BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT: OBSTACLES TO DISCOVERY IN CLAIMS AGAINST CHINESE COUNTERFEITERS

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What is the proper method for U.S. litigants to obtain evidence located in a foreign country for trademark litigation in the United States? The Lanham Act authorizes trademark owners to recover profits made from the sale of goods that infringe on their trademarks. In order to account for and ultimately recover these profits, trademark owners need access to the infringers’ bank records. But access to such records can be a challenge when the infringers and their banks are located outside the United States.

In recent years, several brand owners have instituted a series of trademark infringement lawsuits in the Southern District of New York against Chinese vendors selling counterfeit goods online. This Note focuses on the conflict within the Southern District of New York over whether the Hague Convention or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the appropriate method for obtaining bank records from Chinese banks. At issue is the lack of transparency in the Chinese legal system, leaving the U.S. courts in need of guidance. Ultimately, this Note endorses a presumption against the Hague Convention whenever cooperation from the foreign sovereign is unclear. This Note argues that this policy will incentivize sovereign states to be more accommodating with their handling of foreign requests for evidence and any conflicting laws that might hinder such production.

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Imagine your surprise when you discover that in your efforts to shop for deals online, you inadvertently purchased counterfeit goods. Surprise turns into outrage when you learn that the website was specifically designed to be misleading as to the authenticity of its products. Brand owners incur similar outrage and economic harm when their customers are unsuspectingly deceived by these counterfeit websites.

Counterfeit trademark goods, and the economic harm they cause to trademark owners, have reached global proportions due in part to the internet and the advent of the online marketplace. The internet hosts

1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) defines “counterfeit trademark goods” as “any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country of importation.” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 51 n.14(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (hereinafter TRIPS); see also 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a) (2012) (defining “counterfeit trademark” as “a spurious trademark that is identical to, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered trademark”).

multitude of websites dedicated to the sale of counterfeit products and online marketplaces like Taobao, eBay, and Alibaba have since replaced traditional Chinatown markets as major outlets for counterfeit goods. The internet is an attractive medium for retailers of counterfeit trademark goods because it provides user anonymity, access to a global consumer base, and seamless transition to new websites and marketplaces with relative ease. Although trademark owners can benefit from electronic records and payment trails created by online sales, enforcement of intellectual property rights against infringement over the internet is susceptible to many procedural and technical difficulties. Therefore, robust enforcement of intellectual property rights today requires tools and strategies specifically tailored to combating infringement over the internet.

(“Trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale continue to thrive around the world in part because of the presence of marketplaces that deal in goods and services that infringe intellectual property rights.”); see also Doug Palmer & Melanie Lee, Special Report: Faked in China: Inside the Pirates’ Web, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-china-counterfeit-idUSTRE69P1AR20101026 (“The Internet has just completely changed the face of the problem, made it more complicated and more pervasive,” says John Morton, assistant secretary in charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). “Whole industries now have been attacked, not from the street, but from the Internet.”).

3. A search for the words “Gucci handbags outlet” on Google generates about 8,200,000 results. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also Jenny T. Slocum & Jess M. Collen, The Evolving Threat and Enforcement of Replica Goods, 33 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 789, 796 (2011) (“Any person searching for a cheap version of their favorite goods can find and access them on a multitude of websites. This access has introduced counterfeit goods into every home in the world that has an Internet connection.”).

4. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) compiles an annual list of notorious markets “that are reportedly engaged in substantial piracy and counterfeiting.” See USTR, supra note 2, at 1. Although Taobao was not included in the notorious markets lists for 2012 because it has since taken action to “clean up its site,” Taobao, along with Alibaba, was mentioned in the 2012 list and was included in the monthly lists from 2010 and 2011 “for [its] widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated goods in its electronic marketplace.” Id. at 2; see USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, DECEMBER 20, 2011, at 3 (2011), available at http://ustr.gov/webfil_send/3215; USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS, FEBRUARY 28, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://ustr.gov/webfil_send/2595; see also Memorandum from Travis D. Johnson, Vice President, Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., to Stanford McCoy, Asst. U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual Prop. and Innovation 16 (Feb. 10, 2012) [hereinafter IACC Memorandum 2012], available at http://4356049642aa3c99a6e91c99180a8219894d6198.gripelements.com/pdf/member-resources/iacc_special_301_2012_final.pdf (naming Taobao as the online trade platform in China it was most concerned with and expressing dissatisfaction with Taobao’s “take down” procedures).

5. USTR, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 15 (2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf (“Continued growth in the online sale of pirated and counterfeit hard goods that will soon surpass the volume of such goods sold by street vendors and in other physical markets.”).


7. See infra Part I.C–D.
The Second Circuit has held that online marketplace proprietors, like eBay, are not secondarily liable for trademark infringing products sold by third parties on their websites.\(^8\) Thus, trademark owners seeking to enforce their rights must pursue parties who actually sell or use their infringing marks. Remedies like default judgments and injunctive relief are available options,\(^9\) but they ultimately fall short of providing real monetary recovery or permanence.\(^10\) Hence, trademark rights will continue to be threatened and economic harm suffered absent another solution.

Cutting off the funds that finance counterfeiting operations, via the Lanham Act,\(^11\) could be that solution. Designer brands Tiffany and Co. and Gucci America, Inc. have recently commenced a series of trademark infringement suits in the Southern District of New York against multiple individuals for selling counterfeit trademark goods online.\(^12\) These luxury brand owners are seeking relief in the form of asset restraints and an accounting of profits under the Lanham Act with the goal of recovering the profits made from these online sales. The defendants in these suits all reside in China and have all failed to appear before the court.\(^13\) So, Tiffany and Gucci have attempted to access the defendants’ profits through their banks; namely Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and China Merchants Bank (CMB) (collectively, the

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\(^8\) See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the internet marketplace proprietor was not liable for direct trademark infringement in the use of a jewelry seller’s mark on its website or contributory trademark infringement despite the proprietor’s generalized knowledge of infringement).


\(^10\) See Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum & David Ewen, Catch Me If You Can: An Analysis of New Enforcement Measures and Proposed Legislation To Combat the Sale of Counterfeit Products on the Internet, 32 PACE L. REV. 567, 569 (2012) (describing the impracticality of pursuing default judgments against infringing websites); see also Memorandum from Robert Barchiesi, President, Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., to Stanford McCoy, Asst. U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual Property and Innovation 19 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter IACC Memorandum 2011], available at http://4356049642aa3c99a6e91c99180a8219894d6198.gripelements.com/pdf/member-resources/2011_special_301_iacc_final.pdf (discussing the costs and difficulties in investigating and taking down listings of stand-alone websites, especially when “online counterfeiters are operating through tens, hundreds and in some cases thousands of separate platforms and domain names”).


However, the Banks have resisted complying with discovery, citing Chinese bank secrecy laws.\textsuperscript{15}

The courts have two legal avenues by which to compel compliance with discovery in these cases: the Hague Convention and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Per Second Circuit precedent, judges must apply a multifactor test to determine which avenue is more appropriate in a given case. But despite the similarities of the cases before the Southern District, the test has not produced uniform results. This Note explores the analyses several judges have used and argues that the inconsistency within the district for how to reach Chinese nonparty banks is due primarily to a lack of information and transparency regarding how China handles Hague Convention requests. By illustrating this issue and filling in this information gap, this Note hopes to assist trademark owners in their quest for protection and recovery in China.\textsuperscript{16}

Part I of this Note studies trademarks and infringement, specifically examining the rights afforded to trademark owners; global counterfeiting and its implications; and the developments and procedural difficulties of trademark rights enforcement. Part II reviews several recent trademark infringement suits in the Southern District of New York, which collectively demonstrate the problems courts and trademark owners face in enforcing trademark rights against Chinese infringers. Part III then suggests a uniform approach for courts to adopt when encountering transparency issues in foreign legal systems, with the hopes of improving the protection of U.S. trademark rights.

\textbf{I. THE REACH OF U.S. TRADEMARK LAW TO ONLINE MARKETPLACES SELLING COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARK GOODS FROM CHINA}

This part provides an overview of trademarks and infringement, China’s role as a major source of counterfeit trademark goods, and the rise in online sales of counterfeit goods. It then explores the areas of law and procedural methods commonly employed to stop the sale of counterfeit consumer goods online. Finally, it focuses on the discovery process for evidence located outside the United States for U.S.-based trademark litigation.

\textsuperscript{14} See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.

\textsuperscript{15} See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1; Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.

\textsuperscript{16} The issues presented in this Note address disputes beyond trademark infringement and China, implicating U.S.-based litigation involving evidence located abroad in general. Foreign defendants could potentially use foreign banks as shields from plaintiffs attempting to access their funds and bank records. Conversely, compelling banking institutions to succumb to discovery orders in every jurisdiction where they conduct business could be a serious impediment to the trade and banking industry.
A. Trademarks and Infringement

There are three main forms of intellectual property rights in the United States: patents, copyrights, and trademarks.\(^\text{17}\) Patents protect new, useful and nonobvious inventions;\(^\text{18}\) copyrights protect tangible original works of authorship, such as writings, music, and art;\(^\text{19}\) and trademarks serve as source identifiers.\(^\text{20}\) A trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that can be used to identify and distinguish the goods of a manufacturer or seller from those manufactured or sold by others.\(^\text{21}\) Protected trademarks can range from the name of a company, like Gucci, to a specific and distinctive color that can identify the source of the goods, like robin’s-egg blue\(^\text{22}\) for Tiffany.\(^\text{23}\) Naturally, consumer goods, and luxury goods in particular, benefit from registered trademark protection.

The Lanham Act provides federal protection for trademarks used in commerce.\(^\text{24}\) The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the federal agency that grants patents and registers trademarks.\(^\text{25}\) While registration with the USPTO is not required in order to receive federal protection under the Lanham Act, registration does provide several advantages.\(^\text{26}\) Registration with the USPTO serves as “notice to the public of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, a legal presumption of ownership nationwide, and the exclusive right to use the mark on or in connection with the goods or services set forth in the registration.”\(^\text{27}\) Owners of registered trademarks also benefit from seizures made by U.S.


\(^\text{21}\) Id. § 1127.

\(^\text{22}\) Registration No. 2,416,794.


\(^\text{24}\) See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141. Trademark protection is also available under state unfair competition laws (both statutory and common law). See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 22:10 (summarizing state trademark registration provisions); see also Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1910 n.5 (1997) (“Injunctions also are available in actions brought under state common law as well as state trademark registration, unfair competition, and antidilution statutes.”). This Note focuses primarily on federal trademark rights under the Lanham Act.


\(^\text{26}\) The Lanham Act provides protection for both federally registered marks and common law (unregistered) marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (protection for registered marks); id. § 1125(a) (protection for unregistered, common law marks). Registration with the USPTO provides the benefit of serving as prima facie evidence of validity, but ownership of a mark ultimately goes to the first user of the mark. See id. § 1057(b)–(c); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 16:1 (discussing the first-in-time, first-in-right rule).

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In certain situations, trademark infringement can also lead to federal criminal liability as well. Congress enacted the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 criminalizing conduct that formerly had been subject only to civil penalties because it felt that penalties under the Lanham Act had “been too small, and too infrequently imposed, to deter counterfeiting significantly.”

It is a violation of the Lanham Act to use a valid trademark in commerce without the consent of the trademark owner. Any person who uses any “reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of a mark in commerce where confusion as to the origin of the good is likely, will be liable to the owner of the trademark. Thus, any individual that manufactures and sells goods bearing the name “Gucci” or the color robin’s-egg blue, other than the rightful owners of these trademarks, will be liable to Gucci or Tiffany, respectively. Civil remedies available to owners of trademarks that have been infringed upon include injunctive relief, an accounting of the infringer’s profits, and damages. Where appropriate, treble damages, attorney fees, and costs may be recovered as well.

B. China’s Role in Global Counterfeiting

In 2012, the CBP made “22,848 intellectual property rights seizures with a manufacturer’s suggested retail value of $1.26 billion.” Goods from China accounted for 72 percent of the total retail value. The commodities

33. Id. § 1114(1)(b).
34. A finding of trademark infringement is determined by the likelihood of confusion and the alleged infringer’s use of the mark. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, §§ 23:1–90 (detailing the likelihood of confusion test).
36. See id. § 1117.
38. See id.
most often seized were consumer electronics, footwear, pharmaceuticals, optical media, and apparel. 39

China’s role as a major source for counterfeit trademark goods can be attributed to economic, enforcement, and even cultural factors. The U.S. International Trade Commission has reported that “globalization and the spread of technology” has allowed for “simple and low-cost duplication of popular products, as well as packaging and labeling.” 40 The move of U.S. and other manufacturing operations to Asia increased opportunities in both the production process and import supply chain for counterfeiting. 41 Weak local enforcement and high thresholds for investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters also help perpetrate global counterfeiting in China. 42 The profitability of counterfeiting has even led to the rise of the “Shan Zhai” cultural phenomenon, which means “‘to copy’ and ‘to parody’ as self-aware, casual, and public behavior by ordinary citizens.” 43 Some “Shan Zhai” companies in China have become so successful that they dominate the industries upon which they infringe. 44

A prominent example of this cultural phenomenon, and the increasingly brazen infringement methods to which it has given rise, is the 2011 discovery of fake Apple stores in China. 45 Bearing the same distinctive interior design and employee uniforms of Apple stores, these stores looked

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39. See id.
41. See id.
42. See IACC Memorandum 2011, supra note 10, at 10 (stating that China’s high thresholds for investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters represent a “significant barrier to effective enforcement”; see also Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/china/doingbizinchina/riskmanagement/ipr/index.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (listing “corruption and local protectionism, limited resources and training available to enforcement officials, and lack of public education regarding the economic and social impact of counterfeiting and piracy” as factors that undermine enforcement measures); USTR, supra note 5, at 30 (reporting on local protectionism despite clear evidence of counterfeiting and on instances where local Chinese administrative offices refused to refer cases for criminal prosecution even when thresholds were met).
43. William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai-China’s Copycat Counterculture: Catch Me If You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 611 (2012). The literal translation of “Shan Zhai” is “‘mountain stronghold,’ which in traditional Chinese popular culture refers to the hide-out of bandits and other outlaws.” Id. For a detailed history and discussion on the “Shan Zhai” culture and its impact on Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property rights, see generally id.
remarkably authentic and fooled even the employees working at them.46 Chinese authorities eventually uncovered as many as twenty-seven such stores.47

What is more concerning to trademark holders and consumers alike is the extent to which Chinese counterfeiting permeates the internet. Like fake stores, websites that sell counterfeit goods are often designed to replicate legitimate ones.48 Unlike fake stores, these sites allow counterfeiters to market their products to consumers all over the world with ease.49 These websites often display brand names and logos in attempts to pose as brand vendors, so as to deceive consumers shopping for brand goods.50 And when these websites appear in the same search result as websites for legitimate products,51 the potential for consumer confusion is especially salient.

Such confusion poses a real and potentially dangerous threat to consumers and their well-being. Consumers who seek discounts on authentic goods online often find themselves unwittingly purchasing the counterfeit equivalent, which leads to frustration when those goods are of lesser quality.52 This frustration can turn into physical danger with goods like counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs.53


48. The complaint in Tiffany I alleged that the defendants copied “the designs, patterns and color schemes” associated with Tiffany products and expressly identified their products as Tiffany products on their websites “in an effort to confuse consumers into believing that they are buying versions of the Tiffany Products.” Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 9471).

49. See IACC Memorandum 2011, supra note 10, at 13 (noting the “continuing growth in the use of the internet to promote, sell, and deliver counterfeits directly to consumers via the post”).

50. See id.

51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.


53. See Operation Apothecary Fact Sheet, NAT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS. COORDINATION CENTER, http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/fact-sheets/Operation%20Apothecary%20Fact%20Sheet%20view (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“The consumer purchases the pharmaceutical with the belief that the product advertised is a legitimate product, but in fact, is often purchasing a counterfeit or unapproved version of the drug that has often been manufactured in unsanitary conditions or not subjected to any safeguards or quality control regimes.”). For an example of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs seized in China, see Seized Some 10,000 Fake Viagra Pills, CHINA CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT INTELL. PROP. RTS. (Apr. 21, 2011), http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/tab43987/info298858.htm.
C. Combating Counterfeits

The sale of counterfeit goods over the internet specifically creates a number of enforcement issues. The CBP’s seizure statistics from the past five years indicates “a marked shift towards using international mail and express courier services” for the transportation of counterfeit goods.\(^{54}\) This increase is due in part to the “[c]ontinued growth of websites selling counterfeit and piratical merchandise directly to consumers.”\(^{55}\) Individual packages to consumers can be harder to detect compared to large cargo shipments.\(^{56}\) The General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (GAC)—the Chinese counterpart to the CBP—has also noted a similar trend in exports.\(^{57}\)

Regarding civil liability, the Second Circuit drew the line in *Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.*\(^{58}\) on who could be held liable for counterfeit products sold over the internet. eBay, the proprietor of an internet-based marketplace that facilitates the purchase and sale of goods, “provides the venue for the sale of goods and support for the transactions, but it does not itself sell the items’ listed for sale on the site.”\(^{59}\) Thus, the Second Circuit held that eBay was not liable for direct trademark infringement for displaying Tiffany’s mark on its website\(^{60}\) or for contributory trademark infringement for merely facilitating the sale of counterfeit products by its vendors.\(^{61}\)

After eBay, brand owners focused their efforts on individual sellers and their websites. Trademark owners started engaging in notice and takedown

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\(^{55}\) Id.; see also USTR, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that goods are increasingly “sold by online traders in China (and elsewhere) and delivered to consumers by mail and express delivery service”).

\(^{56}\) See China: Effects of Infringement, supra note 40, at 2-6 (“Counterfeits are purchased online and shipped to the United States and other markets by postal and express mail services, often in relatively small quantities that are difficult to detect.”).

\(^{57}\) Measures Taken, CHINA CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT INTELL. PROP. RTS., http://english.customs.gov.cn/tabid/43989/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“Customs administrations at all levels throughout the country have enhanced the control over the articles delivered by outward mails and express mails.”).

\(^{58}\) 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).

\(^{59}\) Id. at 97 (quoting Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).

\(^{60}\) See id. at 103.

\(^{61}\) See id. at 110. But see Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG (July 12, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5c687807beb24402baaeb362723eb6d4.e34KaxiLc3eQc4OLaxqMbN4Oah4Le0?text=&docid=107261&pagetitle=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&display=first&part=1&docid=589112 (holding that online marketplace proprietors may be liable in Europe if they were aware of ongoing infringement but failed to expeditiously remove such content from their sites).
procedures, in which he or she would send "notice of the infringing product or content to the Internet Service Provider and request[] that the listing be taken down." These procedures temporarily suspend sales and website owners can simply repost their products on new websites with relative ease and little cost. This phenomenon has been described as a "whack-a-mole" problem.

Moreover, for any one trademark-protected product, there can be up to hundreds or even thousands of websites selling the counterfeit versions of that product. To counter this problem, trademark owners then began bringing what Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum and David Ewen call "mass domain lawsuit[s]," where "brand owners join, in one action, as many as five hundred or more John Doe defendants, and target hundreds of counterfeit websites." Mass domain lawsuits, while undoubtedly more efficient than individual notice and takedown procedures, still face the same permanence issues.

Thus, a different approach is to follow the money—targeting the funds that finance counterfeiting operations. The Lanham Act authorizes trademark owners to recover the profits that counterfeiters make from acts of infringement, which could severely hinder a counterfeiter's ability to maintain his or her operation. Courts have held that when performing an accounting of profits, district courts have the inherent power to freeze an infringer's assets "in order to ensure the availability of that final relief."
As one court has said, the fact that the assets to be preserved are located in China has no bearing on this inherent power if personal jurisdiction has been found.72

However, even when the assets are frozen, access to the infringers’ bank account records is required in order for a court to calculate the amount of relief that is to be awarded. In an attempt to circumvent infringers who fail to respond or appear, brand owners like Tiffany and Gucci have turned directly to the banks where the infringers’ assets are held for access to their bank records.73 Brand owners are able to identify specific banks and bank accounts by tracking online payments made to the defendant’s websites.74 If brand owners are able to gain access to the assets and records belonging to the infringers through the banks directly, then recovery is possible without the defendants having to appear at all.

Brand owners Tiffany and Gucci have already begun testing this approach. Starting with Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li75 (Gucci I), Gucci obtained a preliminary injunction on July 12, 2010, restraining the defendants’ assets76 and ordering expedited discovery.77 Similar preliminary injunctions were granted to Tiffany in Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi78 (Tiffany I) and Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse79 (Tiffany II).

In each instance, Tiffany and Gucci served the New York branches of each bank where the respective defendants’ assets were held with copies of (holding that a “district court ha[s] the authority to freeze [assets that can be] used to satisfy an equitable award of profits”).72

72. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) (“Once personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to ‘freeze’ property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United States.”).

73. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.

74. Often, these websites will use companies like PayPal, Inc. to process their customers’ credit card transactions and then transfer the profits to bank accounts in China. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Occasionally, an “acquiring bank” is used instead “to process online purchases by serving as an intermediary between the online merchant and a credit card network such as Visa.” Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). For a step-by-step explanation of the credit card transaction process, see Visa International Operating Regulations Core Principles, Visa, apps. A, B (Oct. 15, 2012), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-core-principles.pdf.


76. Citing “Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) and [the] Court’s inherent equitable power,” the court declared that “any banks . . . who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise, are . . . restrained and enjoined from transferring, disposing of, or secreting any money, stocks, bonds, real or personal property, or other assets of Defendants” Preliminary Injunction and Order Authorizing Expedited Discovery at 6, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010).

77. The preliminary injunction also granted “continued expedited discovery . . . as to third parties, including any banking or other institutions, that received or transferred funds from accounts maintained by Defendants.” Id. at 9.


the preliminary injunctions and subpoenas for discovery. Ultimately, the Banks complied with the subpoenas regarding documents that were located in New York, but objected to the subpoenas for documents outside the United States. The Banks asserted that Chinese bank secrecy laws prevented them from complying with the subpoenas.

D. Foreign Discovery

Drawing from the Tiffany and Gucci cases, this section discusses the procedural mechanisms and rules for obtaining evidence to be used in litigation.

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the discovery process in actions brought before federal courts in the United States. Rule 45 provides that a subpoena may "command each person to whom it is directed to . . . produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control." Tiffany and Gucci served the Banks with subpoenas under this rule. A Rule 45 subpoena is not the exclusive method for obtaining evidence. When discovery involves documents located in a foreign nation, the Hague Convention is a second option.

2. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters

The Hague Conference on Private International Law is a global intergovernmental organization whose purpose is “to work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law.” The Hague Conference achieves this goal through negotiating and drafting multilateral treaties, called Hague Conventions.

80. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci I, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2; Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145. BOC, ICBC, and CMB were the banks served with one or more of these subpoenas. See Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *2; Gucci Am., Inc., 2011 WL 6156936, at *2; Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
In 1970, the Hague Conference adopted the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) for the purpose of “establish[ing] a system for obtaining evidence located abroad that would be ‘tolerable’ to the state executing the request and would produce evidence ‘utilizable’ in the requesting state.”

The goal was to “reconcile different, often conflictive, discovery procedures in civil and common law countries.” The Hague Evidence Convention was signed by the United States in 1970 and ratified by the Senate in 1972. China acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention on December 8, 1997 with an entry into force date of February 6, 1998.

Under the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence located abroad can be obtained either by a letter of request or through a diplomatic officer, consular agent, or commissioner. When a party to a suit commenced in the United States seeks to obtain evidence located in China by a letter of request, the presiding judge from the U.S. court is to transmit a letter of request to the Chinese Central Authority. The Central Authority in China, which is the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China (MOJ), will forward the letter of request to the lower court sitting in the district in which the evidence is located. The lower court will then serve the
discovery request to the addressee.96 Any evidence that is produced is to be returned to the U.S. court through the same channel by which the request was made.97

Although the Hague Evidence Convention states that requests should be executed “expeditiously,”98 the U.S. Department of State estimates that letters of request can take a year or more to be fully executed.99 In 2008, the Hague Conference sent out a questionnaire in an attempt to collect information on the practical operation of several conventions.100 The United States submitted a response to this questionnaire, reporting that it received between 500 to 600 incoming letters of request annually from 2003 to 2007 but did not provide execution times for these incoming letters of request.101 Hong Kong reported less than twenty incoming letters of request annually in that same time period.102 Out of all the letters of request that Hong Kong received in 2007, two were executed under two months, one was executed between two and four months, one was returned unexecuted, and nine were currently pending at the time.103 China did not submit a response.104 Furthermore, absent voluntary reporting from the receiving country, the individualized nature of the Hague Evidence Convention’s procedure for letters of request makes assembling statistics by the requesting country a challenge.105 As a general comparison, letters of

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97. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 13 (“The documents establishing the execution of the letter of request shall be sent by the requested authority to the requesting authority by the same channel which was used by the latter.”).
98. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 9.
103. See id. at 4.
105. This is because letters of request are sent directly from the presiding judge in the U.S. court to the foreign country’s Central Authority. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
request are at least faster than letters rogatory. The State Department, which handles letters rogatory requests, reports that these requests can take a year or more to be executed.

The MOJ in China is only slightly more helpful on this point. The MOJ’s website reports that it executed thirty seven requests in the first half of 2010, but statistics for the years before or after that time period are absent even though China has acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention since 1997.

Furthermore, Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention permits an acceding country to the Evidence Convention to declare that it declines to execute letters of request for pretrial discovery purposes. China has specifically declared that it will only execute requests “clearly enumerated in the letters of request and of direct and close connection with the subject matter of the litigation.” Therefore, given the number of administrative steps involved, obtaining evidence from China via a letter of request can be time consuming and ultimately unfruitful.

3. Rule 45 and the Hague Evidence Convention

In the years after the United States signed and ratified the Hague Evidence Convention, courts struggled with how to use it, often deferring to

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106. Letters rogatory are the customary method of obtaining judicial assistance from abroad in the absence of a treaty or executive agreement.” 


108. Id.

109. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 87, art. 23 (“A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries.”); see also Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89 (“The United States is seeking clarification from the People’s Republic of China regarding its interpretation and implementation of the Convention.”).


federal and state rules instead.112 Specifically, the courts were unsure if the Hague Evidence Convention was to be treated as a discretionary or exclusive method for obtaining evidence located abroad.113 The Supreme Court clarified the relationship between the procedures set forth in the Hague Evidence Convention and the discovery rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.114 The Court held that the Hague Evidence Convention was “intended to establish optional procedures” for obtaining evidence located abroad and does not preclude a district court from ordering a foreign national party to produce evidence physically located abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.115 Under Aérospatiale, the Hague Evidence Convention is to be an option whenever it will “facilitate the gathering of evidence.”116 When a district court is deciding between ordering discovery pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Hague Convention is not to be the “first resort.”117 The Hague Evidence Convention will not always be the superior method; in certain situations, proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention might be “unduly time consuming and expensive” and less likely to result in production of needed evidence than “direct use of the Federal Rules.”118 District courts are thus to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry, applying “scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective” to determine how discovery should proceed.119

4. Comity Analysis

Aérospatiale instructed district courts to conduct a “particularized analysis” of the circumstances in each case but failed to articulate an analytical framework for the courts to follow.120 Thus, to refine the analysis courts in the Second Circuit adopted the five-factor test set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,121

113. See id.
115. Id. at 538–40.
116. Id. at 541.
117. Id. at 542–43 (“A rule of first resort in all cases would therefore be inconsistent with the overriding interest in the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of litigation in our courts.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
118. Id. at 542.
119. Id. at 544.
120. Id. at 543; see also David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Aérospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 521, 522 (1988).
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(1)(c) (1987); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 438 (E.D.N.Y.)
under which a court confronted with foreign discovery is to consider (1) “the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested”; (2) “the degree of specificity of the request”; (3) “whether the information originated in the United States”; (4) “the availability of alternative means of securing the information”; and (5) “the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.”122

The Second Circuit also considers two additional factors: (6) “the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought” and (7) “the good faith of the party resisting discovery.”123


When applying the seven-factor comity analysis, the more familiar a court is with the legal system and interests of the foreign sovereign at issue, the more likely the court’s decision between Rule 45 and the Hague Evidence Convention will be an equitable one. Therefore, a review of China’s legal system is prudent for the purposes of this Note.

China’s intellectual property regime provides civil, administrative, customs, and criminal remedies for trademark owners against infringement. Brand owners with registered trademarks in China are entitled to the intellectual property rights and remedies under Chinese law.124 Suing in China has several advantages. For the brand owners seeking to stop the sale of counterfeit goods online, China is the principal locus of the dispute; the defendants, evidence, banks, bank records, and funds are all located in China. In China, intellectual property rights holders can pick between China’s two-track system: the administrative branch or the intellectual

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122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c).
The Chinese intellectual property courts impose a six-month time limit on domestic intellectual property cases, making for a quicker resolution. Disputes involving trademarks are fairly common; from January to October 2011, China accepted 52,708 intellectual property cases, roughly 40 percent of which involved trademarks.

The administrative track is the more prevalent track, offering a “quick and inexpensive alternative to civil and criminal enforcement.” However, pursuing administrative enforcement can be complicated, as jurisdiction of intellectual property rights is spread over a number of government agencies and offices depending on the type of intellectual property rights and laws implicated. Furthermore, administrative enforcement lacks “the investigation powers to access banking details and emails, the power to open locked premises (including warehouses), the authority to enter private residences and the power to detain suspected infringers.”

Similar to the CBP in the United States, the GAC enforces “customs control” and “customs intellectual property protection” in China. However, the GAC requires the intellectual property rights holder to record its intellectual property with the GAC and submit a written application “at the suspected point of entry or exit where protection is sought” in order for the GAC to seize the infringing goods. In the United States, the CBP just requires trademarks to be registered with the USPTO and recorded with the CBP.

As a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, China must provide criminal

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125. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42 (“The first and most prevalent is the administrative track, whereby an IP rights holder files a complaint at the local administrative office. The second is the judicial track, whereby complaints are filed through the court system.”).


127. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 18.

128. Id. at 22.

129. The SAIC handles trademarks, the State Intellectual Property Office handles patents, the National Copyright Administration of China handles copyrights, the General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine is involved with product quality and standards, the State Drug Administration handles counterfeit pharmaceutical products, and the Ministry of Culture also plays a role in the enforcement process. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42.

130. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 22.


132. See Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42.

133. 19 C.F.R. § 133.1(a) (2012).
enforcement of intellectual property rights for commercial scale piracy and counterfeiting.\(^{134}\)

Therefore, the Ministry of Public Security and the Supreme People’s Procurate Security handle criminal investigation and prosecution of intellectual property rights infringement.\(^{135}\) In recent years, China has taken steps to increase intellectual property rights enforcement, revising its copyright, patent, and trademark laws and even conducting a government wide “Special IPR Enforcement Campaign” from October 2010 to June 2011.\(^{136}\) This campaign targeted intellectual property rights violations ranging from “copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting over the Internet, distribution of infringing optical discs and publications, counterfeit cell phones, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, counterfeit seeds, and counterfeit bulk commodities for export.”\(^{137}\) Overall, intellectual property rights recognition and enforcement in China appears to be improving.\(^{138}\)

Conversely, the intellectual property rights regime in the United States has its advantages as well. Litigants bringing trademark infringement suits in the United States enjoy familiarity with the U.S. legal system, the potential recovery of higher damages, and a more expansive scope of discovery.\(^{139}\)

Million-dollar default judgments for damages in trademark infringement suits are feasible and common in the United States.\(^{140}\) Damages in


\(^{135}\) Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights in China, supra note 42. Civil actions and administrative proceedings are more common, as “[t]he foreign rights holders have had considerably less success in encouraging criminal prosecution of IPR violations.” Id.

\(^{136}\) USTR, supra note 5, at 27. The National People’s Congress (NPC) recently submitted a revised draft amendment to the Trademark Law in China for public comment. See Shāngbì Fǎ Xūzhèng Àn (Cào’àn) Tiáowén (商标法修正案(草案) 条文), NAT’L PEOPLES CONGRESS CHINA (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/201212-12/28/content_1749326.htm. The NPC is considering imposing joint liability on individuals who help facilitate trademark infringement. See id.

\(^{137}\) USTR, supra note 5, at 27; see also Program for Special Campaign on Combating IPR Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeiting and Shoddy Commodities, INTELL. PROP. PROTECTION CHINA (Nov. 11, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/newsarticle/news/government/201011/976869_1.html (detailing enforcement measures taken by the Chinese government).

\(^{138}\) USTR, supra note 5, at 28 (“[T]he Chinese Government’s efforts during the Special Campaign ‘generated goodwill’ among rights holders and sparked some cautious optimism that a recognition of the need for IPR protection and enforcement in China may finally be starting to take root.”).

\(^{139}\) See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.

trademark infringement suits in China, however, are often for less. From 2006 to 2012, the average amount of damages awarded in Chinese trademark infringement cases ranged from 30,000 to 140,000 renminbi.\textsuperscript{141} Trademark infringement cases occasionally settle for larger amounts; Apple, Inc. recently settled a lawsuit in China for $60,000,000 for the legal right to use the iPad trademark in China.\textsuperscript{142} Although the TRIPS agreement has harmonized certain aspects of intellectual property enforcement in China,\textsuperscript{143} the remedies under U.S. law, as discussed above, are more familiar, robust, and satisfying for brand owners who successfully pursue their rights.

Furthermore, “[i]t is well known that the scope of American discovery is often significantly broader than is permitted in other jurisdictions,”\textsuperscript{144} and China is no exception. This difference in discovery scope has led to tension between the United States and many other countries with more restrictive discovery provisions.\textsuperscript{145} The common position taken by foreign countries is that U.S. discovery procedures “may be applied to persons or documents located in another state only with permission of that state.”\textsuperscript{146} The United States however, has taken the position that “persons who do business in the United States, or who otherwise bring themselves within United States jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate, are subject to the burdens as well as the benefits of United States law, including the laws on discovery.”\textsuperscript{147}

On August 31, 2012, China’s National People’s Congress passed an amendment to its Civil Procedure Law.\textsuperscript{148} Key changes included the availability of preliminary injunctions for all types of civil disputes, the requirement of all legally effective judgments and rulings to be made publicly available, and several new evidence rules.\textsuperscript{149} As Professor Mark

\textsuperscript{141} See Cielo Summary Report, supra note 126.
\textsuperscript{142} See Apple Finally Settles a Dispute over the iPad Trademark, It Costs Them $60 Million, BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2012, 11:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-settles-dispute-ipad-name-60m-proview-2012-7.
\textsuperscript{143} See generally TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl.
\textsuperscript{145} RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, reporters’ notes ¶ 1 (1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States.”). For an in-depth discussion of the differences between American and Chinese discovery, see Meg Utterback et al., Obtaining Discovery in China for Use in US Litigation, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/04/articles/dispute-resolution/obtaining-discovery-in-china-for-use-in-us-litigation/.
\textsuperscript{146} RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, reporters’ notes ¶ 1.
\textsuperscript{147} Id.
\textsuperscript{148} Ariel Ye et al., Insight into China’s Revision on Civil Procedure Law, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/10/articles/dispute-resolution/insight-into-chinas-revision-on-civil-procedure-law/.
\textsuperscript{149} Id.
Cohen has noted, the revised Civil Procedure Law can be seen as a step toward increased transparency and more permissive discovery.150

Another provision that is relevant to the discovery process in trademark infringement cases is Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which grants judicial authorities “the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures . . . to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.”151 Provisional measures include preliminary injunctions and preliminary evidence or asset preservation measures.152

The tension between U.S. and Chinese discovery is highly relevant at the pretrial discovery stage of trademark infringement suits. On one hand, expansive pretrial discovery in the United States can help identify additional defendants, such as suppliers and manufacturers of the counterfeit goods, if the original defendants did not manufacture the goods themselves.153 This information may never be uncovered in a foreign state that does not provide for pretrial discovery or has restrictive discovery rules.154

Chinese bank secrecy laws further exacerbate the tension between the U.S. view on discovery and China’s. In Tiffany’s and Gucci’s trademark infringement suits, the Banks have asserted that various provisions of Chinese law would cause the Banks to be liable to the Chinese authorities should they comply with the Rule 45 subpoenas for discovery.155 These provisions impose civil and even criminal liability on banks that violate them.156

Therefore, if a trademark owner ultimately decides to seek relief in the United States, the trademark owner then has to bring the evidence from China into the U.S. courts, opening itself up to the problems associated with the extraterritorial location of the evidence, the risks associated with Hague Evidence Convention requests, the divergent views on discovery, and the implication of Chinese bank secrecy laws. It was with the foregoing circumstances that the district courts in the Southern District of New York decided how best to obtain the Chinese bank records belonging to defendants.


151. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 50(1).


153. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.

154. In Gucci I, Judge Sullivan was especially concerned with the adverse impact reduced discovery would have on the plaintiff’s ability to “fully prosecute their case.” See Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012).

155. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

II. THE ABILITY OF TRADEMARK OWNERS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY FROM NONPARTY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

This part analyzes how district judges in the Southern District of New York have approached the various arguments in support of the Hague Evidence Convention and, conversely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate avenue for obtaining records from nonparty banks located in China. It then examines the efforts of the parties to comply with the resulting discovery orders and the current disposition of each suit.

A. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi

On December 20, 2010, Tiffany, manufacturer of luxury jewelry and silverware, filed a complaint alleging that defendants Qi Andrew, Gu Gong, Silver Deng, and Kent Deng—all doing business as TiffanyStores.org, Fashion Style, and Stores.org; ABC Companies; and several John Does (Tiffany I Defendants) manufactured and sold counterfeit Tiffany products “without Tiffany’s permission, authorization, or approval” through several websites hosted in the United States. Tiffany asserted that the Tiffany I Defendants used PayPal, Inc. to process payments for sales through their websites and transferred the profits to their BOC, ICBC, and CMB bank accounts. On January 3, 2011, after the Tiffany I Defendants failed to appear, the court entered a preliminary injunction against them, which included discovery instructions directed at the Banks. Days later, Tiffany served the Banks with copies of the preliminary injunction and subpoenas specifically requesting

1. communications concerning defendants or defendants’ accounts;
2. documents containing contact information associated with defendants’ accounts;
3. documents relating to any and all credit card transactions processed in connection with purchases from defendants or defendants’ websites;
4. documents concerning any open or closed checking, savings, or money market accounts, and certificates of deposit held in the name of any of the defendants, including bank statements;
5. documents concerning any open or closed loans or mortgages relating to any of the defendants;
6. wire transfer documents and files relating to any of the defendants, including documents reflecting the source of funds for wires into defendants’ accounts and
7. documents relating to Currency Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity Reports concerning any of the defendants.

158. Id. ¶ 4. The complaint additionally alleged that the Tiffany I Defendants also copied designs, patterns and color schemes associated with Tiffany and expressly identified their products as Tiffany products to deceive consumers as to the authenticity of their products. See id. ¶ 3.
160. See id.
161. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
162. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
The Banks searched their records, but did not find any accounts belonging to the Tiffany I Defendants.163 The Banks objected to the subpoenas, stating that they did not have “possession, custody or control” of any bank documents located outside the United States and further objected to any discovery requests, compliance with which would violate domestic or foreign law.164

On July 25, 2011, Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman issued an order addressing the Banks’ objections and Tiffany’s motion to compel discovery.165 Judge Pitman found that the requested documents were in fact within the Banks’ possession, custody, and control.166 As for the Banks’ secondary grounds for objection—that Chinese bank secrecy laws prohibited them from complying with the subpoena—the judge conducted the seven-factor comity analysis to determine whether the court should compel discovery of the bank records in China.167

First, Judge Pitman considered the importance of the bank records to the litigation.168 He agreed with Tiffany that the information requested was “vital” because the requested documents had the potential to “reveal the identities of those involved in the counterfeiting operation” and would indicate if the funds from these bank accounts were used to create counterfeit goods. The bank records could also identify manufacturers or others involved in the operation, which could lead to other defendants.169 Tiffany’s requests, which included account numbers for some of the defendants,170 were specific enough for the judge to find the second factor—the degree of specificity of the request171—in favor of Tiffany.

However, Judge Pitman determined that the third through seventh factors did not.172 For the third factor—whether the information originated in the United States173—the requested bank records were clearly located in China and were not accessible from the New York branches of the Banks.174 The fourth factor questioned if the Hague Evidence Convention qualified as a viable alternative to a Rule 45 subpoena, and the judge found that it did.175

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163. The Banks searched only the records located in their New York branches. See id. at 145–46.
164. Id. at 146. The Banks offered to assist Tiffany in preparing a document request pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention for the bank records at issue, but Tiffany turned their offer down. Id.
165. See generally id.
166. See id. at 147–50.
167. See id. at 151 (“Where a party from whom discovery is sought asserts foreign law as a bar to production, courts perform a comity analysis to determine the weight to be given to the foreign jurisdiction’s law.”); see also supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
169. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 151–52 (emphasizing that because the defendants had failed to appear, production was all the more vital).
170. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 152.
171. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
172. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160.
173. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
175. See id. at 152–53.
He examined China’s history with Hague Evidence Convention requests, cases in the Southern District of New York addressing this particular issue, expert opinions provided by Tiffany and the Banks, secondary sources, and China’s Article 23 reservation when it acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention.176

Judge Pitman relied heavily on language, albeit recently removed, from the State Department’s website reporting China’s historically low response rate to Hague Evidence Convention letters of requests.177 Specifically, he found the removal of this language from the website particularly compelling.178 He found additional support in MOJ reports of a 50 percent execution rate over the past five years, with requests averaging six to twelve months in processing time, and thirty-seven executed requests in the first half of 2010 alone.179

The Judge proceeded to dismiss Tiffany’s remaining arguments for the fourth factor based on the revision of the State Department’s website. He declined to follow Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China,180 a case in the Southern District of New York which had considered and rejected the Hague Evidence Convention as a viable means of obtaining documents from China, because Milliken was not binding precedent and, more importantly, Milliken had relied on outdated language from the State Department.181 He similarly found the expert opinions182 and secondary sources183 that Tiffany and the Banks had proffered to not be particularly “useful” since many of them had relied on the outdated language from the

176. See id. at 153–56.
177. The State Department had previously posted:
   While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China pursuant to a letter rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence Convention), such requests have not been particularly successful in the past. Requests may take more than a year to execute. It is not unusual for no reply to be received or after a considerable time has elapsed, for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American court with no indication that the request will eventually be executed. Id. at 153. The State Department’s website now states, “[t]he United States is seeking clarification from the People’s Republic of China regarding its interpretation and implementation of the Convention.” Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 89, at n.8.
178. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 153 (“[T]he deletion of the language from the State Department’s Circular that is critical of China’s enforcement of Hague Convention requests implied[d] that the conditions described by the omitted language no longer exist.”).
179. See id.
182. Tiffany’s experts—Donald Clarke, a professor at George Washington University Law School, and William Alford, Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School—were skeptical of China’s treatment of Hague Evidence Convention requests while the Banks’ experts—James Feinerman, professor of Asian Legal Studies at Georgetown University Law Center, and Zhipan Wu, professor of law, Executive Vice Chancellor, and Dean Emeritus at Peking University Law School—were optimistic. Id. at 154–55.
183. Tiffany cited a 2008 ABA paper, which reported low success in obtaining documents from China through the Hague Evidence Convention, and a 2011 article, which noted the difficulty of making Hague Evidence Convention requests directed at China. Id. at 155.
State Department’s website as well. Judge Pitman was confident that Tiffany’s document request was sufficiently related to the litigation, so China’s Article 23 reservation would not be an issue. He stressed that thirty-six other Hague Evidence Convention signatories had made similar reservations as well. Acknowledging the “dearth of information as to the current efficiency” of Hague Evidence Convention requests, the judge nevertheless determined that requests to China would not be futile, relying on the assumption that China’s response rate was in fact improving—an assumption based on the removal of certain language from the State Department’s website.

Judge Pitman found that the fifth factor—interests of the states also favored the Banks. He found China’s interest in enforcing its bank secrecy laws to outweigh the United States’ interest in enforcing its trademark laws and in adjudicating matters before its courts. He considered the threat of civil and possible criminal sanctions the Banks faced if they were to “disclose the requested information in contravention of Chinese law” serious enough to rule the sixth factor—the hardship of compliance—in the Banks’ favor. The judge was also satisfied that Chinese bank secrecy laws had been used in previous Chinese cases to impose civil and even criminal liability on commercial banks, even if the facts were not especially analogous. The judge furthermore suggested that the onus was on Tiffany to demonstrate that the Banks would not face negative consequences for complying with the subpoenas.

Lastly, the judge found no evidence of bad faith by the Banks and ruled the last factor—good faith of the party resisting discovery—in their favor. Thus, with five of the seven factors weighing in the Banks’ favor, he directed Tiffany to proceed with discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention, but he also preserved Tiffany’s right to “renew [its] application

184. See id.
185. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
186. Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 155–56 (“While it is not possible to conclude definitively whether China would execute a request for the documents plaintiffs seek, the documents at issue certainly appear to be closely related to the litigation, and, therefore, plaintiffs’ request is not clearly prohibited by this reservation.”).
187. Id. at 156.
188. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
189. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 158.
190. Id. (“While the United States certainly has an interest in enforcing its orders and protecting trademark rights, the Chinese interest in protecting its account holders’ confidentiality appears more significant in this case.”).
191. Id. at 160.
192. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
193. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 158 (noting that an order to compel discovery should only be imposed on a nonparty in “extreme circumstances”).
194. See id. at 158–59 (citing Chinese cases where commercial banks in China were held to be civilly and criminally liable).
195. See id. at 158.
196. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
197. See Tiffany I, 276 F.R.D. at 160.
to enforce [its] subpoenas” if the Hague Evidence Convention proved futile. 198

Tiffany followed the discovery orders but eventually renewed its application on September 20, 2012. 199 Before renewing its application, Tiffany submitted a letter of request to the MOJ, but only received a portion of the documents it requested nine months later. 200 The MOJ had decided not to produce certain documents that were lacking “direct and close connections with the litigation” at hand. 201 The MOJ’s partial production was fully consistent with China’s Article 23 declaration on pretrial discovery when it acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention. 202

Unfortunately, the partial production amounted to information regarding one BOC, one CMB, and three ICBC accounts in total, and questions such as whether the Tiffany I Defendants had additional accounts at the Banks, if there were any detailed wire transfer records, and whether the Banks had complied with the asset restraint portion of the preliminary injunction, remained unanswered. 203

Despite this nine-month delay, Judge Pitman was not convinced that the Hague Evidence Convention was futile, and on November 8, 2012, he ultimately denied Tiffany’s renewed application to enforce the previous subpoenas. 204 The judge opined that the MOJ had unquestionably produced documents that were relevant and responsive. 205 Additionally, he did not consider nine months to be “inordinately long given the delays inherent in international discovery proceedings.” 206 Although the judge acknowledged that the resulting production was “more limited than it would have been under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” this result was the reality of international litigation and foreign discovery. 207 Furthermore, the judge pointed out that additional discovery would not necessarily uncover the source of the counterfeit goods. 208

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198. Id. at 160–61.
200. See id. The MOJ produced “account opening documents (including the government identification card of the account holder), written confirmation of certain transfers into the accounts and a list of transfers out of the accounts.” Id.
201. See id. at *2.
202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
204. See id. at *2.
205. Id.
206. Id. (noting the lack of “statistical compilations” and citing personal experience).
207. Id. at *2–3 (“The high cost of discovery in federal litigation is well known, and the fact that another sovereign chooses to take a more restrictive view of the appropriate scope of pretrial discovery is not unreasonable.” (citations omitted)).
B. Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li

Gucci I, is a similar trademark infringement suit brought by Gucci and its affiliates against several websites and their operators (Gucci I Defendants) six months before Tiffany filed its complaint in Tiffany I. Judge Richard J. Sullivan presided over the case. Much of the initial pretrial proceedings paralleled Tiffany I: the complaint and alleged infringement, the Gucci I Defendants’ failure to appear, and the preliminary injunction. The main difference was that BOC was the only bank implicated. Still, BOC took the same course of action—searching for bank records only in its New York branch and objecting to documents located outside the United States—when served with the preliminary injunction and a subpoena for bank records belonging to the Gucci I Defendants. The judge also applied the seven-factor comity analysis, but the similarities ended there.

Judge Sullivan found that the first two factors, concerning the importance of the bank records to the litigation and the specificity of Gucci’s requests, weighed in Gucci’s favor. He then determined that the third factor—whether the information originated in the United States—weighed in BOC’s favor as the bank records were clearly located in China.

As for the fourth factor—alternative means of securing the information—the judge disagreed with Judge Pitman, finding that the Hague Evidence Convention was not a viable alternative for obtaining bank records located in China. Notably, Judge Sullivan arrived at his

209. The named defendants include Weixing Li a/k/a Xin Li, Lijun Xu a/k/a Jack London, Ting Xu a/k/a Jack London a/k/a Xu Ting a/k/a Rebecca Xu, Wenyong Guo, Xiaochao Shang, Lei Xu, Fengyuan Zhao, Liqun Zhao, Ming Zhao, and Peiyuan Zhao—all doing business as Redtagparty, Myluxurybags.com, Kuelala.com, Xpressdesigners.com, Xpressdesigner.net, and Designer Handbags; ABC Companies; and several John Does. See Second Amended Complaint at 2, Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2011).
216. See id. at *6. The Gucci I Defendants’ bank records were “likely to provide the most fruitful avenue for discovering the identity of additional infringers” and as a practical matter, the records were “likely to provide the most effective measure of the revenues generated” by the Gucci I Defendants. Id.
217. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
conclusion from the same evidence and arguments presented in *Tiffany I*.221 Although Judge Pitman interpreted the revision of the State Department’s website as a sign that China’s response rate was improving, Judge Sullivan was not as optimistic, expressing skepticism over what seemed to be an “unexplained revision.”222 Judge Sullivan was not willing to discount Gucci’s expert opinions and secondary sources without “concrete evidence” of China’s compliance with Hague Evidence Convention requests.223

Unlike Judge Pitman, Judge Sullivan did not require the Hague Evidence Convention to be completely futile224 and instead cited language from *Aérospatiale* stating that the Hague Evidence Convention is to be considered a viable alternative as long as it was an “effective, or efficient, method.”225 However, Judge Sullivan found the evidence to indicate that the Hague Evidence Convention in this instance would be “unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less certain to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules” and therefore, that it was not viable.226

Judge Sullivan also disagreed with Judge Pitman on the fifth factor,227 concluding that China’s interests did not outweigh those of the United States.228 In addition to the United States’ interests in protecting intellectual property rights and preventing consumer confusion, the judge was also concerned with the Banks using Chinese bank secrecy laws as a “shield against the requirements faced by other United States-based financial institutions” and the possibility of counterfeiters utilizing foreign banking secrecy laws to “facilitate global infringement schemes.”229

As for BOC’s hardship in complying with the subpoenas, Judge Sullivan found the threat of sanctions too speculative for the sixth factor to favor the Banks.230 Finally, the judge held that BOC’s opposition to the subpoena was not in bad faith.231 Thus, with five of the seven factors weighing in

221. Compare id. at *7–9 (discussing MOJ’s statistics, now defunct language on the State Department’s website, expert opinions, and secondary sources), with supra notes 176–86 and accompanying text.
223. Id.
224. Judge Sullivan stated that requiring the Hague Evidence Convention be deemed futile in order to be considered an unviable means of obtaining evidence was “plainly in tension with the Supreme Court’s rejection of a blanket rule requiring resort to Convention procedures in the first instance.” Id. at *8 (citing Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).
225. Id. (citations omitted).
226. Id. at *8 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987)).
227. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (interests of the states).
229. See id. at *10–11.
230. Id. at *11; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
231. See *Gucci I*, 2011 WL 6156936, at *12 (noting, however, that it was “certainly conceivable that Bank of China has actively assisted Defendants in concealing illegally-obtained profits”).
Gucci’s favor, the judge granted Gucci’s motion to compel discovery under the Rule 45 subpoena. 232

Rather than complying with Judge Sullivan’s order, BOC resisted production of the Gucci I Defendants’ bank records and instead filed motions—albeit unsuccessful—for leave to appeal to request an extension to comply with the discovery order and then for reconsideration of the discovery order. 233 On November 15, 2012, Judge Sullivan finally held BOC in civil contempt and ordered the bank to pay a fine of $75,000 for failing to comply with the discovery order despite having been given multiple extensions and opportunities to be heard. 234 The judge reasoned that allowing BOC’s noncompliance to continue would produce grave consequences. 235 If BOC did not produce all of the documents responsive to the 2010 Subpoena, Gucci’s ability to fully prosecute its case against the Gucci I Defendants would be jeopardized. 236 The judge was not sympathetic to BOC’s contention that it was awaiting permission from China to produce the Gucci I Defendants’ bank records, especially since BOC had waited almost a year before seeking such permission. 237 Therefore, any and all delay was solely attributed to BOC. Furthermore, Judge Sullivan reiterated his position on the Hague Evidence Convention: the Hague Evidence Convention would leave Gucci “empty-handed” because the letters of request have “little likelihood of success.” 238 This case is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit and the contempt order has been stayed. 239

C. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse

On July 20, 2011, six months after Tiffany filed its complaint in Tiffany I, Tiffany filed another complaint against a separate group of websites and their operators 240 (Tiffany II Defendants) alleging similar causes of action

232. See id.

233. See Gucci I, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012). BOC did produce documents for two of the nine accounts listed in the original subpoena but this limited production was in itself incomplete as it lacked documentation of deposits and withdrawals associated with the two accounts. Id. at *2.

234. See id. at *9. It had been over a year since Judge Sullivan’s discovery order was issued. See id. at *2–3.

235. Id. at *8.

236. Id.

237. See id. at *7.

238. Id. at *6. Judge Sullivan’s statement about the Hague Evidence Convention came eight days after Magistrate Judge Pitman deemed the Hague Evidence Convention a viable means for obtaining evidence located in China. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.


240. The named defendants include Bruce Forbse, Chen Jia Wen, Gimi Wooten, Hu Xin Xing, Alyarica Ltd., Tiffany Jewelleries Inc., Tiffany-Gifts Inc., United Merchants, Ltd, and Web Sale Merchants LLP—all doing business as Tiffany-Collections.com, Tiffany-
and infringing activity as in *Tiffany I* and *Gucci I*. Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald presided over *Tiffany II*. The pretrial proceedings for *Tiffany II* progressed in a similar fashion as the prior cases. While all three banks were implicated in this suit, BOC played a special role as the acquiring bank for one of the infringing websites. For sales over the internet, an acquiring bank serves as an “intermediary between the online merchant and a credit card network such as Visa” and “is also often responsible for performing due diligence on the merchant and accordingly often accepts the risk of ‘chargebacks,’ meaning customer disputes that result in a reversal of a transaction.”

On May 23, 2012, Judge Buchwald directed Tiffany to use the Hague Evidence Convention for the Tiffany II Defendants’ bank records at ICBC and CMB. However, because of BOC’s role as an acquiring bank, the judge separately ordered BOC to comply with the “discovery provisions of the preliminary injunction.”

The seven-factor comity analysis that Judge Buchwald conducted resulted in three of the seven factors weighing in favor of CMB and ICBC and only two of the seven factors for BOC. Despite Tiffany garnering a majority of the factors against all three banks, the judge allowed ICBC and CMB to proceed through the Hague Evidence Convention rather than comply with the Rule 45 subpoenas. She reasoned that China should be given the opportunity to demonstrate its cooperation under the Hague Evidence Convention as a first instance and that future courts could “take notice and adjust their analysis” should it prove futile.

The judge took a different approach with BOC. BOC’s role as an acquiring bank bolstered factors one—the importance of the documents requested—and seven—the good faith of the party resisting discovery—thus tipping the balance in Tiffany’s favor. Specifically,
the court believed that through the due diligence that BOC was required to perform in order to become an acquiring bank, and from its active role as an acquiring bank BOC was in possession of “valuable information as to the identity, business activities, and even location of one or more defendants.”254 It was possible that BOC even had information on where the Tiffany II Defendants were depositing their profits.255 The judge was suspicious of BOC’s ability to confirm that TiffanyOutletStore.com—a website with the word “Tiffany” in its name—was using its payment systems, suggesting that BOC was withholding crucial evidence.256

Furthermore, Judge Buchwald’s May 23, 2012 order brought new developments in this conflict to light. The judge revealed that according to Tiffany’s expert opinions, the Chinese government holds large ownership interests in all three banks, making the threat of sanctions highly doubtful.257 This information hurt the Banks in the sixth factor—the hardship of compliance.258 She was also the first to address a November 3, 2011 letter from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)—two financial regulatory bodies in China—to four judges of the Southern District of New York with similar cases pending on their dockets.259

In this letter, the PBOC and CBRC urged the judges to utilize the Hague Evidence Convention and assured the judges that they would “actively coordinat[e] with the PRC Ministry of Justice and judicial organs in the PRC” to ensure timely execution of any letters of request.260 The judge interpreted this letter as an expression of the Chinese government’s intention to establish the Hague Evidence Convention as a viable alternative means for obtaining evidence in China, thus allowing the fourth factor to weigh in favor of the banks.261 With respect to the fifth factor—the interest of the states262—however, the court found the interests of both China and

254. Id. at *5 (noting that the due diligence generally performed on merchants with whom a bank works with often includes physical inspections of the merchant’s premises).
255. See id. at *10 (“[I]t would seem possible, if not likely, that BOC could have identified the infringing website based on a simple search of its records.”).
256. Id. at *9 (“[T]he Chinese government either directly or indirectly owns 67% of the A shares in BOC, 70% of the A shares in ICBC, and over 25% of the shares in CMB.”).
257. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *9.
258. Tiffany II, 2012 WL 1918866, at *6. The letter was addressed to Judges Sullivan, Pauley, Pitman, and Batts. Id. at *6 n.7.
259. Id. at *6.
260. Id. at *7 (“It would seem prudent to forebear from assuming that the Hague Convention is not a viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so.”).
261. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
the United States to be equally compelling and thus determined that neither interest predominated.\footnote{Id. at *8 (finding the possibility of “transnational counterfeiters” using such laws as a shield from the consequences of their unlawful actions worrisome).}

BOC has appealed Judge Buchwald’s order to comply with the Rule 45 subpoena, along with ICBC and CMB, which both appealed on separate grounds.\footnote{Tiffany II, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-2317 (2d Cir. June 7, 2012).}

\section*{D. Additional Cases}

The Banks are also involved in at least three additional cases in the Southern District of New York that implicate the seven-factor analysis.

\textit{Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.}\footnote{No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS), 2012 WL 5378961 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012).} is a wrongful death action brought against BOC arising out of a 2006 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.\footnote{See id. at *1.} While the factual circumstances of this case are inapposite to the previous three cases, this case was filed in the Southern District of New York and involves obtaining bank records in China and China’s handling of Hague Evidence Convention requests.\footnote{See id. The court noted that this was not the first time “a party has sought the production of documents by BOC, BOC has objected that production would threaten it with civil and criminal liability under China’s Bank Secrecy Laws, and a court has responded by applying the Second Circuit’s multi-factor comity test.” Id. at *3.} In \textit{Wultz}, it had been over a year since the plaintiffs sent the MOJ their Hague Evidence Convention request and so, on October 29, 2012, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In arriving at her decision, the judge emphasized that despite numerous discovery orders in several other pending cases, BOC had yet to be sanctioned by the Chinese government and that it was evident that the MOJ had “chosen not to defer to the relatively broad scope of American discovery” in handling Hague Evidence Convention requests.\footnote{Id. at *3.} On January 10, 2013, in response to BOC’s contentions as to what documents were subject to production under the October 29, 2012 order, Judge Scheindlin issued another order clarifying exactly which categories of documents BOC was required to produce.\footnote{See \textit{Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd.}, No. 11 Civ. 1266(SAS), 2013 WL 132664 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013).} Judge Scheindlin stated that the October 29 order did not require BOC to automatically produce certain documents and communications from BOC to the Chinese government whose “disclosure is specifically and categorically prohibited” under “Article 5(1) of the Anti-money Laundering Law of the PRC; Articles 7, 15(2) and 16 of the Rules for Anti-money Laundering by Financial Institutions; and Article 6 of the Measures for the Administration on Financial Institutions' Reports of Large-
sum Transactions and Suspicious Transactions.” In refusing to produce any documents and communications to the Chinese government “outside the course of ‘regular regulatory reviews.’” In exempting certain documents from production, the judge reasoned that, while previous application of the seven-factor comity analysis to Chinese bank secrecy laws favored production, application of the same test to the regulatory laws at issue in the January 10, 2013 order demanded the opposite result. Specifically, the judge awarded more deference to the regulatory laws at issue because they were geared towards combating money laundering—one of the central interests considered in the October 29 order.

In *Gucci America, Inc. v. Bagsmerchant, LLC* (*Gucci II*), Gucci filed a complaint against several websites and their operators (*Gucci II* Defendants) on April 5, 2010. Judge Scheindlin is the presiding judge on this case as well. On July 8, 2011, she entered a default judgment in the amount of $7,800,000 against the Gucci II Defendants but vacated that judgment on September 27, 2012.

*Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong,* is yet another trademark infringement suit Tiffany brought on March 30, 2011 against several websites and their operators (*Tiffany III* Defendants). Judge George B. Daniels entered default judgment against the Tiffany III Defendants on March 22, 2012 and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Frank Maas.

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270. Id. at *1-2.
271. Id.
272. *Id. at *1.
275. The named defendants include Bagsmerchant, LLC; Bagsmerchant Co; Bags Store Ltd. a/k/a www.bags-store.com; Yunjing LLC; Authentictrading Ltd.; Yi Wang; Wu Xianhui; Yu Zhang; Jason James a/k/a Jason Mioto a/k/a Jermen Mioto; www.bagsdeal.com—all doing business as www.bagsmerchant.com; ABC Companies; and John Does. See id. at *1.
277. *See id.*
278. See id. at *1. BOC and CMB successfully argued that the default judgment was the equivalent of an ex-parte turnover order, which required special proceedings. *Id. at *2*
281. *See id.*
III. ADVERSE PRESUMPTIONS AND PLACING THE BURDEN ON FOREIGN CENTRAL AUTHORITIES TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY

A review of Tiffany I, Gucci I, and Tiffany II reveals serious transparency problems with the Chinese Central Authority and, more importantly, the ability of a Hague Evidence Convention request to undermine the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of trademark infringement suits.\(^\text{283}\) Moreover, clarification on the appropriate avenue for obtaining evidence located in China is imperative, as there are at least two pending cases where this issue is highly relevant.\(^\text{284}\) Rather than offering foreign countries “meaningful opportunities”\(^\text{285}\) to demonstrate their cooperation—while domestic litigants bear the costs—whenever there is uncertainty on the proper course of foreign discovery, courts should adopt a presumption against the country’s cooperation, with the burden on the foreign government to indicate otherwise.

This part will assess the reasoning in Tiffany I, Gucci I, and Tiffany II and suggest how courts should view the Chinese legal system when evaluating the viability of the Hague Evidence Convention.

A. Lost in Translation: Misconceptions of the Chinese Legal Landscape

Tiffany I is illustrative of the risks associated with requesting evidence pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention. Although Judge Pitman was not concerned with China’s Article 23 reservation under the Hague Evidence Convention,\(^\text{286}\) this reservation was the reason that substantial portions of Tiffany’s document requests were denied.\(^\text{287}\) While the MOJ’s discretion on the scope of production is consistent with China’s Article 23 reservation,\(^\text{288}\) it has drastically reduced Tiffany’s ability to uncover the source of the counterfeit goods and to identify additional defendants.\(^\text{289}\) Even if Judge Pitman was to now grant additional discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been over two years since the complaint in Tiffany I was filed. The evidence and funds that Tiffany seeks are likely long gone. Not only are Hague Evidence Convention requests time consuming, but Tiffany I demonstrates the ability of such requests to ruin subsequent discovery attempts to uncover time sensitive information. Judge Sullivan’s concern that plaintiffs will not be able to fully prosecute their cases against their infringers when a court declines to compel discovery was realized in Tiffany I.\(^\text{290}\)

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\(^{283}\) See supra note 117 (language from Aérospatiale).
\(^{284}\) See supra notes 276–82 and accompanying text.
\(^{285}\) See supra notes 250, 261 and accompanying text.
\(^{286}\) See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
\(^{287}\) See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
\(^{288}\) See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
\(^{289}\) See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
\(^{290}\) See supra notes 236, 238 and accompanying text.
Therefore, provisional evidence preservation measures, as authorized by the TRIPS Agreement, can be extremely useful in these situations.\textsuperscript{291} Litigants who have been ordered to conduct discovery through the Hague Evidence Convention should consider asset and evidence preservation measures in China while their letters of request are pending. However, litigants should tread carefully, as Chinese courts have not been employing evidence preservation measures to their fullest extent.\textsuperscript{292} Fortunately, the recent amendments to China’s Civil Procedure Law could lead to increased use of preliminary injunctions.\textsuperscript{293}

Secondly, each judge to subsequently address the threat of sanctions by the Chinese government clearly grew increasingly skeptical.\textsuperscript{294} As Judge Buchwald pointed out, the threat of sanctions is hardly credible when the Chinese government possesses large ownership interests in all three banks.\textsuperscript{295} The Chinese government, as signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention and owner of substantial interests in the Banks, should arguably be more compliant with the letters of request.\textsuperscript{296} Additionally, the fact that BOC subsequently produced certain documents, albeit minuscule, in accordance with the discovery order in \textit{Gucci I}, also casts serious doubts as to the reality of sanctions.\textsuperscript{297} Furthermore, the court in \textit{Wultz} pointed out the absence of a single instance of sanctions against the Banks in the two years since the first time the Banks raised this argument.\textsuperscript{298} The threat of sanctions was their main argument for resisting discovery, and this argument has become increasingly questionable.\textsuperscript{299}

Moreover, related to the issue of sanctions was China’s interest in enforcing its bank secrecy laws. Judge Pitman was the only judge to consider this interest to outweigh the United States’ interest in enforcing its

\textsuperscript{291} See Cohen, supra note 152 (“Preliminary evidence preservation measures can be especially critical when evidence is ephemeral, such as in the on-line environment.”).

\textsuperscript{292} See id.

\textsuperscript{293} See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{294} See, e.g., supra note 268 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{295} See supra note 257 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{297} See supra note 233 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{298} See supra note 268 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{299} See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
intellectual property rights. Surprisingly, none of the courts considered China’s interest in intellectual property rights enforcement. China’s recent revisions to its copyright, patent, and trademark law, coupled with recent steps to improve enforcement, suggest that intellectual property rights enforcement is a compelling interest to China as well. From a policy standpoint, several of the judges were concerned with the potential for abuse should the courts continue to defer to the Hague Evidence Convention and thereby impede the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Specifically, Judge Sullivan was concerned with foreign banking institutions shirking the requirements that domestic banking institutions faced, and Judge Buchwald was apprehensive of transnational counterfeiters avoiding liability for their unlawful actions. Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement requires member states to adopt specific enforcement procedures against infringement of intellectual property rights, which are to “be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.” As a member of the World Trade Organization, China has an obligation under the TRIPS agreement to enforce intellectual property rights, and the discretionary nature in the execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests threatens to create a loophole for counterfeiters to avoid liability to U.S. rights holders.

Finally, the fact that the courts recognized that their orders were based on the acknowledged lack of information on China’s handling of Hague Evidence Convention request is disconcerting. Additionally, there were several issues with the evidence that the courts utilized. The courts noted that China had executed thirty-seven requests in the first half of 2010. However, the MOJ’s website, the source of this statistic, does not provide any figures for the years before or after the first half of 2010. With no context in which to consider that statistic, it is not informative. Another oversight is in the discussion of the Chinese cases where commercial banks in China were subject to civil and even criminal liability. China is a civil law country rather than common law and, therefore, direct analogizing of cases was misplaced, especially when these cases were made known to the court via expert opinions rather than judicial interpretation or other more official guidance.

300. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 124–38 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
304. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 41.
305. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
Perhaps the biggest misconception about the Chinese legal system is the response time with which to measure whether the Hague Evidence Convention is a viable means of obtaining evidence. The State Department and several of the courts stated that Hague Evidence Convention requests can take anywhere from six to twelve months.\textsuperscript{310} When the MOJ finally executed Tiffany’s request after nine months, Judge Pitman was satisfied with the timing of the execution based on his personal experience.\textsuperscript{311} While six, nine, or even twelve months might be acceptable timeframes for discovery in the United States, none of the courts compared this timeframe to average timeframes in China.\textsuperscript{312} Domestic intellectual property court proceedings in China have a six-month time limit.\textsuperscript{313} Judge Pitman failed to consider the time limits in China, or the States’ or other similar countries’ reciprocal timeframes for letters of request, before signing off on the MOJ’s nine-month timeframe.

Although the letter from PBOC and CBRC shed light on the Chinese side of the Hague Evidence Convention debate, the authority of this letter is questionable.\textsuperscript{314} The MOJ is the Central Authority, which handles the execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests.\textsuperscript{315} A similar letter from the MOJ would undoubtedly be authoritative and deference would be warranted. However, the PBOC and CBRC are regulatory bodies for the banking industry in China.\textsuperscript{316} Although the PBOC and CBRC may be considered part of the Chinese government, their authority over Hague Evidence Convention requests or its power to influence the MOJ as the Central Authority is largely unclear.

\textit{B. Adverse Presumption As a Policy To Facilitate Foreign Evidence Gathering}

All of the above issues, concerns, and misconceptions can be eliminated if the courts adopt a uniform policy. This policy should be a presumption against the viability of a Hague Evidence Convention request whenever there is a lack of transparency with the foreign state. The burden should be placed on the foreign state’s Central Authority to clearly establish that it will, in fact, cooperate under the terms of the Hague Evidence Convention in a timely and efficient manner. This will eliminate the need for U.S. courts to speculate on foreign governmental matters when deciding on pretrial issues.\textsuperscript{317} An adverse presumption rule will also incentivize foreign

\textsuperscript{310} See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{311} See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{312} See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{313} See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{314} See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{315} See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{316} See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{317} See supra notes 177–78, 180–84, 223–24 and accompanying text.
governments to increase the transparency of their laws and international litigation policies.

Increasing transparency and cooperation from China is consistent with numerous trade organizations and the U.S. government’s current trade and intellectual property rights enforcement policies. In 2011, the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) recommended to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) the need for “Chinese authorities [to] increase the level of transparency in their handling of counterfeiting, piracy and other IP violations.” Specifi cally, the IACC emphasized “the need to establish clearer benchmarks for progress by individual ministries, with statistics for enforcement published more regularly, broken down by region, and broken down by reference to the exact law under which penalties are imposed.”

The U.S. government’s commitment to protecting the intellectual property rights of Americans in foreign markets is evidenced by joint law enforcement efforts like Operation In Our Sites and USTR’s Notorious Markets List, targeting “infringing foreign-based and foreign-controlled websites.” Increased efforts by the U.S. government to encourage and work with the Chinese government to enforce intellectual property rights suggests that a policy on adverse presumption that encourages transparency, facilitates discovery, and even recovery by intellectual property rights holders would be compatible.

Finally, with the amendments to China’s Civil Procedure Law requiring Chinese courts to make legally relevant decisions publicly available, decisions on other Hague Convention requests and instances where banks were actually subjected to liability under bank secrecy laws should now be made available to interested parties. This would be in line with reading China’s Civil Procedure Law amendments as a step toward increased transparency. Conversely, as discovery becomes more permissive under China’s Civil Procedure Law, China’s previous Article 23 declaration under the Hague Evidence Convention will begin to hold less weight as a reason for declining production under the Hague Evidence Convention. This could potentially result in the increased viability of the Hague Evidence Convention for Chinese evidence.

Judge Sullivan’s approach in Gucci I best illustrates this proposal. Judge Sullivan was unwilling to deem the Hague Evidence Convention a viable

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318. IACC Memorandum 2012, supra note 4, at 23.
319. Id.
320. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
means for obtaining evidence in China absent concrete evidence establishing that it was. Furthermore, the State Department could improve on its transparency as well since many of the judges cited the State Department in their cases. The State Department should maintain up-to-date reports on details like response rates and timing. Proactive measures to keep the courts informed on the status of Hague Evidence Convention signatories by the State Department would eliminate the need for judges to resort to deciphering the significance in oracular changes to the State Departments’ website.

CONCLUSION

Global counterfeiting calls for global enforcement of intellectual property rights. As governments increase enforcement measures through customs and criminal prosecution, so too must civil enforcement. Therefore, the U.S. legal system must provide an efficient method for obtaining evidence located abroad to ensure that trademark owners are able to attain final relief. Consistent with the global movement toward increased recognition and enforcement of intellectual property rights, U.S. courts should adopt an adverse presumption against the Hague Evidence Convention whenever enforcement of the intellectual property owner’s rights are threatened by the opaque handling of the receiving Central Authority. This policy is consistent with the holding in Aérospatiale (i.e., proceeding with the Hague Evidence Convention only when doing so would be efficient and effective), while promoting “just” and “speedy” resolution of intellectual property disputes.

327. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 179–89, 224–26 and accompanying text.