The debate surrounding the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial scope represents a tension between two competing objectives:  protecting the U.S. economy from foreign anticompetitive conduct on one hand and respecting the sovereign authority of other nation-states on the other.  Applying U.S. law abroad risks undermining sovereign authority by regulating foreign economies, though such regulation appears necessary in some cases to protect U.S. consumers.

Congress’s attempt to square these objectives through enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) failed to settle the matter.  The statute left courts with two new questions:  how to distinguish “import” from “nonimport” commerce, and how to determine when anticompetitive conduct that exclusively occurs abroad has a direct effect on the U.S. economy.

This Note examines the circuit split over both questions.  This Note then argues that reading the FTAIA’s two provisions together necessitates a narrow interpretation of “import commerce” and a proximate cause standard for the direct effects provision.  By construing “imports” narrowly and “direct” broadly, courts can balance protecting competition and respecting international comity.  This interpretation not only aligns with the text and legislative intent of the FTAIA but also promotes a more coherent and effective approach to antitrust enforcement for both the U.S. enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs seeking redress for antitrust harms originating from outside the United States.