, or miscellaneous orders from commercial database comparisons. See McAllister, supra note 12, at 1127–28 (explaining likelihood that some nontrivial percentage of database “hits” are not merits terminations, therefore making estimates of coverage “optimistic”).

160. Id. at 1128 & fig.2.

161. These are appeals coded as either “0” (for no consolidation) or “3” (for the lead case) in the IDB’s “JOINAPP” field. FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 12–13.

162. See infra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
in the hand-coded data set. It is possible, of course, that some of these unmatched entries resulted from a data-entry error (mine or the court’s), but that is unlikely to account for all missing decisions, especially given the high overall matching rate. But there do appear to be some significant court errors or discrepancies that may account for a substantial portion of missing decisions in at least some circuits, as I will explain below. For now, Table 3 identifies the number of IDB entries for merits terminations that are missing from Bloomberg Law. These decisions are subdivided by those that have been resolved with or without oral argument, and the numbers reported here reflect only those decisions that were identified either as not consolidated or as a lead case in an otherwise consolidated appeal. For both categories of cases, we would expect a corresponding decision in Bloomberg Law. The final column notes the margin of error based on the numbers of presumed missing decisions from Table 2.

Table 3: IDB Entries Missing from Bloomberg Law Database
(Unconsolidated Merits Terminations with and Without Oral Argument) ¹⁶³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>-9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>6,370</td>
<td>7,025</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁶³. The second and third columns of this table display the number of missing entries as determined using the IDB’s “DISP” field, which distinguishes between terminations on the merits issued after oral argument (“1”) or without oral argument (“2”). FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 9. Entries were counted only if the “JOINAPP” field, which tracks consolidation, was either a “0” (no consolidation) or a “3” (lead case). Id. at 12–13.
Overall, this approach—comparing database hits against expected entries based on court data—appears predictively sound for estimating missing decisions for most circuits. But something in Table 3 likely jumps out at you (and may strike you as suspicious)—the number of missing decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit involving unconsolidated merits terminations issued after oral argument. It turns out that the eye-popping number is a reporting glitch. In 2017, the Third Circuit treated at least 510 appeals in the multidistrict litigation (MDL), In re Fosamax, as unjoined appeals (all of which were filed against the same defendant, Merck, making them easy to spot in the raw data). These appeals were all resolved after one oral argument, involved joint briefing, and resulted in one final published opinion. In my view, they should have been treated as consolidated appeals for reporting purposes, especially because treating the cases as unjoined skews the Third Circuit’s statistics on oral argument and publication (both of which count unjoined or postconsolidation cases).

If we remove the Fosamax MDL from the data, the number of missing decisions drops to 6,515 overall and only 145 missing merits terminations decided after oral argument. It is entirely possible that some of those numbers are misleading for the same reason—that is, that there are other cases in which the court has resolved more than one appeal with a single decision yet treated the appeal as unjoined. But it is unlikely that such a scenario happens so frequently as to account for more than 6,000 missing decisions. Indeed, within the entire 2017 reporting year, only 3,022 appeals were reported as consolidated; it seems improbable that within a

164. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 268 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that the “opinion applies to all appeals listed in [an appendix]”).
165. See Matthew Stiegler, I’ve Updated Yesterday’s Post About Third Circuit Case Statistics: Data I Originally Thought Was Significant Turns Out to Be Meaningless, CA3BLOG (Mar. 16, 2018), http://ca3blog.com/suggestionbox/i’ve-updated-yesterdays-post-about-third-circuit-case-statistics-data-i-originally-thought-was-significant-turns-out-to-be-meaningless/ [https://perma.cc/NT9C-2R8R] (recognizing that increase appeared “jaw-dropping” but that the “source of the problem” was treating the Fosamax appeal as over 500 separate cases).
166. Id.
167. I think it is fair to characterize this as an error. At some point between when I wrote an article (in 2019) that relied on publication statistics from the Administrative Office, see McAlister, supra note 14, at 597 fig.A-4, and now, the Administrative Office adjusted the publication statistics for the Third Circuit to treat these cases as consolidated for those purposes. Table B-12 for 2017 now indicates that “[t]otals for cases terminated on the merits in the Third Circuit and in the nation have been revised following resolution of a technical issue affecting the data.” ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTNS., TABLE B-12: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPE OF OPINION OR ORDER FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2017 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EQU-GKVS]. This “technical issue” was so significant that it affected the national nonpublication rate for 2017: from the 86.9 percent figure I had used in “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, see McAlister, supra note 14, at 550, fig. 1, to 88.2 percent, as it is now corrected. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTNS., supra.
168. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTNS., TABLE B-1: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING, DURING
six-month period, there were more than twice as many pocket consolidations that would skew the statistics so substantially. That said, it is quite likely that all or nearly all 145 missing decisions from terminations after oral argument result from the same *Fosamax* MDL-type problem, and for this reason I will assume these decisions are not really “missing.”

Among the 6,369 remaining merits terminations that did not match with any Bloomberg Law entry, it is likely that more than 75 percent of those decisions are substantive—at least in the sense that the courts self-reported that these decisions contained some amount of reasoned explanation. Figure 2 identifies the relative percentages of court-reported reason-giving among what is missing. Of course, courts self-report these figures, and there is reason to believe they may be more generous than a reader might be in how they describe the extent of the court’s reasoning. But what we do know is that many of these decisions at least say *something*, as opposed to simply “affirmed,” because such perfunctory or “without comment” decisions are tracked separately. It is important to keep in mind, though, that even when there is no reasoning, an unreasoned or summary affirmance may still have value as an indication of appellate approval of a district court decision. Missing unreasoned decisions in direct appeals thus risk misrepresenting the procedural history of an appealed district court decision that appears in a commercial database.

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169. See, e.g., Serrano-Alberto v. Att'y Gen., 859 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2017) (identifying Case No. 16-1586 in caption, but the case appears in missing decision data, and the court does not denote it as a joined appeal); United States v. Barret, 848 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2017) (identifying Case No. 13-3800 in caption, but the case appears in missing decision data, and the court does not denote it as a joined appeal).

170. Going forward, I also exclude the D.C. Circuit from the discussion of missing decisions. One of its two missing decisions is a consolidated decision. See Ampersand Pub'l'g, LLC v. NLRB, No. 15-1074, 2017 BL 67821 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 2017) (identifying Case No. 13-3800 in caption, but the case appears in missing decision data, and the court does not denote it as a joined appeal). The other—the only real missing decision—is an order granting a petition for leave to file a successive motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See *In re Nugent*, No. 16-3118 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2017), ECF No. 1670350.

171. For example, the Fourth Circuit reported not having issued any unreasoned decisions during the relevant reporting period. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S.CTS., supra note 167. Yet it would be difficult to describe all decisions in Appendix A, which are all from the Fourth Circuit, as “reasoned” within the meaning of that report, which defines reasoned decisions as “only opinions and orders which expound the law as applied to the facts of the case and detail the judicial reasons upon which the judgment is based.” *Id.; see also* McAlister, supra note 14, at 576–77 & n.220 (discussing extent of reason-giving in perfunctory decisions with examples from the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, where one decision was labeled as “reasoned” and one was not).

172. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1147–48 (observing that missing decisions “skew the procedural history information of the district court decisions otherwise included in those databases” and relaying that commercial databases describe one-word affirmances as “highly valuable as part of the overall case history”).
Figure 2: Proportion of Reason-Giving in Unpublished Decisions Among Missing IDB Entries

Figure 3, below, represents what is missing across the circuits based on the expected extent of reason-giving. Observe that, in the only two circuits—the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits—that report meaningful numbers of unreasoned decisions, many were missing (more than 1,300 in total). Large numbers of reasoned decisions were missing from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—all of which are busy circuits. Keep the existence of missing decisions from these circuits in mind when considering the mean word count statistics below. In each of these circuits, the observed disparities between represented and unrepresented appellants may be artificially diminished because of the effect of missing decisions. Table 4 provides a more detailed breakdown of the data represented graphically in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Entries Missing by Reason-Giving Across the Circuits
Many of these missing decisions—likely around 50 percent—involve a decision in an appeal from a final judgment in the district court. Figure 4 identifies the relative percentage of missing termination decisions by appeal type (with some categories combined for ease of reading). Table 5 provides more detailed information about what appears graphically in Figure 4; it identifies the number of missing entries by type of appeal across each circuit. What is perhaps most significant about these data is that they demonstrate that two categories for which we expect missing decisions—

---

173. This data set comprises 6,349 entries, which is slightly less than the 6,369 number of nonargued missing entries noted above. Eight decisions were published, and I have omitted those for the same reason I exclude the argued missing entries. The remaining shortfall reflects a small handful of entries that were missing the relevant coding criteria. The numbers here reflect those missing decisions from each circuit that satisfied the following conditions: (1) the “DISP” code was “2,” meaning that the decision was on the merits and reached without oral argument; (2) the “JOINAPP” code was either a “0” or “3,” to exclude consolidated or nonlead appeals; and (3) the “PUBSTAT” code was either “3,” “5,” or “7,” to identify the type of unpublished decision (signed is “3,” unsigned but reasoned is “5,” and unreasoned is “7”). See FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 9, 12–13.

174. This table reports “APPTYPE” for the IDB entries not recovered from the same date-limited search in the Bloomberg Law database. See id. at 2–3. The category “Criminal” here includes appeals coded with “13,” “14,” “15,” “16,” “17,” “18,” “19,” or “20.” Id. at 3. “Federal post-conviction” identifies only those appeals coded as “21,” which are “appeal[s] arising from a [U.S. district court] order entered after the judgment of conviction,” and thus does not include 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings. Id. at 3.
original proceedings—only account for a little less than half of the missing entries in this data set.

Figure 4: Relative Percentage of Missing Entries by Appeal Type

Overall, across most circuits many missing decisions arise from ordinary civil proceedings in appeals as of right or on requests for certificates of appealability. Figure 5 graphically reflects the number of missing decisions across the major appeal types in each circuit, while Table 5 provides exact numbers on what Figure 5 represents graphically.

175. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1134–35 (hypothesizing that original proceedings may account for some, but not all, of what is missing from commercial databases).

Figure 5: Missing Decision by Appeal Type Across the Circuits

- Administrative Review or Enforcement
- Original Proceeding
- Bankruptcy
- Criminal (and Fed. Post-Conviction)
- All Civil (U.S. and Private)
Table 5: Missing IDB Entries in Unpublished Decisions by Appeal Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed Cir Ct</th>
<th>Admin Review</th>
<th>Orig Proc</th>
<th>Admin Enforce</th>
<th>Civil, U.S.</th>
<th>Civil, Private</th>
<th>Bankr.</th>
<th>Criminal (and Fed Post-Conviction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>177</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>201</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>2359</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>2359</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

177. These are appeals that satisfy all conditions in Table 5 counted by “APPTYPE” field. See JFC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 2–3.

178. Ninety-seven percent (or 391 of 403) administrative proceedings involve immigration-related appeals. To obtain this number, I identified the number of appeals involving “Administrative Review” that also involved the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service as the designated agency (code “6” in “AGENCY” field). Id. at 6.
Drilling down a bit deeper into these categories, it quickly becomes apparent that most missing entries involve litigation with vulnerable populations: criminal defendants, incarcerated persons, undocumented persons, or persons without permanent status in the United States. Of the missing original proceedings, 2,202 of 2,539 (or 86.7 percent) involve petitions requesting permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Among the two categories of civil litigation (which, together, are the largest category), 2,158 of 2,524 (or 85.5 percent) of all missing terminations in civil proceedings involve prisoner litigation. Table 6 identifies the prisoner-related nature of suit codes for the missing decisions for the “Civil, U.S.” and “Civil, Private” appeal types—of the appeals missing, slightly more than 60 percent involve state defendants.\(^{180}\) Collectively, that means that 5,021 of 6,349 (or 79.0 percent) of missing terminations with unpublished adjudications involve appeals or original proceedings brought by either a prisoner or a criminal defendant. If we add the number of immigration matters (391) to those totals, then 85.2 percent of missing entries involve litigation with vulnerable populations.

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179. This name is a bit misleading, as it should not imply civil, nongovernmental status—it refers to civil matters not involving the United States as a party. Many suits brought by incarcerated people (including petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) fall within this large umbrella category.

180. To derive this figure, I used the “JURIS” field for “Prisoner Petitions” (identified by the “NOS” field, see infra note 181), which has a special value and interpretation in the IDB for prisoner appeals. See FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 6.
Table 6: Civil Appeal Types by Prisoner Nature of Suit Codes in Missing Entries Data Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Appeal</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Prison Petitions-Habeas</th>
<th>Prison Petitions—Mandamus &amp; Other</th>
<th>Prison Petitions—Vacate Sentence</th>
<th>Death Penalty Habeas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner—Civil Rights</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner—Prison Conditions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed. Cr. Ct.</td>
<td>First</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Third</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

181. This table uses the “NOS” field in the IDB. See FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 6–7, 21–23. Appeals by incarcerated litigants are identified as follows: “510 Prisoner Petitions—Vacate Sentence,” “530 Prisoner Petitions—Habeas Corpus,” “535 Habeas Corpus: Death Penalty,” “540 Prisoner Petitions—Mandamus and Other,” “550 Prisoner—Civil Rights,” and “555 Prisoner—Prison Condition.” Id. at 22.
Given the large volume of litigation brought by incarcerated people among the missing entries, it is no surprise that the vast majority of what is missing involves appeals in which the appellant was unrepresented throughout the proceeding: 4,578 of 6,370 missing decisions (or more than 71 percent) involve proceedings with an unrepresented appellant. In every circuit, the share of missing entries involving unrepresented appellants exceeds the five-year means for unrepresented appeals in the circuit. Table 7 details these findings across the circuits.

Table 7: Representation Status of Appellants in Missing Entries (and Compared to Overall Rate in Circuit)\textsuperscript{182}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed. Cir. Ct.</th>
<th>Appellant Pro Se at Filing and Termination</th>
<th>% of Overall Missing Entries</th>
<th>5-YR Mean for % of Pro Se Appellants (SD)\textsuperscript{183}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>34.6% (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>39.5% (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>52.9% (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>60.7% (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>45.3% (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>57.4% (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>59.1% (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>52.4% (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>45.4% (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>47.3% (2.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>58.2% (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,578</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>49.1% (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we might expect, nearly 75 percent of what is missing from merits decisions on appeal (as opposed to in original proceedings) involves affirmances or denials of certificates of appealability, which function as affirmances in habeas corpus proceedings.\textsuperscript{184} But what may be surprising is

\textsuperscript{182} To generate this table, I counted the number of merits terminations issued without oral argument (“DISP” code “2”) that were either not consolidated or were lead cases (“JOINAPP” code “0” or “3,” respectively) and the number of cases in which the appellant was pro se at filing and at termination (“PROSEFLE” and “PROSETRM” both equal “1”). See FJC APPEALS CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 2, 12–13, 17–18.

\textsuperscript{183} “SD” refers to the standard deviation for the five-year means.

\textsuperscript{184} Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a person seeking habeas corpus relief from state custody or seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which governs motions challenging the lawfulness of federal custody, must seek a certificate of appealability before appealing the denial of relief.
that nearly 7 percent of the missing entries involve an arguably favorable result for the appellant: a reversal (2.8 percent), a reversal in part (0.5 percent), or a remand (3.4 percent). The nationwide reversal rate for the same period—a rate that does not count reversals in part or remands—was only 7.8 percent. Figure 6 identifies these outcomes graphically, while Table 8 describes the outcomes in the missing terminations from across the circuits.

Figure 6: Outcomes by Percentages Among Missing Entries Across All Circuits

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186. Id.
Table 8: Outcomes in Missing Entries (Excluding Original Proceedings)\(^{187}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed Cr. Ct.</th>
<th>Denied</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Remanded</th>
<th>Dismissed</th>
<th>Affirmed in part/Reversed in part</th>
<th>Reversed</th>
<th>Affirmed/Enforced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>312</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>240</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>238</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>974</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>994</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{187}\) Table 9 reports the IDB’s “OUTCOME” field for those decisions terminated on the merits (“DISP” is “2”). FJC Appeals Codebook, supra note 131, at 10–11. The “OUTCOME” field is not used for original proceedings. Id. at 10.
Similarly, the merits terminations arising from original proceedings also include some favorable results (more than 10 percent were granted), even though the vast majority (over 85 percent) were not favorable to the petitioner. That so many granted decisions in original proceedings are missing may be especially problematic for those who file the most common type of original proceeding missing from the data set: a request to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). More than 86 percent of the missing entries in original proceedings involve requests under § 2244(b). Table 9 identifies the outcomes in missing termination decisions from original proceedings.

Table 9: Outcomes in Original Proceedings in Missing Entries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed. Cir. Ct.</th>
<th>Granted</th>
<th>Denied</th>
<th>Dismissed/Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>355</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
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<td>412</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tenth</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>293 (10.7%)</td>
<td>2,347 (86.0%)</td>
<td>89 (3.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is missing, ultimately, is what many frequent users of commercial databases might use the least: claims brought by vulnerable litigants against the government. I will discuss the implications of this finding in Part III, but, for now, I will observe that the harm from missing decisions may be asymmetrical, thereby exacerbating inequities already present within a system that makes it much more difficult for unrepresented litigants and incarcerated people to obtain relief. The government may be aware of a missing decision because its attorneys have litigated the issue before, but the incarcerated person will have great difficulty finding relevant missing

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188. This table identifies the “OPDISP” field in the IDB among those missing entries that involve original proceedings. See id. at 12.
authority because it will not be available on court websites or, should they have access, in commercial databases or volumes of the Federal Reporter and the Federal Appendix). Missing decisions ultimately require a certain level of inside knowledge to find—knowledge that most unrepresented litigants likely lack.189

C. Results

This section describes the main findings from the matched pair data set for merits terminations—that is, the results based on what was found in Bloomberg Law’s database and matched to information in the FJC’s IDB. These results should be understood against the backdrop of what is missing from the data set because inclusion of those missing decisions may only deepen the disparities discussed below. Any examination of the output of the federal appellate courts’ second-tier process is necessarily tentative and incomplete without that data set. Nevertheless, these data offer some insights and observable trends that suggest that our understanding of a two-tier system of federal appellate justice may be incomplete—there may be, instead, three tiers of decisional quality and process.

This section begins with a high-level summary of findings and limitations. It then explains those findings in greater depth—first by comparing this data set with the longitudinal work of the Gluck Study, then by turning to this project’s unique contribution to the study of unpublished decisions. Part III will separately consider the implications of these findings.

1. Summary of Findings and Limitations

This study suggests that unpublished decisions are not all created equal. Holding constant outcome, oral argument, and publication status, unrepresented litigants are more likely to receive unpublished decisions half the length of those issued in similarly situated counseled appeals. That these disparities exist even when a large volume of unrepresented appeals cannot be included—because the decisions are missing from commercial databases—only underscores the likely extent of the disparity.

This Article also demonstrates significant differences in unpublished decisions across the circuits. For example, the length of unpublished affirmances is more than five times greater in circuits with the most robust decisions when compared to the circuits with the shortest decisions.190 Those

189. I should note that the value or utility of these missing decisions is beyond the scope of this Article, but I have discussed those issues in earlier work. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1149–53 (discussing examples of missing decisions and arguing that some may have precedential value). Likewise, the implications for empirical researchers of the discovery of missing decisions are also beyond the scope of this Article, but it is conceivable that empirical tools may help researchers detect and correct for missing decisions. See generally Edward K. Cheng, Detection and Correction of Case-Publication Bias, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (2018) (proposing use of multiple-systems estimation to detect and correct for case-publication bias).

190. See infra Table 10.
differences exist for no obvious reason.191 Some differences may reflect circuit culture, adding to our understanding of how circuit personalities192 may shape litigation experience on the ground.

Ultimately, these findings suggest that in some—if not in most—circuits, there may be three tiers of federal appellate review: a first tier for the system’s “haves” and the most “important” or interesting cases, a second tier for the system’s “haves” who have lawyers but present routine, boring, or “easy” issues, and a third tier for the system’s “have-nots” who are unrepresented. Put differently, the results here suggest that the triage decision, which funnels certain kinds of cases to staff attorneys, may have a disparate effect even within the class of unpublished decisions.

Now for the limitations. First, consistent with other studies of this type, this work relies on word count as a proxy for reason-giving.193 But it is only a proxy. Data developed here that rely on more subjective assessments of the strength of a decision’s reason-giving also show a correlation between the mean word count of unpublished decisions in each circuit and the extent of reason-giving.194 Although there was greater disagreement among coders on this more subjective measure (and thus it has not been used to supplement the word-count data), the strength of the correlation generally suggests that fewer words are more likely to reflect thinner reasoning.

Second, the existence of missing decisions is also a limitation. The absence of these decisions from the data set—many of which are likely to be shorter and more perfunctory than the unpublished decisions included—may well skew the results in meaningful ways. To the extent that inclusion of those data would change the story, there is every reason to believe that it would likely change the story for the worse. Based on the nature of what is missing, and the reason why shorter forms of decisions may be excluded from

191. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 18, at 94 (arguing that it is unlikely that “caseload differences, either in number or kind account for the[se] differences” in how courts use shortcut procedures, and asserting that although some “experimentation” may be “tolerable,” there is “no apparent reason” for these differences); see also McAlister, supra note 3, at 1182–86 (considering the extent to which docket composition may affect use of oral argument and unpublished decisions across the circuits).

192. See generally Larsen & Devins, supra note 15 (arguing that circuits have unique personalities that are important counterweights to increased judicial partisanship).

193. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 70 n.260 (using word count “as a proxy for how much reasoning unpublished opinions contain” and noting that “[t]he word count of an opinion, of course, is only a rough proxy for whether an opinion is in fact ‘well-reasoned’”). I note that, unlike the Gluck Study, see id., at 70 n.261, this work excludes header material in its word counts. I note, further, that this category of coding had a low error rate in a random cross-check of 396 data fields—only four such disagreements, based, primarily on whether a concurrence or dissent had been included.

194. The Pearson coefficient between average word count of unpublished decisions in each circuit and the number of decisions hand-coded as lacking independent reasoning is -0.53, which suggests a strong negative correlation between word count and reason-giving—that is to say that fewer average words correlates with fewer overall decisions with independent reason-giving. See Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 82, 100 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that when Pearson correlation coefficient is greater than 0.5, it reflects a medium or strong correlation).
court websites, it is reasonable to assume that including what is missing likely would exacerbate existing differences in decisional length that is observed in decisions in unrepresented and represented appeals. The discussion above demonstrates that the missing decisions mostly affect unrepresented and other vulnerable litigants and likely involve more summary adjudications.

Third, it is entirely possible that there are other meaningful differences between unrepresented and represented appeals within the second tier for which this study cannot account but that may explain the disparity seen. I believe that the richness of the data (it contains more than 4,700 direct comparative observations in counseled and unrepresented appeals from the second tier) supports the assertions made here, but I have not accounted for any difference in relative complexity between counseled and unrepresented appeals within the second tier. Put differently, this study assumes that there is no meaningful difference in complexity between unrepresented and counseled appeals that do not receive oral argument and result in unpublished affirmances. But that is only an assumption, and one with which not all may agree.

Finally, this study is limited in time. That said, I have no reason to think the period studied—the first six months of 2017—is aberrational. In Appendix B, I contextualize the data within five-year means to demonstrate the sample’s consistency with overall trends. The trends are also consistent, generally, with the longitudinal work of another recent study, which used a significantly larger data set of FJC data but a substantially smaller coded sample. At the very least, I have confidence that this work is a snapshot in time that accurately describes the decisional practices of the courts of appeals during the first six months of 2017.

2. Comparison with Other Studies

My results here are consistent with recent work by Gluck and her colleagues that evaluated certain features of unpublished federal appellate decisions based on aggregate IDB data from 2008 to 2020. The Gluck Study included nearly 420,000 terminations from IDB data, supplemented by a hand-coded sample containing approximately 1,400 observations across six circuits. This project provides a closer examination of all decisions issued across all geographic appellate courts for a limited period within the longitudinal reach of the Gluck Study. This Article’s hand-coded data set, with more than 11,000 observations, allows for a comparative account of

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195. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 10, 21, 45–46 (discussing different decisional schemes and how some types of decisions, especially those related to summary orders, are not made available on court websites).
196. See infra Appendix B.
197. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 46.
198. Id. at 42 n.189.
199. Id. at 49 n.210.
200. This work occurred in parallel, and I was unaware of the Gluck team’s findings until publication of their article in May 2022.
unpublished decisions across the circuits that the Gluck Study does not address. The work is complementary; it both confirms and deepens the discussion of disparity that emerges from the Gluck team’s work, and it offers a more comprehensive account of the interplay between and among the circuits.

But it is important to underscore that my findings are consistent with some of the key insights of the Gluck Study. This study’s overall word count comparison between published and unpublished decisions is consistent with the Gluck team’s findings, which compared word length of published and unpublished decisions through 2017. They pegged the mean word count for published decisions since 2010 at approximately 5,000 words, whereas the mean length of unpublished decisions has been consistently at or near 1,000 words since 1991. They conclude that “unpublished opinions are usually a fraction of the length of published opinions—about one-fifth on average in recent years from 2010 on.” This study’s observations are consistent. Across all unpublished decisions in the data set, the mean word count was 962, while the mean word count for published decisions was 4,607.

The rates of publication for unrepresented and represented appeals across both studies are similar as well. In the Gluck Study, “just 2.1% of self-represented” appellants received published decisions. In this study’s sample, 2.9 percent (or 133 of 4,606) merits terminations involving unrepresented litigants resulted in published decisions. Conversely, 27.9 percent (or 1,792 of 6,415) terminations involving represented appellants resulted in published decisions. The Gluck Study concluded that “self-represented appellants were twelve times less likely to receive a published opinion than appellants represented by counsel.” For this study, unrepresented litigants were slightly less than ten times less likely to receive a published decision—a difference for which the missing decisions could account because the Gluck Study used aggregate FJC data for this finding and not the universe of matched pairs discussed here.

Ultimately, the Gluck Study concluded that the disproportionate rates of publication between unrepresented and represented appellants “merits further investigation.” They recognized that “[n]eutral explanations for this differential treatment may exist,” but that “bias could be another explanation” for the disparities observed. This work offers one such explanation by demonstrating that even when represented parties raise

201. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 47–48, 70–71. The Gluck Study analyzed (through an automated process) the total word count of just under 600,000 federal appellate decisions issued between 1991 and 2017 to derive their word count data. Id. at 70.
202. Id. at 71 & fig.17.
203. Id. at 40.
204. Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 37.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 52.
207. Id. Among those “[n]eutral explanations” are the possibility that such appeals are “less likely to raise meritorious claims or novel legal issues” or that they involve “poor advocacy.” Id. at 52–53.
208. Id. at 53.
routine or “easy” issues, they still seemingly receive more attention from the courts. That finding increases the possibility that bias—or inequities built into the triage system itself—may partly drive the observed disparities.

3. Findings in Greater Depth

This section explores in greater depth the main claim of this Article: if the second tier is full of “easy” cases, the courts of appeals differ markedly in how much reasoning they provide in “easy” cases. Not all “easy” cases are treated alike, and circuits are not alike in how they treat “easy” cases. To be sure, we might expect some disparities or differences within the second tier and across the courts of appeals. But the extent of the disparities observed, and the risks they pose, raise significant concerns about equal access to justice, law development, transparency, accountability, and litigant dignity. Before turning to these implications in Part III, this section details the observed disparities within and across the courts of appeals in how they resolve second-tier appeals.

Let us begin by examining the differences among the courts of appeals in how much written attention they give to second-tier appeals, compared to first-tier appeals, by comparing word length across the circuits in published and unpublished decisions. For a particularly stark example, consider the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Sixth Circuits: the mean word count for unpublished decisions issued in the Eighth Circuit is 352. In the Sixth Circuit, it is 2,206, making them five times as long as the decisions in the Fourth Circuit. And that is far from the only difference in how courts approach unpublished decisions—and published decisions, for that matter. Figure 7 below compares the mean word counts for published and unpublished decisions across the circuits, while Figure 8 more closely examines the mean word counts for unpublished decisions across the circuits.

![Figure 7: Mean Word Counts in All Published and Unpublished Decisions Across the Circuits](image)
Recall that we are missing a substantial number of decisions from the Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, which might be artificially raising those means. But another outlier here—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit—has particularly good coverage. It also happens to be the least busy federal appellate court (in terms of filings per judge)\textsuperscript{209} and the only court where judges perform all triage decisions themselves. If the adage that, with more time, one would write a shorter letter, were true, it seems not to hold much sway in the context of unpublished decisions. More reasoning, and thus longer decisions, may reflect greater judicial (or staff) effort and provide a more robust, quasi-precedential foundation across more areas of the law. Less is not always more when it comes to unpublished decision-making, where it may be tempting to say as little as possible to save time.

The differences across the circuits do not end there. Disparities in how courts resolve appeals within the second tier of appellate process also appear to exist. Even when an appeal does not receive oral argument, is affirmed, and results in an unpublished decision, appellants who are represented by counsel receive decisions nearly twice the length of those who are unrepresented. Removing criminal appeals from the group of represented appellants (and thus comparing civil appeals to civil appeals) deepens the

\textsuperscript{209} See McAlister, supra note 3, at 1211 tbl.17; id. at 1160 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s screening process); see also Larsen & Devins, supra note 15, at 1326 (discussing triage process in the Tenth Circuit and noting that judges consider screening to be “their most urgent task”).
disparity. Adding proceedings involving denials of certificates of appealability (which function as affirmances in habeas corpus proceedings) does not meaningfully change the story, nor would focusing only on civil appeals. The bottom line is that, on average, an unrepresented litigant is more likely to receive a shorter decision disposing of their appeal than a represented party, even when neither receives oral argument, a published decision, or a victory. Figure 9 identifies average word counts in all merits terminations across the circuits based on representation status, and holding constant outcome, oral argument, and publication status.

Figure 9: Word Count Comparisons in “Easy” Cases

![Figure 9: Word Count Comparisons in “Easy” Cases](image)
What drives these differences, it appears, are significant disparities at both the high and low ends of the distribution. Figure 10 identifies the relative frequency of decisions in certain length ranges, up to decisions with word counts of over 1,500 words. In most ranges, there is an observable disparity between appeals involving represented appellants (dark gray) and appeals involving unrepresented appellants (light gray), but the discrepancies are particularly pronounced at the high and low ends of the distribution.

*Figure 10: Frequency of Decisions Within Word Count Bands in Represented and Unrepresented “Easy” Appeals*
Differences exist within circuit decisional practices, too. In some circuits, there is little meaningful difference between how courts resolve unrepresented appeals and represented appeals; in others, the difference is stark. Figure 11 graphically depicts the difference between average word counts across the circuits between represented (dark gray) and unrepresented (light gray) appellants, whereas Table 10 details the mean word count and number of observations (n) across the circuits for represented and unrepresented second-tier appellants. Table 11 details the median word counts for the same data (represented and unrepresented second-tier appellants by circuit).

Figure 11: Average Word Counts in Represented and Unrepresented “Easy” Appeals Across the Circuits

210. These figures do not include denials of certificates of appealability; they thus compare only decisions issued in appeals as of right depending on the representation status of the appellant only (and they include criminal and civil appeals). Note that above, in Figure 9, and below, in Table 10, I have used all circuit means to reflect the total number of words in all similarly situated counseled and unrepresented terminations, divided by the total number of such terminations, which should mitigate the effect of some extreme outliers with few observations.
Table 10: Average Word Count in Unpublished Affirmances Issued Without Oral Argument Based on Representation Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed. Cir. Ct.</th>
<th>Represented</th>
<th>Unrepresented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>894 (n=20)</td>
<td>301 (n=62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>1,471 (n=25)</td>
<td>171 (n=13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>985 (n=181)</td>
<td>832 (n=70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>1,931 (n=162)</td>
<td>1,170 (n=199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>621 (n=370)</td>
<td>178 (n=392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>617 (n=332)</td>
<td>552 (n=247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>2,201 (n=209)</td>
<td>1,610 (n=144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>487 (n=3)</td>
<td>1,034 (n=95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>818 (n=94)</td>
<td>218 (n=155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>444 (n=580)</td>
<td>346 (n=527)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>2,186 (n=106)</td>
<td>1,366 (n=109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>1,600 (n=479)</td>
<td>1,450 (n=162)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean Across All Circuits 1,084 (n=2,561) 666 (n=2,175)

Table 11: Median Word Count in Unpublished Affirmances Issued Without Oral Argument Based on Representation Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fed. Cir. Ct.</th>
<th>Represented</th>
<th>Unrepresented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>643 (n=20)</td>
<td>156 (n=62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>1,342 (n=25)</td>
<td>176 (n=13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>961 (n=181)</td>
<td>780 (n=70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>1,713 (n=162)</td>
<td>1,033 (n=199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>517 (n=370)</td>
<td>111 (n=392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>436 (n=332)</td>
<td>438 (n=247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>1,940 (n=209)</td>
<td>1,275 (n=144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>642 (n=3)</td>
<td>974 (n=95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>780 (n=94)</td>
<td>153 (n=155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>305 (n=580)</td>
<td>369 (n=527)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>1,860 (n=106)</td>
<td>1,115 (n=109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>1,302 (n=479)</td>
<td>1,094 (n=162)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some of these differences, and the low number of observations, reflect the effect of missing decisions. But again, it is unlikely that including what is missing would make the picture better—it is more likely that what is missing are the poorest quality decisions with the least reasoning, as those are more likely to be issued through a summary procedure and not as written opinions.

More than 30 percent of the unrepresented appeals involving appeals as of right (and thus not including certificates of appealability in habeas corpus proceedings) involved prisoner claims. The mean word count in those 710 appeals was 638 words. There were ninety counseled appeals involving prisoners among the data set of “easy” cases, and those appeals generated substantially longer decisions, with an average word count of 1,455. In some circuits, like the Eleventh Circuit, the difference was especially sharp (an average word count of 2,702 in prisoner cases with counsel and 1,274 in cases without counsel). In other circuits, the presence of counsel seemed to make no difference, as all prisoners received perfunctory decisions: in the Eighth Circuit, the average word count for all prisoner appeals was only ninety-nine.

Admittedly, these results are not nearly as dramatic as the difference in length between published and unpublished decisions, which is closer to one-fifth as opposed to one-half. But bear in mind that these are differences within the second tier itself. None of these appeals went to oral argument. None has been designated for publication or is precedential. And it’s likely that many have been written by staff attorneys (and perhaps even rubber-stamped by a judge). These data suggest that, in conducting a limited review for error correction in second-tier appeals, the judge who reviews a staff attorney or law clerk’s recommendation will generally have less-reasoned decisions to review for approving a result in an unrepresented appeal than in a counseled appeal. And there could be cascading effects: future unrepresented litigants may have less guidance, should they pursue similar claims, and the law may develop more slowly in these areas over time.

One may argue that these are not apples-to-apples comparisons because the nature of the suit and the types of claims may be different across represented and unrepresented proceedings. That is undoubtedly true (and...
also the point). Ultimately, however, those differences are exceedingly difficult to quantify. The constants here—oral argument, publication status, and outcome—are meant as proxies for “easy” cases. If the animating presumption in sending unrepresented cases to the second tier by default, or in publishing decisions in those cases at a fraction of the rate of represented appeals, is that these cases are “easy” or “routine,” then it is helpful to compare “easy” cases to “easy” cases based on the treatment they received. That “easy” unrepresented cases receive less-reasoned decisions even within that second tier suggests that, perhaps, what these decisions look like may have less to do with the merits than with possible bias toward unrepresented (and incarcerated) litigants. Put it this way: if these appeals are all losers, why should the reasoning in one class of appeals be, on average, substantially thinner than in the other class of appeals?

Now, it is still possible that unrepresented appeals have a higher rate of frivolity than even similarly situated, second-tier, counseled appeals. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the fact of representation in some appeals, but not in others, is an indication of frivolity—that is, that representation status performs something of a screening function. Were that true, it would presumably be a neutral reason for any disparate treatment of unrepresented litigants. Again, that is also a reason that is difficult to test. But here is one indication that the presumption of frivolity and litigiousness around unrepresented litigants may be overblown: on average, unrepresented litigants are no more likely than average to seek rehearing or file a petition for certiorari after a loss. For all merits terminations during the study period, rehearing petitions were filed at a rate of 19.2 percent, which means that I observed 2,128 rehearing (or rehearing en banc) petitions filed from 11,065 merits terminations. For appellants unrepresented at termination, the rate was roughly similar—20.5 percent, or 946 of 4,606. The same was true for petitions for writs of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The overall rate for counseled appellants seeking a petition for certiorari was 12.9 percent (or 1,432 of 11,065) of merits terminations; the rate for those who were unrepresented at termination was 11.4 percent (or 526 of 4,606). To be sure, it is possible that unrepresented appellants are less familiar with postdecision options for review than those appellants with counsel, and that more would file for such relief if they knew it were available, but this is at least some indicia that unrepresented appellants are no more given to frivolous filings than other kinds of appellants.

There may be other, neutral reasons for treating appeals with similar merit (or lack thereof) differently, but the effects may lead to something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: by writing shorter decisions and issuing more unpublished decisions in some areas of the law than in others, it will be harder

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215. Compared to represented litigants whose appeals did not receive oral argument or a published decision (that is, second-tier represented appellants), the rate of seeking rehearing in unrepresented appeals was higher. Only 369 of 3,144 similarly situated represented appellants, or 11.7 percent, filed for rehearing (compared to 20.5 percent). The rate for filing petitions for certiorari was roughly equivalent (348 cert petitions filed out of 3,144 merits terminations, or 11.1 percent).
for those bringing similar claims to find useful precedent. Development of legal rules might slow down, and it might slow down more quickly in some circuits than in others. Compare the experience of the unrepresented appellant in the Fourth or Eighth Circuits to the experience of one in the Tenth or Eleventh Circuits. In the latter, the appellant is more likely to receive a decision ten times as long as in the former. The difference between those types of decisions is as significant as the difference between published and unpublished decisions themselves. These dates thus suggest that unrepresented appellants’ cases comprise the bottom rung of federal appellate procedure. The next part explains why we should care about the bottom rung, and how we might ameliorate its negative effects.

III. WHY WE SHOULD CARE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE

That the “easiest” cases percolating through the federal appellate courts receive the least written attention is neither controversial nor groundbreaking. At least not anymore—it has been that way for decades; that is why we have published and unpublished decisions in the first place. And few if any—including me—would suggest that all appeals should receive the same treatment or amount of attention from very busy courts. But what these data suggest is that it is not just that “easy” cases are getting less attention, but that particular kinds of “easy” cases in particular circuits, are getting much less. At its most extreme, consider this: the average represented appellant in the Tenth Circuit receives an unpublished decision more than twelve times as long as an unrepresented appellant in the Fourth Circuit. That is far more written attention for the represented appellant in one circuit than for an unrepresented appellant in another. That disparity raises a host of concerns about law development, accountability, equality, disuniformity, and litigant experience across the federal appellate courts.216

This part explains why we should care about these inequities, and it offers some solutions.

A. Why the Disparities Matter

If we judge the health of our institutions by how they treat the least powerful among us, then the triage regime needs a check-up. We might disagree about the prescriptions, but hopefully we are moving toward agreement about the basic need for an examination. The facts on the ground demonstrate that our federal appellate courts are a system of “haves” and “have-nots”—and that status depends not only on the resources of the appealing party, but also on the court that hears the appeal.

The disparities observed here are at least two-fold: first, there is the difference in how many courts seem to be treating cases that are superficially alike (that is, how dismissive courts are of “easy” cases), and second, perhaps

216. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 94 (asserting that publication practices should be assessed through the lens of the judicial system’s values, principally “development of the law, equal treatment, dignity, transparency, efficiency, and perceived legitimacy”).
even more problematically, how treatment is remarkably uneven across the circuits. And the latter may be leading to the former, as circuit disparities in reasoning may be driving the trends observed in how courts address unrepresented appeals overall.

Circuits have different cultures and norms, and those distinctions may be important to the vitality of the institutions themselves. Professors Allison Orr Larsen and Neal E. Devins, two esteemed chroniclers of the federal courts, have recently argued that circuit personalities are essential bulwarks against rising judicial partisanship. But there is a difference between cultivation of vibrant and unique circuit cultures that provide interconnection and collegiality, and circuit cultures that seemingly tolerate the deterioration of adjudicative and process values. We can encourage the former without tolerating the latter.

The data in this Article reveal some uncomfortable disparities—that may be produced and perpetuated by circuit triage regimes. Take, for example, the data from the Third Circuit, where the average word count in represented appeals without oral argument and publication is nearly 2,000 words (twice the national average), and in similar unrepresented appeals, it is closer to 1,170—consistent with the disparities observed nationally (but way better than what any litigant receives, on average, from any unpublished decision issued by the Fourth Circuit). There is reason to think the Third Circuit’s unique triage regime contributes to that disparity, as its judges set many cases for oral argument (only later to remove them), while it sends unrepresented appeals to staff attorneys (and standing panels) by default. The judges handle cases set for argument, even if they ultimately remove them from the argument calendar, by dispositions drafted in chambers.

There is every reason to think that some of what these data show is the


218. Larsen & Devins, supra note 15, at 1322 (observing that “unique traditions foster bipartisan relationships and a joint commitment to the rule of law”).

219. Levy made a similar point when recognizing that uniformity in circuit case management practices is neither obtainable nor desirable. Levy, supra note 19, at 382–83. “[D]eep value disuniformity,” she asserted “may be indefensible, [and] would mean the resulting priority disuniformity may also be problematic.” Id. at 384. The problem, of course, as Levy recognized, is that we have little transparency into the values that may animate some of the differences we observe. Id. at 383–84 (“[T]o improve current court practices and facilitate discussions about how practices relate to the courts’ underlying values, greater transparency and information sharing among the circuits are needed.”).

220. See Levy, supra note 19, at 358 (discussing the Third Circuit’s triage process).

221. Id. (cases that go on the oral argument calendar, even if later removed, “are decided in dispositions drafted in chambers”).
difference in the extent of reason-giving between triage by default for unrepresented litigants and active judicial resolution for represented appeals.

Of course, the seeming quality of decision-making from the Third Circuit might well make other circuits—like the Fourth, Eighth, or Ninth Circuits—blush. The effort that the Third Circuit expends in unrepresented appeals—to say nothing of represented appeals—dwarfs the output in other circuits. The average word count in the Third Circuit for unrepresented appeals is more than six times the average length of unrepresented appeals in the Fourth Circuit, for example. It is hard to imagine what might justify that kind of disparity as a circuit value. And if the Third Circuit has prioritized reason-giving as one of its circuit values, it is equally difficult to imagine why that should not be a shared value across all circuits—as a matter of transparency, accountability, equality, and litigant dignity.

The comparison between the Third and Fourth Circuits draws to light another point: if seemingly neutral (or nondiscriminatory) reasons—like poorer briefing or more frivolous filings—produce systemic disparities between represented and unrepresented appellants, what acceptable, neutral reasons might account for the disparities observed across circuits? It is highly unlikely that the Fourth Circuit sees demonstrably more meritless unrepresented appeals than its neighboring circuit. Indeed, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the difference between these two circuits confirms that disparities between represented and unrepresented litigants result, at least in part, from cultural disdain for unrepresented appellants—a disdain that may be particularly great in the Fourth Circuit, which sees a larger share of unrepresented appeals than any other circuit.

The stability that the Gluck Study describes in the length of unpublished decisions over time—compared, that is, to published decisions, which have swelled—underscores these observations about decisional disparities. The average length of unpublished decisions has held steady at around 1,000 words for twenty-six years. That suggests there is a floor for decisional length that assures sufficient reason-giving, and that floor is somewhere elsewhere.

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224. See supra note 222.

225. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 71 fig.17.

226. Id. at 71 (identifying mean word count for federal appellate decisions by publication status between 1991 and 2017 and observing that “mean word court [sic] of unpublished opinions has remained around 1,000 words” during that time).

227. This was the stated goal from the early days of nonpublication. A 1968 memorandum from the chief judge of the Fourth Circuit explained that unpublished decisions would be
around 1,000 words. That some courts fall well below that floor provides a
reasonable basis for concluding that the reasons they offer some litigants are
meaningfully thinner than those offered to others in other circuits.
We should be especially concerned that the triage system’s results appear
to impose uneven burdens on the system’s most vulnerable (and most frequent) litigants. The risk for dignitary harm and the frustration to accountability are great—especially when these litigants may lack other recourse against governmental abuses. Consider the consequences of decisions like those from the Fourth Circuit in Appendix A. Imagine being on the receiving end of a decision stamped “not precedential” or “not intended for publication” or “summary” that contains a scant 200 words. Imagine how difficult it is to assess the correctness of that ruling on its face. To be sure, one can say a lot with a few words. Perhaps “less is more” should be the norm, but it is not. To the contrary, modern courts appear to view the amount of ink spilled as positively correlated with a case’s importance. And when litigants have no other touchpoints with a court, it is difficult not to rely on the written decision as the only measure of judicial engagement. If you received this hypothetical 200-word decision, what assurance would you have—having had no other interaction with the court that issued it—that the court really read your briefs and considered your arguments? How might anyone be able to tell that the decision was correct or based on sound reasoning?

Even for those unmoved by litigant dignity, or equality, or transparency concerns, the disparities discussed threaten the uniform development of the law. The risk of systemic nonpublication, coupled with demonstrably shorter unpublished decisions in some circuits, may undermine even-handed law

“succinct[]” but “always adequately[] state[] the facts, the contentions, and the reasons for the conclusion,” even when the appeal was “frivolous.” Jones v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d 1091, 1095 (4th Cir. 1972) (attaching memorandum).

228. See Anne Morrison Piehl & Margo Schlanger, Determinants of Civil Rights Filings in Federal District Court by Jail and Prison Inmates, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 80 (2004) (“The only universal accountability mechanism is the inmate lawsuit seeking damages or some kind of remedial action for injury inflicted by official misconduct.”).

229. See infra Appendix A.

230. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 71–72 & fig.17 (observing that published decisions have become longer since a rule change permitted citation to unpublished decisions and hypothesizing that “courts may be issuing more time-saving unpublished opinions because of the greater time they have chosen to spend on drafting published opinions”); see also Meg Penrose, Enough Said: A Proposal for Shortening Supreme Court Opinions, 18 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 49, 52–56 (2019) (cataloging and critiquing the verbose Roberts Court).

231. See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/us18rulings.html [https://perma.cc/YWS4-6Y8P] (comparing decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which had fewer than 4,000 words, with the 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), another school desegregation case, that reached 47,000 words, and observing that median length of decisions in 1950s was around 2,000, and by 2010, it was 4,751).
development. Although unpublished decisions do not formally bind courts, they are a valuable source of persuasive authority that impact the development of law. Elsewhere, I have identified helpful unpublished decisions that are missing from commercial databases—a problem that this study only underscores. Unpublished decisions can make “important contributions to common law,” and recent work confirms that at least some unpublished decisions are cited frequently. There is reason, then, to care about what unpublished decisions look like, how reasoned they are, and how they might be used differently across the circuits.

These concerns are especially great in the context of unrepresented appeals, which predominately involve claims brought by incarcerated persons. Not only are these decisions harder to find, but the reasoning may well be thinner and less useful to future courts, constitutional actors, and incarcerated persons themselves. The consequence of this underdevelopment for civil rights law is concerning because, where, as Professor Alan M. Trammell has observed, “litigation [in that space] rests on the premise that law indeed becomes settled,” and that “[c]itizens may rely on the eminently reasonable assumption that officials will abide by settled law, and they may seek compensation when officials fail to do so.”

Systematic under-publishing and under-reasoning in certain areas of the law, and in certain courts, threaten to undermine the very development of “settled law” on which our civil rights enforcement regime rests.

It may also produce inefficiencies for the courts themselves. Better legal development, and greater access to those decisions, will help litigants know in advance that some arguments may be losers and that other arguments are

232. See Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 95 (“[I]f courts issue non-precedential opinions more frequently in certain subject areas than others, these practices could cause the law to develop in a lopsided manner.”).
233. McAlister, supra note 12, at 1149–51 (discussing Jones v. Gelb, No. 15-1680 (1st Cir. filed June 8, 2015), a case with a missing decision from the First Circuit, and arguing that some missing decisions are significant and worth finding and using).
235. To be sure, unpublished decisions are cited far less frequently than their published counterparts, especially by courts, but it is undoubtedly also the case that “some unpublished opinions are sufficiently reasoned to be useful to litigants and courts.” Gluck et al., supra note 2, at 87; see id. at 85–86 (observing a ratio of “approximately thirty citations to a published opinion for every citation to an unpublished opinion,” but also finding that litigants cited to unpublished decisions in their briefs nearly 70 percent of the time in at least one circuit with high nonpublication rates).
236. See McAlister, supra note 14, at 555, 556 fig.7 (demonstrating that 47 percent of all unrepresented appeals involve claims by incarcerated litigants and another 18 percent—most of which are also filed by incarcerated litigants—involves original proceedings).
237. Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 67, 119 (2019); see also Trammell, supra note 9, at 989 (recognizing that “precedents create affirmative legal obligations for state officials, even if those officials were not parties to the precedent-making lawsuits”).
more likely to be winners. Even ventilating meritless arguments may serve to aid in legal development, as the public and Congress learn what issues are emerging and recurring. It is conceivable that issuing more thoroughly reasoned unpublished decisions creates more barriers for marginalized litigants to succeed. That is, courts may create more law (whether persuasive or binding) for litigants to overcome. Although that is a real concern, it is not a concern that, in my view, outweighs the benefits that reason-giving provides: increasing accountability, transparency, and litigant dignity. Moreover, other measures—like increased publication of results favorable to incarcerated persons and other vulnerable litigants—are far more important measures for offsetting the risk that uneven law development poses.

B. What to Do

Now for the difficult part: what to do. Not all appeals—even those within the second tier—may be equal. That much may be true. It is equally true that judicial resources are finite. Working within existing constraints, then, Levy is right that some form of case management is both rational and needed. But how do we decide when there has been too much triage? And if we think there has been too much, how much should there be? These are difficult questions, and I do not purport to have all the answers. But they are essential questions to ask, especially in the face of lessening docket pressures. If a triage system’s primary boon is more efficiency and preservation of scarce judicial resources, how should we recalibrate that scheme when resources (e.g., judicial time) are seemingly more plentiful? Indeed, do we still need triage at all?

Reforms must begin with transparency. Congress should task each circuit court to issue periodic reports that explain, in detail, their triage regimes (or any changes thereto) and identify and defend the values that animate it. In that process, courts should incorporate dissenting voices from within the court, survey results on litigant experience (including from unrepresented appellants), and invite and engage with the views of district court judges who follow circuit precedent. These courts should be asked to explain, anew, decisions to send appeals to staff attorneys by default,

239. See Reinert, supra note 103, at 1226–30 (discussing benefits of meritless litigation).
240. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 32, at 183, 191 (arguing that “not all cases are of equal merit”).
241. See supra notes 53–61 and accompanying text (discussing Levy’s appraisal of case management or triage regimes).
242. See McAlister, supra note 14, at 552–54 (demonstrating that caseload volume has decreased since 2005 and showing lack of correlation between overall caseload and use of unpublished decisions).
243. One could also ask this question in the context of the possibility of adding more judges to the federal appellate courts. See McAlister, supra note 3, at 1216–18 (discussing why adding judges may address systemic deficits in distribution of judicial attention to marginalized litigants).
244. Reforms also should include a mandate that courts provide free access to all opinions with merits terminations on their websites. See McAlister, supra note 12, at 1160–62 (making that recommendation).
especially now that caseload volumes have fallen, and judicial time has become less burdened.

To aid in that process, and to provide more systemic information to inform the cost-benefit calculus of triage regimes, Congress should require the courts to report detailed statistics annually about the results of their triage schemes, including the percentage of cases handled primarily by judicial staff and those handled in chambers. This information should be sufficiently granular so as to be able to identify average word length, rate of publication, and percentage of oral argument by representation status and nature of suit. Courts should be required to post these annual reports on their websites and report such data to the Administrative Office, which should evaluate and publicly report on intercircuit disparities.

These transparency reforms may have the positive effect of prompting the courts to revisit their own procedures in the process. That would be good, for sure. Courts were the ones to innovate the federal appellate triage system when it seemed most needed; they may be well positioned to innovate it again, as the need for triage recedes and the regime’s costs become more apparent. Ultimately, I believe that the triage system could be reformed in ways that better account for individual litigant need—that is, the value that litigants might assign to process itself. Professor Matthew B. Lawrence’s work discusses this possibility in the context of triaging administrative review processes for Medicare coverage determinations. He proposes a unique triage regime that might ration resources based on “the inherent value of participation to particular claimants,” which may shift procedural attention to frustrated beneficiaries instead of the providers who frequently appeal. A framework like that—or one that provides greater attention to disfavored appellants based on a random lottery like the one that Professors Daniel Epps and William Ortman have proposed for Supreme Court review—may have net benefits for law development, error detection, and procedural justice. The point is that the triage regime could be recalibrated to allocate judicial attention where it might matter most, not only to the development of the law or the detection of error, but also to the litigants themselves.

But the size of the disparities across the circuits suggest that circuit habits may be too entrenched for us to expect the courts to solve these problems on their own—no matter what innovations they might prefer. One way to address decisional disparities that impose uneven burdens on marginalized litigants would be to mandate a reason-giving decisional floor by statute.

245. See Lawrence, supra note 36, at 83.
246. Id.
248. To be clear, I believe that law development and error correction should continue to have a significant role in designing any triage regime. I am suggesting that another value—the importance of judicial attention and process to the litigant themselves—be an additional consideration in how courts allocate attention.
249. Such a requirement would likely pass constitutional muster—especially given the plenary authority that Congress has over the lower federal courts. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); cf. Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and
Although some might view that solution to be something of a sledgehammer, it may be the kind of systemic jolt needed to unsettle entrenched habits. Congress could require all federal appellate decisions terminating an appeal or original proceeding on the merits to (1) identify the issues on appeal, (2) identify and explain relevant law, and (3) apply that law to key facts. Only when a court makes a specific and detailed finding of frivolousness might it be relieved of the burden to explain its result, but these frivolous appeals should be identified as such and they should be tracked and reported by the Administrative Office.

I have previously discussed the trade-offs of a reason-giving norm in the context of unpublished decisions and concluded that the pros outweigh the cons. The goal in mandating such a reform would be to bring uniformity to the practice of unpublished decisions, thus ensuring that reason-giving is consistent throughout the federal appellate courts, even if some courts choose to issue more (or fewer) unpublished decisions. The development of the law—even as a source of persuasive authority, which all unpublished decisions are—should not suffer as a result of court preferences. Such a mandate may create more “junk” precedent—that is, more of what Professor Brian Soucek has described as “copy-paste” precedent, through which courts repeatedly regurgitate inaccurate descriptions of the law in unpublished decisions. Perhaps perversely, generating more of such precedent might make it easier to detect the development of errant law of the sort that copy-paste precedent produces. But another requirement might also stymie this risk—requiring the appellate courts to cite to, rely on, and quote only published authority in their decisions. When no published decision is on point, that may be a sign that precedential treatment is necessary.

There is another benefit to establishing a reason-giving mandate. It might help develop a more robust legal basis to distinguish between meritlessness and frivolity. Doing so might provide further guidance to litigants on the difference between the two, and it may help deter frivolous appeals by putting all on notice that a particular argument is a certain loser. But distinguishing between meritless and frivolous appeals would also help identify and root out systemic biases. If, for example, one circuit claims that it has a substantially greater volume of frivolous appeals than another, that might be cause for suspicion—it may be a sign of bias against certain appellants. If courts are

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250. See McAlister, supra note 14, at 591 (arguing for a similar reason-giving norm in unpublished decisions).

251. Id. at 583–93 (discussing and defending a reason-giving norm for federal appellate courts).

252. See Soucek, supra note 54, at 165–71 (discussing the hazards of copying inaccurate descriptions of the law from one nonprecedential decision to another); see also Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1619, 1622 (2020) (discussing similar phenomenon in district court opinions).

253. This is similar to Soucek’s prescription. See Soucek, supra note 54, at 170 (“Courts should refrain from releasing unpublished opinions when the governing legal principle either is not, or cannot be, quoted directly from a precedential opinion.”).
giving short shrift to some appeals because they are frivolous, they should be tasked with explaining on the record why an appeal is not worth their time. If, however, an appeal is not demonstrably frivolous, the least we should expect is reasoned decision-making—that is, an explanation of what the appeal is about and why the party appealing has lost. That kind of basic reason-giving requirement would benefit all and help eliminate bottom-rung appeals.

CONCLUSION

The federal appellate regime produces measurable, observable inequities in how it distributes procedure and judicial attention. Those disparities affect vulnerable and marginalized litigants more than other, better-resourced appellants, even when both bring “easy” appeals. These disparities, moreover, are uneven across the circuits. In some circuits, reason-giving appears, on average, to be very poor; in others, it is far more robust. Little explains these differences, and their persistence may jeopardize law development, transparency, and accountability in civil rights, habeas, and immigration appeals—areas where unpublished decisions are used frequently. The presence of these intercircuit disparities alone suggests that bias infects the federal appellate triage regime—at least in circuits where disfavor toward this class of claimants may be greater.

In an ideal world, courts would revise triage regimes on their own; they might develop and implement reason-giving norms to provide quality, reasoned decisions to all litigants. Some courts appear to have done just that, assuming that these data accurately reflect persistent trends. But others lag well behind their peers. Although reason-giving atrophy was to be expected as courts shifted to a nonpublication norm, this study demonstrates that some courts have gone too far in eroding core decisional values. It is time to eliminate bottom-rung appeals, and if the courts will not do it on their own, then Congress should.
APPENDIX A

The following was coded as “not identifying the cause of action,” “not identifying the issues on appeal,” “not containing independent reasoning,” and “resting entirely on the district court’s decision”:

Althea Marie Hughes appeals the district court’s order dismissing her civil action for failure to state a claim for relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Hughes v. Bank of Am., No. 3:16-cv-00672-HEH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85236 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.254

The following was coded as “identifying the cause of action,” “not identifying the issues on appeal,” “not containing independent reasoning,” and “resting entirely on the district court’s decision”:

George Riley Altman, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Altman v. Hollenbaek, No. 5:15-hc-02256-D (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.255

The following was coded as “not identifying the criminal offense,” “identifying the issues on appeal,” “containing independent reasoning” (here, lack of jurisdiction because appellant challenged only a discretionary sentencing decision), and “not resting entirely on the district court’s decision”:

Chandra Padgett seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting the Government’s motion in her criminal case. Our review of the district court’s order is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) (2012). United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 190, 193 (4th Cir. 2012). While the statute gives us “jurisdiction to hear challenges to the lawfulness of the method used by the district court in making its sentencing decision,” we lack “jurisdiction to review any part of a discretionary sentencing decision.” Id. at 194. Because the sole issue Padgett raises on appeal challenges the district court’s discretionary sentencing decision, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.256

256. United States v. Padgett, 691 F. App’x 93, 94 (4th Cir. 2017).
The following was coded as “identifying the cause of action,” “not identifying the issues on appeal,” “not offering independent reasoning,” and “not resting exclusively on the district court’s decision”:

Robert Lee Pernell, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000); see Miller El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484–85.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Pernell has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.257

APPENDIX B

The following table compares the data set’s publication and oral argument rates to the available one-year and five-year mean statistics for the same decisional features. It demonstrates that the sample comports with the overall trends for the same period.

*Table B.1:* Overall Profile of Data Set Compared to Oral Argument Statistics

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<tr>
<th>Fed. Cir. Ct.</th>
<th>Matched Pairs</th>
<th>Matched Merits Terms.</th>
<th>Merits Decided after OA</th>
<th>% of Merits Terms Decided after OA</th>
<th>5-yr Mean Rate of OA (SD)</th>
<th>2017 Rate of OA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>47.1% (2.6)</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>25.5% (2.6)</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>33.4% (1.6)</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>11.6% (1.7)</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>9.2% (2.2)</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>19.4% (2.9)</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>13.8% (1.3)</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>37.2% (4.2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>16.7% (1.1)</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.4% (1.8)</td>
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<td>513</td>
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<td>26.2% (3.1)</td>
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<td>194</td>
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<td>10.2% (1.5)</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
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</tbody>
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258. These means were generated using data from Table B-10 in *Judicial Business* for each year between 2015 and 2020. See also McAlister, supra note 3, at 1177 tbl.4 (using same). “SD” refers to the standard deviation for each mean.

Table B.2: Overall Profile of Data Set Compared to Publication Statistics

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<td>137</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>60.0% (4.3)</td>
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<td>707</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
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<td>93.7% (1.6)</td>
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260. These means were generated using data from Table B-12 in Judicial Business for each year between 2015 and 2020. See also McAlister, supra note 3, at 1176 tbl.3 (using same). “SD” refers to the standard deviation for each mean.