The organizing principle of American succession law—testamentary freedom—gives decedents a nearly unrestricted right to dispose of property. After surveying the justifications for testamentary freedom, I examine the circumstances in which it may be socially beneficial for courts to alter wills, trusts, and other gratuitous transfers at death: imperfect information, negative externalities, and intergenerational equity. These justifications correspond with many existing limitations on the freedom of testation. Yet, disregarding donor intent to maximize the donees’ ex post interests, an increasingly common justification for intervention, is socially undesirable. Doing so ignores important ex ante considerations, including a donor’s happiness, a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest, and the structure and timing of a donor’s gifts. If donors believe courts may not facilitate their intent, donors may be less happy, accumulate less property, and alter gifts during life. Moreover, because the law often affects donor behavior, ignoring donative intent to benefit particular donees may harm not only the donors but also donees as a class. Thus, the living may themselves benefit if the law allows a certain degree of “dead hand” control.

    When the Supreme Court introduced the “secondary effects” doctrine to allow for zoning of adult businesses, critics fell into two camps. Some, like Justice William Brennan, predicted dire consequences for the First Amendment, particularly if the doctrine was used in political speech cases. Others, like Professor Laurence Tribe, predicted secondary effects analysis would be limited to sexually explicit speech and would not threaten the First Amendment. The modern consensus is that the doctrine has, in fact, been limited to cases about sex.

    Recent cases demonstrate, however, that the impact of the secondary effects doctrine on the First Amendment has been broader and more insidious than is generally understood. It is true that courts usually avoid expressly invoking the doctrine outside the adult speech context, instead applying the standard content–neutrality analysis. But that “standard” neutrality analysis has actually been quietly warped over the past three decades by the influence of the secondary effects doctrine. These doctrinal distortions have occurred without anything like the outcry generated by the prospect of express use of the doctrine in political speech cases.

    The results of this doctrinal shift are striking, with some courts treating as “neutral” laws that deliberately discriminate among speakers and messages on public sidewalks, in issuing parade permits, and even in what political messages can be worn on T–shirts.

    This Article (1) describes the manner in which the standard neutrality analysis has been warped by the secondary effects doctrine, (2) demonstrates the dangerous First Amendment effects of those changes by examining several recent cases in which courts have allowed contentbased or even viewpoint–based speech restrictions to stand, and (3) explains how the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts can and should correct this serious First Amendment problem.

    In the spring of 2012, JPMorgan Chase and Co. (JP Morgan), one of the largest and most profitable banks in the United States, made a $6 billion mistake. The issues all began in London, with a division of JP Morgan known as the Chief Investment Office (CIO). While the CIO’s stated purpose was to use excess deposits to hedge against interest rate risk, it had in fact been responsible for earning approximately $4 billion in profits for JP Morgan over the three previous years. This all came to a screeching halt when Bruno Iksil, now known as the “London Whale,” took a series of high–risk positions in derivatives and credit default swaps (CDS). To date the incident has cost JP Morgan billions of dollars in losses and fines and resulted in the criminal prosecution of several individuals involved in the incident.

    Politicians and commentators have held the London Whale incident up as another example of large complex financial institutions behaving badly, and have accordingly pushed for stronger measures to eliminate the implicit subsidies that make such entities and their bad behavior possible. Lacking from this debate has been any meaningful discussion of the impact that explicit subsidies, like deposit insurance, have on the financial system in the United States. This is despite the fact that the funds the CIO used to make such fantastic profits for JP Morgan were federally sponsored deposits. This Note describes how the explicit federal safety net, specifically federally sponsored deposit insurance, contributes to the creation of financial instability and, potentially, financial crisis. This Note then analyzes several proposed reforms that could alleviate these problems, and, while continually advocating for increased attention to this issue, ultimately suggests a system of narrow depository institutions to solve it.

    Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides that when one party in a trial or hearing offers into evidence a portion of a statement in a misleading way, the opposing party can offer the rest, or some other portion of, that document or recorded statement at the same time if it is necessary for the factfinder to understand and contextualize the first part. Sometimes, however, the other portion, or “remainder,” would be inadmissible if it were offered by itself, either because it is hearsay or for some other reason. This leaves the court in a difficult position: Should it allow the remainder to be entered into evidence in violation of some other rule that would exclude it? Or should the court exclude the remainder and allow the initial misleading portion to stand, uncorrected?

    Some circuits have held that Rule 106 must trump the other rules of evidence in order to do its job. These courts admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence for its truth. Other circuits have held that if no independent hearsay exception exists for the remainder, it must be excluded despite Rule 106. Finally, some opinions have suggested that Rule 106 allows the remainder of a statement to be admitted for the narrow purpose of contextualizing the initial misleading portion.

    This Note argues the following: if one party offers a misleading portion of a statement into evidence, the opposing party should be able to offer the remainder, but the jury should only be allowed to use it for context. The evidentiary basis for doing so is not Rule 106, but rather the U.S. Supreme Court case Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, which holds that remainders necessary to correct misleading impressions are automatically relevant for a nonhearsay purpose. The end of this Note offers courts a step–by–step process for judges to follow when ruling on whether to admit remainders.

    Indigent single parents who turn to welfare for financial support must cooperate with their state’s child support enforcement requirements before receiving some or all of their benefits. Single parents are required to provide information about the absent parent because states use the information to pursue the absent parent for child support. While child support helps reduce poverty and increase parental emotional support for children, it can also be very dangerous for some single mothers. The good cause exception exempts parents from child support enforcement when it would be contrary to the “best interests of the child.” Mothers and children who would be physically endangered by contact with the absent father can therefore demonstrate good cause by proving dangerous circumstances, such as those where the child was conceived through rape. But evidentiary standards requiring official or third–party corroboration to satisfy good cause can impose a heavy burden on women who gave birth to a child conceived during rape. Rape is overwhelmingly unreported, and women often hide their rape from friends and family for fear of social stigma. This makes the third–party corroboration requirement more burdensome for rape victims.

    Evidentiary standards to satisfy good cause vary by state. All states accept official documentation, often in the form of records from birth certificates and documentation from medical professionals or law enforcement. The majority of states provide that sworn statements of third parties with knowledge of the circumstances leading to good cause may substantiate the claim. A minority of states, however, articulate polarized approaches, outlining either a more achievable “permissive” approach, or requiring more demanding “restrictive” standards. The minority permissive approach allows for both third–party statements and applicant corroboration, while the minority restrictive approach will not accept anything other than official documentation. This Note argues that states must craft evidentiary requirements that are compatible with victim behavior following sexual assault to properly protect rape victims seeking welfare benefits from the danger of continued contact with their rapist through child support enforcement. The majority and minority restrictive approaches are too limited, as they require the rape victim to have reported or disclosed her rape in order to receive benefits, despite the realities of victim behavior.

    Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased judicial scrutiny. Agency actions are presumptively reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which means they are generally subject to, among other requirements, “arbitrary and capricious” review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) and Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Heckler v. Chaney that agency no–action decisions are presumptively unreviewable because they are “committed to agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Are agency settlements also presumptively unreviewable? In other words, are they more like actions or no–action decisions?

    The Supreme Court has twice analyzed agency settlement decisions but has never reached the “committed to agency discretion by law” question. While the D.C. Circuit has ruled that such settlements are presumptively unreviewable, no other circuit has established binding precedent on the issue, and the Ninth Circuit has reviewed agency settlements in several discrete cases. This Note argues that, based on the criteria put forward in Heckler v. Chaney, agency settlements are not presumptively unreviewable. They are, in short, more like actions than no–action decisions.

    The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel when deciding whether to plead guilty. Defense counsel, therefore, must ensure that his client understands the direct consequences of the plea: the nature of the criminal charge and the sentence. However, pursuant to the traditional collateral consequences rule employed by most courts, counsel has no Sixth Amendment obligation to warn that criminal defendant of so–called collateral consequences, such as mandatory sex offender registration, civil commitment, or ineligibility for parole. Prior to 2010, deportation was also considered a collateral consequence of a guilty plea in most jurisdictions.

    In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court made deportation an exception to the collateral consequences rule, and held for the first time that counsel’s failure to advise a criminal defendant of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Lower courts have differed on whether to interpret Padilla as effecting a change to the collateral consequences rule, and more specifically, how to define direct consequences, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This Note examines the conflict, and concludes that courts should redefine the scope of direct consequences in light of the factors considered by the Court in Padilla.

    Perhaps nothing is more important to a litigant bringing an action in federal court than knowing the relevant pleading standard for his or her underlying claims. Ever since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one of two pleading standards have applied to common law claims: the Rule 8(a)(2) standard, requiring a short and plain statement demonstrating entitlement to relief, or the Rule 9(b) standard, demanding that allegations of fraud or mistake be pled with particularity. At the intersection of these two pleading standards is the common law claim of negligent misrepresentation. Courts across the country have long disagreed over which standard should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims, with divisions present across and within circuits and districts.

    In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court further complicated this issue in the seminal opinion Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which effectively imposed a heightened “plausibility” requirement for claims governed by Rule 8(a)(2). This change has since led some lower courts, but not all, to reconsider which pleading standard to apply to claims of negligent misrepresentation.

    This Note: (1) explores the pleading standards and their evolution with respect to negligent misrepresentation claims; (2) describes the circuit split and intracircuit fractures that have emerged from the different standards; (3) analyzes the significant procedural and substantive problems the competing standards have created, especially in light of Twombly; and (4) offers a possible resolution comporting with the Twombly holding to standardize the pleading of negligent misrepresentation claims across the nation’s federal courts.

    As the internet has become nearly ubiquitous, child pornography possession has become increasingly widespread. Law enforcement efforts to combat the reach of these images have become increasingly aggressive and sophisticated. Sentences have also dramatically increased. As of 2008, the mean sentence for child pornography possession was ninety–two months, with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.

    Circuit courts have confronted child pornography search warrant applications based mainly upon a prior child molestation conviction or enticement of a minor. Evaluating similar fact patterns, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that child molestation or child enticement cannot be used to establish probable cause for a child pornography search warrant because the connection between the two acts is not well established. However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that there is an intuitive relationship between both crimes, which can establish probable cause.

    This four–part Note analyzes the circuit court split using empirical evidence about the connection between child pornography and child molestation. Although it is a relatively new area of study, social science literature has begun to address the connection between possession of child pornography and child molestation. This Note concludes that, given the relative uncertainty in social science literature, more research should be done before reaching the Eighth Circuit’s holding. A prior conviction for child molestation or an attempt to entice a child should not be enough to establish probable cause to search an individual’s home for child pornography.