In just eight months, Delaware’s legislature upended over fifty years of corporate law.  Its courts had long upheld shareholder primacy, treating shareholders equally in proportion to their ownership.  But after several controversial decisions reinforced this principle, sudden amendments to the corporate code shifted the law toward a distinct paradigm:  controller primacy.

While motivated by legitimate concerns, the legislation went too far, threatening to fundamentally realign corporate power and purpose.  Contrary to shareholder primacy, the new regime disproportionately prioritizes controlling shareholders above all others.  It authorizes contracts that cede the board’s managerial authority to controllers, insulates their self-dealing from shareholder approval and judicial review, affords them a silent safe harbor from liability, and curtails the information rights of any who would challenge them.  Crucially, the amendments conflate traditional majority shareholders, whose large equity stakes align their economic incentives with minority investors, with a growing class of “small” controllers who wield outsized authority through super-voting stock or governance contracts.

This broad empowerment and immunization needlessly risk mismanagement and expropriation by controllers whose interests diverge from other shareholders.  To reduce these risks, this Article proposes statutory corrections that recalibrate procedural safeguards based on cash-flow rights rather than voting power.  By linking control to economic alignment, Delaware can preserve the benefits of visionary leadership that its legislature sought to promote, while protecting minority investors pursuant to its longstanding principles of corporate governance.