Professionals, Politicos, and Crony Attorneys General: A Historical Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence – Fordham Law Review

Colloquium

Professionals, Politicos, and Crony Attorneys General: A Historical Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence

By Jed Handelsman Shugerman

March 30, 2019

Related Reads

Colloquium

Lawyers in Government Service— a Foreword

By Bruce A. Green

Mr. Try-It Goes to Washington: Law and Policy at the Agricultural Adjustment Administration

By Daniel R. Ernst

May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction from the President?

By Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe

Hidden Nondefense: Partisanship in State Attorneys General Amicus Briefs and the Need for Transparency

By Lisa F. Grumet

DACA, Government Lawyers, and the Public Interest

By Stephen Lee & Sameer M. Ashar

Legal Dilemmas Facing White House Counsel in the Trump Administration: The Costs of Public Disclosure of FISA Requests

By Peter Margulies

Join Our Mailing List